Parshas Re’eh – 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Ask The Rav
May a Photographer Publish Wedding Photos Without the Couple’s Permission?
Q: A chosson and kallah hired a photographer to photograph their wedding. Sometime later, they visited his studio and discovered that a large portrait of themselves was prominently displayed in the storefront and featured on the photographer’s website. They strongly objected, insisting that they did not want their images publicly displayed. The photographer responded that the photograph was his property and that he was therefore entitled to use it however he wished. Is he correct, or may a person prevent the publication of his image without consent?
A: It is well known that the Chazon Ish zt”l strongly objected to being photographed, and his brother-in-law, the Steipler Gaon zt”l, likewise protested vigorously whenever someone attempted to photograph him.
Nevertheless, it has become common practice to photograph people even without their explicit consent. While this may often be accepted in practice, it is certainly not appropriate to make use of another person’s image against his wishes.
In my sefer Ohel Yaakov (Hilchos Avodah Zarah), I noted that contemporary poskim dispute whether a person has the halachic right to prohibit others from photographing him.
Regarding our case, where the photographs have already been taken and the photographer now wishes to publish them, Harav Yitzchak Zilberstein shlit”a cites a fascinating exchange involving Harav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld zt”l.
The argument presented against publication was that “one may not conduct business with another person’s property”—the photographer should not profit from someone else’s likeness without permission.
Rav Sonnenfeld, however, responded that the photograph is not the subject’s property, but rather the photographer’s own creation. Just as an artist who paints another person’s portrait owns the painting, so too the photographer owns the photograph he produced.
At the same time, Rav Zilberstein notes that when the couple hired the photographer, they certainly did not intend to authorize him to cause them embarrassment or emotional distress through public display of their wedding pictures.
Under certain circumstances, they may even have grounds to claim that the agreement was entered into under mistaken assumptions (mekach ta’us), potentially entitling them to cancel the arrangement—although doing so would likely require returning all of the wedding photographs.
Regardless of the legal ownership of the images, publicly displaying them against the wishes of the subjects violates the spirit of “V’ahavta l’rei’acha kamocha” and the principle of “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.”
One should not earn a livelihood by causing distress to another.
Even if the photographer cannot be compelled in beis din to remove the images, he may nevertheless bear responsibility in the eyes of Heaven.
Several contemporary poskim have ruled that if publication of a photograph causes embarrassment or discomfort, the person depicted has the right to object and demand that it not be published.
Likewise, one may insist that his photograph not appear in publications or media outlets that he considers inappropriate.
May One Replace Drinks Taken from a Hotel Minibar Instead of Paying the Hotel Price?
Q: A guest staying in a hotel found a minibar in his room stocked with soft drinks, beer, wine, and other beverages available for purchase. The hotel’s policy is to charge guests several dollars for each bottle consumed. During his stay he became very thirsty but did not wish to pay the inflated hotel price. He therefore considered drinking one of the bottles and later purchasing an identical bottle from a nearby store for about one dollar, replacing the hotel’s bottle before checking out.
Since he ultimately returned the very same product, would this be permissible, or is it considered theft?
A: Anyone who takes another person’s property without permission and uses it is considered a thief, even if he intends to return an identical item afterward.
Accordingly, one may not drink beverages from a hotel minibar without paying for them, since the hotel owner clearly intends to profit from those sales and objects to guests helping themselves without payment.
This principle is stated explicitly in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 366:3), which rules that one who borrows another person’s property without permission assumes the status of a thief and bears full responsibility for the item until it is properly returned.
The Sma explains that this applies even if the item was taken from the owner’s adult son with permission, since the property still belongs to the father. Likewise, even if the item was originally entrusted to a minor by the owner, taking it without authorization still constitutes unauthorized borrowing.
Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchos Metziah U’Pikadon §27) rules that one may not enter another person’s home and read from his sefer without permission, even if he is certain no damage will occur. Unauthorized use itself is prohibited unless it is assumed that the owner would willingly allow it, such as in certain mitzvah situations.
Therefore, one who intentionally drinks from the hotel minibar with the plan of replacing the bottle later has nevertheless committed an act of theft by using the hotel’s property without permission.
