Parshas Bereshis – 5787 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
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Beginning Shnayim Mikra V’Echad Targum from Minchah Gedolah or Only After Davening Minchah
Q: A very common question regarding the halachos of Shnayim Mikra V’Echad Targum is whether one may begin reading Shnayim Mikra for the coming week from the time of Minchah Gedolah on Shabbos, even if he has not yet heard the Torah reading of the coming parshah, or whether he may begin the new parshah only after hearing its reading at Minchah.
A: The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 285:3) writes: “From Sunday onward, it is considered im hatzibbur — together with the congregation” — regarding the obligation of Shnayim Mikra V’Echad Targum. See Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 7), who explains that since at Minchah on Shabbos we already begin reading the coming week’s parshah, one who begins Shnayim Mikra at that point is once again considered to be reading im hatzibbur. Accordingly, when the Mechaber writes that one may begin “from Sunday,” this is not meant specifically. The Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 8) further cites an opinion that the ideal time to read Shnayim Mikra is on Erev Shabbos. Others, however, maintain that one who reads it from the beginning of the week is also fulfilling the mitzvah in the most ideal manner. The Maaseh Rav likewise records that the Gra would read a portion of the parshah Shnayim Mikra V’Echad Targum each day immediately after davening, completing it on Erev Shabbos. I also personally observed Maran HaGaon Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l, who would read a portion of the parshah each day before davening, continuing in this manner until Erev Shabbos before Minchah. See also Shaar HaTziyun (se’if katan 12), who writes that one certainly fulfills his obligation if he reads Shnayim Mikra from Minchah onward.
The question, however, is what precisely determines when one may begin Shnayim Mikra for the coming week. Is it specifically after he has heard that parshah read at Minchah on Shabbos, or may he begin once the time of Minchah Gedolah has arrived, even though he has not yet heard Krias HaTorah?
First, it appears obvious to me that even if we assume that one may begin Shnayim Mikra from the time of Minchah Gedolah before hearing Krias HaTorah, this would only apply if he has already completed the parshah of the current week. This is because we rule that one should not read a later parshah before completing the earlier one, and doing so would be reading the parshiyos out of order.
The sefer Halichos Chaim (p. 94) cites the opinion of Rav Chaim Kanievsky zt”l that even if the time for Minchah has arrived, if one has not yet davened Minchah, it would appear that he may not begin the mitzvah of Shnayim Mikra for the coming week until he hears its reading at Minchah. However, Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah (42:60), in the footnote there, writes that it would seem that according to the Rishonim who maintain that one may complete the parshah from the time of Minchah onward, this means from the time of Minchah Gedolah, since at that point the new parshah is already fit to be read.
The sefer Bikkurei Chaim (Chapter 2) cites the author of Meor HaShabbos shlit”a as being uncertain whether this depends simply on the arrival of the time for the Minchah Torah reading, even if the individual himself did not participate in the reading, or whether he must actually daven Minchah and hear the Torah reading.
Furthermore, the Ketzos HaShulchan (siman 72), in Badei HaShulchan (se’if katan 7), writes that according to the Rishonim who maintain that one may complete the previous week’s parshah only until Minchah on Shabbos, if he has already davened Minchah with a minyan and heard Krias HaTorah, or if there is only one minyan available to him and they have already davened Minchah, or even if all the batei knessiyos in the city have already davened Minchah although he himself did not daven with them, he can no longer be considered as completing the previous parshah im hatzibbur. According to this reasoning, in our case as well, under such circumstances one would indeed be considered to be reading the coming parshah im hatzibbur. See also Shu”t Minchas Chen, Vol. II (siman 17, os 5), who discusses this matter at length and rules that one should be stringent and wait until he actually hears the coming parshah during Krias HaTorah at Minchah, rather than relying on the arrival of the time of Minchah Gedolah. My rebbi, Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, likewise ruled this way for me.
