Parshas Haazinu – 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Ask The Rav
Wearing the Clothing of Non-Jews- The Prohibition of “You Shall Not Follow Their Ways”
Q: Does one transgress the prohibition of You Shall not follow in the ways of the goyim, by wearing clothing that is the style of the goyim?
A: We find three pesukim in the Torah that relate to the prohibition of “U’vchukoseihem lo seileichu”—“You shall not follow their ways”—yet the Monei HaMitzvos count them as only one prohibition. The Rambam brings this in Sefer HaMitzvos (Lo Sa’aseh 30) and in Hilchos Avodah Zarah (11:1), where he writes: “We may not follow the practices of the non-Jews or imitate them, neither in clothing nor in hairstyles and the like, as it says, ‘You shall not follow the practices of the nation’… and it says, ‘You shall not follow their ways,’ and it says, ‘Beware lest you be ensnared after them.’ All of these are referring to one matter: He warns us not to imitate them. Rather, a Jew must be distinct from them and recognizable by his clothing and his other actions, just as he is distinct from them in his knowledge and outlook.
The Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 262) explains that the reason for this prohibition is because they have strayed from following Hashem and worship idolatry.
In the Shu”t Maharik (Shoresh 88), he was asked about a particular garment called a kapa, which doctors were accustomed to wearing, and whether a Jewish doctor was prohibited from wearing it because of the prohibition against imitating their clothing. His ruling was codified by the Rema (Y.D. 178:1), who added to the Shulchan Aruch’s ruling that one may not wear clothing that is unique to them. The Rema writes that this prohibition applies only to something that non-Jews adopted for purposes of immodesty—for example, wearing red garments, which were the clothing of noblemen and similar forms of immodest dress—or to something that they adopted as a custom or practice without any reason, in which case there is concern that it falls under Darchei HaEmori and contains a vestige of the idolatry of their ancestors. However, something that they adopted for a practical benefit—for example, where it is customary that every expert doctor wears a distinctive garment that identifies him as a professional doctor—is permitted. Likewise, something worn for reasons of honor or another legitimate purpose is permitted.
The Vilna Gaon (Y.D. 178:7), however, challenges the Maharik: Why should this fall under the prohibition of “U’vchukoseihem lo seileichu” in the first place? It is not a strange practice without a reason, nor does it violate the boundaries of modesty. Thus, according to the Maharik, who maintains that the prohibition applies only when one of these two concerns exists, there should be no prohibition here.
The Vilna Gaon therefore disagrees with the Maharik in halachah. He maintains that practices adopted for the sake of idolatry are prohibited even if they are already mentioned in the Torah, while other practices that they have adopted remain included in Chukos HaAkum, even if there is a reason for their practice, unless the practice is already explicitly mentioned in the Torah.
The Tiferes Yisrael in Sanhedrin (7:3, Boaz, os 1) resolves the Vilna Gaon’s question on the Maharik by explaining that since non-Jews punish murderers in this manner because they believe that their idolatry commanded them to do so, it is prohibited for us to perform a mitzvah of burning in the same manner that they do. This constitutes a practice associated with idolatry. See also Shu”t Maharam Shik (Y.D. 165) for an explanation of the Maharik’s approach.
In Igros Moshe (Y.D. I:81), Rav Moshe Feinstein further clarifies the parameters of the prohibition regarding clothing. He was asked about people from Poland who had been accustomed to wearing clothing that differed from the clothing worn by non-Jews in Poland. After coming to America, however, they found that there was no distinction between the clothing worn by Jews and non-Jews. Were they required to continue wearing their former clothing because of Chukos HaAkum? He writes that there is no prohibition of wearing the clothing of non-Jews in such a case, because virtually all Jews wear these garments. If so, who says that these should be considered “the clothing of non-Jews”? Why not say that from the outset they were never designated exclusively for non-Jews, but were also established as clothing for Jews? According to this, even according to the Vilna Gaon’s approach, it would be permitted to wear such clothing, since it is not considered “the clothing of non-Jews.”
It emerges that there are virtually no commonly worn garments today about which there should be a concern of violating “U’vchukoseihem lo seileichu.”
Today, most contemporary poskim have followed the reasoning of Igros Moshe and permit wearing clothing that is also worn by non-Jews.