However, if someone already drank a bottle and only afterward decided to replace it with an identical bottle purchased elsewhere, returning an equivalent item fulfills his obligation of restitution.
Since the hotel has suffered no financial loss, he is not required to pay anything beyond replacing what he took.
This follows the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 363:3), which states that one who unlawfully uses another person’s animal and then returns it unharmed has indeed violated a prohibition, but owes no additional compensation once the property has been restored intact.
Learning Mishnayos for Multiple Neshamos After Accepting Payment
Q: I have been asked many times about someone who is hired to learn Mishnayos l’ilui nishmas a deceased relative. If he would also like to dedicate the same learning to another recently departed individual, may one session of learning serve both neshamos, or must he learn the Mishnayos twice?
A: It would appear that this question is comparable to a discussion among the Acharonim regarding someone who is paid to recite Kaddish.
May he recite one Kaddish on behalf of two deceased individuals, or must each neshamah receive its own Kaddish?
Some Poskim maintain that a single recitation benefits both, while others require a separate Kaddish for each. See Shu”t Maharsham (Vol. II, §29), Igros Moshe (Yoreh Deah I, §224), and Minchas Yitzchak (Vol. III, §144).
Because of this disagreement, some authorities rule that lechatchilah one should not intend the same learning for multiple neshamos.
Naturally, if he learns the Mishnayos more than once, each additional session may certainly be dedicated to another soul.
Nevertheless, since learning Mishnayos would appear analogous to reciting Kaddish, and there are authorities who permit one Kaddish to benefit multiple neshamos, it would seem that one may likewise dedicate a single session of Mishnayos to more than one departed individual.
An important distinction should be noted, however.
When someone is being paid specifically to learn on behalf of a particular person’s parents, the one providing payment has the right to expect that the learning be dedicated exclusively to them, especially in light of those authorities who require separate learning for each neshamah.
Even so, if the learner already dedicated the Mishnayos to multiple neshamos, he may retain the payment and need not inform the one who hired him.
As explained by the Minchas Yitzchak (Vol. III, §144), once he is already in possession of the payment, he may rely upon the opinions that hold one act of remembrance benefits multiple souls.
A further distinction applies where no payment is involved.
It is common in a house of mourning for visitors to accept upon themselves to complete a masechta or another portion of Mishnayos as part of a communal siyum l’ilui nishmas the deceased.
In such a case, where one voluntarily undertakes the learning without payment or specific conditions, he need only complete the learning by the designated time while intending it for the deceased.
He may simultaneously have in mind another relative or additional neshamos as well.
This, too, is the ruling I heard from my rebbe, Harav Avigdor Nebenzahl, shlita.
May Tissue Boxes Be Placed on the Bimah?
Q: I have been asked on numerous occasions about a common sight in many batei knesses. Tissue boxes are often left on the tables, and some people even place them on top of the bimah. Is this permitted, or is it improper to place ordinary objects on an item that serves as a tashmish kedushah?
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 154:8) rules that when constructing an Aron Kodesh or other articles used for a Sefer Torah, one may stipulate from the outset that they may also be used for ordinary purposes.
The Rema adds that it has long been the accepted custom to derive certain incidental benefits from sacred articles, such as the cloths covering sefarim, synagogue tables, and Torah mantles.
The reason given is that since this practice became widespread and it is difficult to prevent entirely, Beis Din is considered to have made this stipulation on behalf of the community from the outset.
The Mishnah Berurah (141:4), quoting the Eliyah Rabbah, writes that a ba’al korei should not lean on the covering placed upon the reading table, since it has the status of a tashmish kedushah.
Leaning on the table itself, however, is permitted.
Shu”t Beis Yehudah (§27) explains that this implicit stipulation applies only to uses that have become accepted communal practice, such as placing sefarim on the bimah or leaning upon it.
Uses that are uncommon cannot be permitted on this basis unless an explicit condition was made when the item was first dedicated.
This ruling is likewise accepted by Shu”t Az Nidberu (Vol. III, §49).
Since placing tissue boxes on tables in shul and even on the bimah has become a widespread and accepted practice, there is room to rely upon this principle, and it may be permitted.