I have also heard from several Morei Horaah shlit”a that, in practice, one should be stringent and not begin the coming week’s Shnayim Mikra until he has heard Krias HaTorah at Minchah. According to this view, it is not sufficient that the tzibbur has already begun hearing the new parshah from the time of Minchah Gedolah. However, Maran Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l, however, ruled that one may read Shnayim Mikra from the time of Minchah Gedolah. Since the tzibbur has already begun the new parshah, this is considered im hatzibbur, and there is no reason to require one to wait until they have completed the Torah reading. Since the leading poskim differ on this issue, I generally rule that one who wishes to be lenient certainly has whom to rely upon. Nevertheless, one who is able to wait and follow the more stringent opinions should preferably do so. Ultimately, it depends upon the individual circumstances and whether it appears that he will have sufficient time to complete the parshah during the coming week.
Bending an Aluminum Pan — Does This Make It Considered a Utensil Made by a Jew?
Q: I know that there are several opinions regarding whether disposable aluminum pans require tevilas keilim. According to the Igros Moshe, the issue arises only if one intends to use the pan several times. Some are stringent after the first use, while others are lenient. My question is whether, in order to avoid any question of an obligation to tovel the pan, it would help for a Jew to bend the pan until it is unusable and then straighten it out again. Could this be considered as though the Jew made the utensil, thereby exempting it from tevilah even if it will subsequently be used many times?
A: It appears obvious to me that this is not considered an act of craftsmanship performed by a Jew, and consequently it accomplishes nothing with regard to tevilas keilim. I have likewise heard this from several leading Morei Horaah shlit”a. However, I saw that Shu”t Emek HaTeshuvah, Vol. VIII (siman 92), was asked regarding these thin utensils manufactured by a non-Jew whether there is a basis to permit their use if a Jew bends them and subsequently straightens them out again. The reasoning for such a possibility is that the obligation to tovel a utensil manufactured by a non-Jew results from the act of manufacture performed by the non-Jew. Thus, if the Jew nullifies the non-Jew’s act, perhaps the original manufacture is considered nullified. This could be compared to bishul akum: if a non-Jew places a pot on the fire and a Jew subsequently removes it and places it back on the fire, the cooking is no longer considered to have been performed through the act of a non-Jew. Perhaps the same principle applies here.
Furthermore, this halachah is not comparable to tumah, where the status depends upon the object’s susceptibility to tumah. If a utensil is broken and then repaired, it may once again become fit to receive tumah, and one can say that it has returned to its original status. With regard to tevilas keilim, however, the matter depends upon the act through which the utensil was made. Once it has subsequently been made into a utensil through the act of a Jew, the obligation of tevilah should no longer apply. He therefore concludes that, halachah lemaaseh, with such a utensil it is effective to nullify the original act of the non-Jew by bending it and subsequently straightening it. This is considered a repair or completion performed by a Jew, and the utensil would therefore be exempt from tevilah.
However, see Shu”t Cheshev HaEphod, Vol. III (siman 70), who writes that a prominent Rav ruled that if one bends such a utensil and subsequently straightens it, its original status as a utensil manufactured by a non-Jew is nullified, and it becomes considered a Jewish-made utensil that is exempt from tevilah. The author himself, however, writes that he finds this difficult to accept. Pressing the sides of such a pan inward, even to a minor degree, can hardly be viewed as nullifying its status as a utensil. The very nature of these utensils is that they can be bent and then straightened again without any concern. This can happen even to brand-new pans at the time of purchase. The accepted practice has already become that if one purchases these pans for disposable, one-time use, they are not toveled, based upon the ruling of the Gaon, the author of Igros Moshe. However, if one intends to use such a pan repeatedly, the accepted practice is to tovel it. The author concludes that he sees no reason to disagree with this practice.