Hatzalah Volunteers Who Respond to a Call in the Middle of Shemoneh Esrei
Q: I was asked by Hatzalah members who responded to a call in the middle of Shemoneh Esrei and were away for approximately an hour, but remember exactly where they were holding in their tefillah: Must they begin Shemoneh Esrei again from the beginning, or may they continue from the brachah where they stopped? They also asked about other interruptions that occur in the middle of Pesukei D’Zimrah or Birchos Krias Shema.
A: It is clear from the words of the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 104) that if a Hatzalah member interrupted his Shemoneh Esrei, if he did not remain silent for enough time to recite the entire Shemoneh Esrei, he returns to the beginning of the brachah in which he interrupted. In the first three and final three brachos, he returns to the beginning of that section. However, if the interruption lasted long enough to recite the entire Shemoneh Esrei, he must return to the beginning of Shemoneh Esrei. The halachah regarding an interruption during Shemoneh Esrei is more stringent, since there are those who rule that in every case one must return to the beginning. This is also evident from the Mishnah Berurah (104:16). The reason is that any interruption during Shemoneh Esrei is considered a significant interruption. Regarding someone who left in the middle of Pesukei D’Zimrah, he returns to the place where he stopped. See also the Mishnah Berurah (51:7), who writes that if one interrupted in the middle, when he resumes he should recite the pesukim that precede Vayevarech David. He should then say:“Baruch Hashem le’olam amen v’amen, Baruch Hashem miTzion shochein Yerushalayim, Baruch Hashem Elokim Elokei Yisrael oseh niflaos levado, u’varuch shem kevodo l’olam v’yimalei kevodo es kol ha’aretz amen v’amen.” Through this, it is considered as though he recited a brachah both before and after Pesukei D’Zimrah.
It is important to point out to Hatzalah members that if they leave in the middle of davening after Baruch She’amar, they may not engage in permitted conversation that is unrelated to the Hatzalah operation, since they have already reached Baruch She’amar, after which one may not interrupt with speech.
Catching a Mosquito or Bee with a Cup on Shabbos
Q: I was asked a common question regarding Shabbos Kodesh. A person notices that a mosquito has entered his home. There is no concern of an allergy or anything similar; the only concern is discomfort to the body and disturbance of one’s peace of mind. Is there room to be lenient and cover the mosquito with a cup in order to trap it until after Shabbos?
A: It appears that this question should be divided into several different cases. First of all, if there is a concern of an allergy or something similar that could potentially lead to pikuach nefesh, then it is certainly permissible to trap the insect, and it is also permissible to kill it in such a situation. This is explained in the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 316:10). See also Shemiras Shabbos K’hilchasa (25:1). A mosquito, fly, or similar insect that is flying around the house and disturbing one’s peace of mind may not be trapped on Shabbos. The reason is that the Sages did not permit a rabbinic prohibition of trapping when one’s intention is merely to remove the creature from himself, except in a case where there is bodily discomfort because the creature will bite him. This is explained by the Mishnah Berurah (316:37) regarding a flea: because of the discomfort caused by its bite, the Sages did not impose the rabbinic prohibition of trapping. However, when there is only tza’ar hanefesh—mental distress—and not bodily discomfort, they did not permit trapping, even though the trapping involved here is only rabbinic, since these creatures are not generally trapped for use.
Similarly, regarding a cockroach or other insects that enter a home, even when they cause panic or anxiety among the members of the household, their trapping was not permitted. Only where there is bodily discomfort, such as with a flea that bites when it is on one’s body, does the Shulchan Aruch permit trapping it. Where there is no bodily discomfort, trapping is not permitted, and it is likewise forbidden to kill the insect for this reason, as explained in the Biur Halachah (s.v. Mutar). The only case in which killing was permitted is a louse, since there is both bodily discomfort and ma’us—disgust—when it is generated by human sweat. In such a case, Chazal permitted killing it. A cockroach and other insects, however, may not be killed for this reason. Similarly, in such a case, even a bee flying around the house may not be trapped merely because there is a concern that it may sting. Regarding a flea, the halachic permission to trap it applies only when it is on one’s body or inside one’s clothing, not when it is simply flying around the house.
Nevertheless, in the case under discussion, where a mosquito is present in the house on Friday night and the person knows that one of his children will be bitten—and certainly in a case where it appears almost certain that someone in the house will be bitten, causing them genuine discomfort based on past experience—it would seem that there is room to permit trapping it.
The Shulchan Aruch (316:9) rules that if a flea is on one’s flesh and biting him, it is permissible to trap it, although it is forbidden to kill it. The poskim, as brought in the Mishnah Berurah there, explain that because of the discomfort caused by the bite, Chazal did not impose the rabbinic prohibition of trapping, since the creature is not generally trapped for use. Therefore, one may trap it and dispose of it. The Taz (316:8) permits trapping the flea even when it is inside one’s garment, since it is likely to come to bite him. From this, we can derive the halachah in our case: if a person knows that when there is a mosquito in his house at night, one of his children will wake up in the morning having been bitten, this is comparable to a flea that is on one’s flesh, for which trapping is permitted. The difference is that in the case of a flea, it is only when it is on one’s body or inside his clothing that it is likely to bite him. Regarding a mosquito, however, even when it is flying around the house, it is effectively considered as though it is already on his body, and therefore it should be permitted to trap it, although it remains forbidden to kill it, as explained in the Mishnah Berurah (316:38). This leniency is likewise endorsed in the sefer Meir Nesivos (316).
Practical Corner:
By Rabbi Nesanel Odzer from the Rabbanim of Beis Horaah KLY
Can I Eat Dunkin Donuts During Aseres Yimei Teshuvah?
Q: Can I eat Dunkin Donuts, with a reliable hechsher of course, during Aseres Yimei Teshuvah?
A: Before discussing the question, two clarifications are important. First, this discussion is not intended to advocate relying on pas palter. Rather, we are discussing the halachah for one who generally follows the accepted lenient opinions regarding pas palter during the year. Second, we are not addressing the kashrus status of any particular Dunkin’ location or product. The discussion assumes that the particular donut has a reliable hechsher and focuses only on the question of Pas Yisrael. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 603:1) writes that even one who is not careful about pas akum during the year should be careful during Aseres Yimei Teshuvah. Thus, even one who ordinarily relies on the heter of pas palter should preferably eat only Pas Yisrael during these days. But does this apply to a donut? The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 112:2) permits commercially baked pas palter when Pas Yisrael is unavailable, while the Rema brings the more lenient opinion permitting it even where Pas Yisrael is available. The Shach (ibid. s.k. 9) writes that although the accepted practice follows this leniency, it is preferable to be machmir where Pas Yisrael is available, unless the pas palter is of significantly better quality.
The question, then, is whether a deep-fried donut is halachically considered bread at all. This depends on a major machlokes Rishonim regarding thick dough that is subsequently cooked or fried. Rabbeinu Tam, together with many other Rishonim, maintains that thick dough (blilah avah) retains the status of bread even when it is later cooked or fried (Tosafos, Berachos 37b, s.v. Lechem ha’asui l’kutach; Tosafos, Pesachim 37b, s.v. d’kulei alma). Rabbeinu Shimshon, together with many other Rishonim, disagrees and maintains that when dough was made from the outset with the intention that it be cooked or fried, it does not receive the halachic status of bread. The Tur discusses this broad machlokes both in Hilchos Challah (Y.D. 329) and in Hilchos Brachos (O.C. 168).
Regarding challah, the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 329:3) rules that such dough is exempt. The Shach (ibid. s.k. 4), however, writes that because many Rishonim disagree, it is proper to separate challah without a brachah.
We find the same basic issue regarding brachos. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 168:13) brings both opinions regarding thick dough that was cooked or fried. According to one opinion its brachah is Mezonos, while according to the other it remains Hamotzi. The accepted practice is to be lenient and recite Mezonos, although the Shulchan Aruch writes that a yerei Shamayim should satisfy both opinions by eating it only after making Hamotzi on ordinary bread. Accordingly, although this is a significant machlokes Rishonim, me’ikar hadin fried dough is not treated as bread.
It would therefore seem that one who relies on pas palter during the year may rely on this accepted lenient ruling regarding fried dough during Aseres Yimei Teshuvah as well. Being that avoiding pas palter during these days is itself an added chumrah, while a deep-fried donut me’ikar hadin is not considered bread, there is a basis to eat such a donut even if it is not Pas Yisrael. Indeed, Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl ruled to us that one who is meikel regarding pas palter throughout the year may also be meikel regarding such donuts during Aseres Yimei Teshuvah.
One final point: a dairy donut may present a separate question regarding cholov akum. That is an entirely separate halachic discussion and is beyond the scope of this Dvar Torah. The above addresses only Pas Yisrael and assumes that the particular product bears a reliable hechsher and meets all other applicable kashrus requirements.