I subsequently found that in the same work (siman 115), in the notes of the author’s son zt”l, os 3, he cites his father’s position that bending the utensil does not nullify its status as a utensil at all. He further adds that the Pri Megadim (O.C. 451, Mishbetzos Zahav, se’if katan 6) writes that one who purchases a sheet of metal from a non-Jew, makes a hole in it, and turns it into a rib eizen, should tovel it without a berachah. Only when one purchases raw silver from a non-Jew and fashions it into a goblet is it exempt from tevilah, because an entirely new entity has come into existence. Changing a sheet of metal into a rib eizen, however, is not considered a sufficiently significant transformation, and it therefore still requires tevilah. Accordingly, if even such a change is not sufficiently significant to exempt a utensil from tevilah, then certainly merely bending an aluminum pan cannot be considered a sufficient transformation to exempt it from tevilah — even if we were to assume that while it is bent it temporarily loses its halachic status as a utensil. This follows the reasoning of the Pri Megadim cited above.
Practical Corner:
By Rabbi Nesanel Odzer from the Rabbanim of Beis Horaah KLY
When Finding a Blood Spot in an Egg
Q: This is one of the most common questions that people know is a question, but are confused about the basic halachah:
If I crack an egg and find a blood spot, must I throw away the entire egg, or can I simply remove the blood? What if I already poured the egg into a cake or other food and only afterward remembered that it contained a blood spot? Must the entire mixture now be discarded?
A: There is an important distinction between a fertilized egg and an egg produced without a rooster, which Chazal refer to as safna de’ara.
When an egg is fertilized, a blood spot can potentially be connected to the beginning of development. The Shulchan Aruch therefore distinguishes between where in the egg the blood is found. In certain locations, only the blood must be removed and the rest of the egg remains permitted, while in other locations the blood prohibits the entire egg. The Rema writes that the accepted custom is to be stringent whenever blood is found and to prohibit the entire egg, without distinguishing between the different locations of the blood spot (Yoreh Deah 66:3). An egg produced without a rooster is different. Since it can never develop, a blood spot does not have the same status. The Shulchan Aruch rules that such an egg remains permitted, although the blood itself must be removed (YD 66:7; see Shach 66:14). The Pischei Teshuvah likewise writes that in a safna de’ara egg, only the blood is prohibited, while the egg itself remains permitted (Pischei Teshuvah 66:2). Nevertheless, Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that when a blood spot is found in an individual egg, the accepted practice is to discard the entire egg. Although the basic halachah of an unfertilized egg would permit the egg after removing the blood, since an individual egg is inexpensive, the custom is to be stringent and throw it away (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah I:36). That is all when the egg is still by itself. Once it has already been mixed into other food, the halachah is different. If the egg was actually fertilized and the blood was of the type that prohibits the entire egg, the prohibited egg would require sixty times its volume in the mixture in order to be nullified.
However, if it was a safna de’ara egg, the egg itself was never prohibited. The Shulchan Aruch rules that when the blood is of a type that does not prohibit the egg, and one forgot to remove it before mixing the egg into other food, the mixture is permitted (YD 66:5). The Pischei Teshuvah specifically applies this to safna de’ara: once the egg and its blood have been mixed in, the mixture is permitted.
Rav Moshe goes even further. He writes that in such a case one does not even require a majority of permitted food against the egg. He explains that the overwhelming majority of commercial eggs are produced without roosters, and therefore, according to the basic halachah, we follow the majority and assume that an ordinary egg is safna de’ara. One need not be concerned that this particular egg was fertilized unless there is some reason to know otherwise (Igros Moshe, YD I:36). That commercial reality remains the norm today: the vast majority of ordinary supermarket eggs are produced from laying flocks in which roosters are generally not present. Therefore, if a blood-spotted ordinary commercial egg was accidentally poured into a cake or other food before the mistake was remembered, the mixture is permitted and does not need to be discarded.
Summary: An individual commercial egg with a blood spot should be discarded in accordance with the accepted practice. However, if it was already accidentally mixed into other food, we rely on the fact that ordinary commercial eggs are overwhelmingly safna de’ara. The mixture is therefore permitted, even without sixty, and Rav Moshe rules that one does not even require a majority against the egg.