Parshas Behar Bechukosai 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Ask The Rav
May A Yeshivah or Seminary Assist a Lender by Admitting Students at His Request?
Q: I was asked by a successful and wealthy individual, who has connec-tions with prominent yeshivos and seminaries. From time to time, he lends substantial sums to these institutions in order to assist them. He is accus-tomed, however, to request in return that they accept certain boys or girls into their yeshivos or seminaries, particularly since they feel a sense of grati-tude toward him and comply with his wishes.
Is there a concern of ribbis in such an arrangement?
A: The Poskim discuss this question. The question is as follows: since the yeshivah is dependent upon him and his generous loans, the lender may lev-erage his relationship with the administration to pressure them into accepting a student, for example, the son of an acquaintance whom they would other-wise prefer not to admit for various reasons. Such influence over admissions has tangible monetary value, as parents would even be willing to pay consid-erable sums to secure acceptance for their child into a desired institution. If so, it could be argued that the lender has received a benefit equivalent to money, effectively constituting ribbis in exchange for his loan. Now, this would not constitute ribbis d’oraisa, as it is a delayed benefit (ribbis me’ucheres). Nevertheless, the question remains whether it would be assur m’drabanan. In Shu”t Veyishma Moshe, this very issue is addressed. He cites several leading Poskim who were inclined to be lenient, explaining that since the lender did not stipulate at the time of the loan that he would receive influence over admissions, it does not constitute ribbis. Furthermore, since this is for the sake of a mitzvah — helping a student gain admission to a Torah institution — there is additional basis for leniency, as noted in Shul-chan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 160:18). However, reliance on the factor of it being a mitzvah alone is not universally accepted, as not every case clearly quali-fies, and each situation must be evaluated individually. Additionally, the Mishneh LaMelech (Hilchos Malveh V’Loveh 7:11) discusses whether “benefit” (tovas hana’ah) is considered to be monetary value, with the prac-tical ramification being whether it would be considered ribbis in such cases. After presenting differing views, he concludes that if no condition was made at the time of the loan, and only afterward the lender seeks to provide some benefit, then according to the view that it is not considered monetary value, it would be permitted. Applying this to our case: since the lender did not stipulate this condition at the time of the loan, and only afterward requests this favor, and especially since it is for a mitzvah purpose, there is room to permit it. HaGaon R’ Dov Landau shlit”a added another point of leniency. If we were to view the yeshivah’s administrator as having personal ownership over the institution’s assets, one might argue that accepting a student at the lender’s request constitutes a personal benefit given in exchange for the loan. However, in reality, the administrator does not possess personal financial ownership of the yeshivah. He himself did not receive the loan; rather, the institution did. The yeshivah’s desire to maintain a positive relationship with the lender is an institutional concern, not a personal financial transaction. Therefore, this does not fall under the prohibition of ribbis between lender and borrower.
On the other hand, HaGaon Rav Pinchas Vind shlit”a maintained that there is indeed a concern of ribbis in such cases, depending on several factors:
- Whether an active loan currently exists: If the yeshivah presently owes money to the individual, the concern is more severe than if no debt exists and they merely hope for future assistance.
- The nature of the student: If the student is a good student and has been accepted elsewhere, and the parents simply prefer this particular yeshi-vah, the benefit is less clearly monetary. However, if the student is a prob-lematic student and the administration is reluctant to accept him due to antic-ipated challenges, then accepting him constitutes a clear and significant monetary benefit to the lender.
- Explicit acknowledgment of pressure: If the Rosh Yeshivah states open-ly that he is agreeing only because he cannot refuse the lender, this strength-ens the concern, as he is making it clear that it is due to the loan.
In practice: A recommended approach is for the lender not to make such requests directly. Instead, he should send a third party to convey to the yeshivah’s administration that, although he does not wish to impose such requests due to concerns of ribbis, nevertheless, it would make him very happy if they were to accept the boy, and he respectfully asks that they re-consider the matter. When doing it in this indirect approach, combined with the fact that it is for the sake of a mitzvah — particularly nowadays, where a boy without a yeshivah placement and left to wander is pikuach nefesh in a spiritual sense — there is room for leniency.
Traveling by Taxi to Avoid Improper Sights — May One Pay with Ma’aser Funds?
Q: I was asked by a certain baal chessed who strives to overcome the chal-lenges of our generation in the area of guarding one’s eyes, which is a fre-quent test for him on his daily commute to work in Manhattan. He therefore wishes to travel specifically by Uber, rather than by bus or train, in order to avoid exposure to immodest and inappropriate sights that are more prevalent on public transportation or while walking. His question is whether he may pay for the taxi using maaser funds.
A: To address this question, we must first determine whether there is an obli-gation to incur expenses in order to avoid exposure to immodesty. The Ge-mara in Bava Basra (57b) teaches that if there exists an alternative route (darka acharina), even if one closes his eyes while passing through an area of immodesty, he is still considered a rasha if he chooses that path. The im-plication is that one must take the alternative route even if it is less conven-ient or longer. This is codified in Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21:1). Ac-cordingly, if traveling by bus, train, or on foot presents issues of immodesty, and taking a taxi would avoid them, it would depend on the following. If the additional cost of the taxi is significant, one is not obligated to incur that expense, and it is considered as though no viable alternative route exists. This is the ruling of Rav Aharon Leib Shteinman zt”l (cited in Shalmei Torah, os 36). However, if the additional cost is minimal, then one is obligated to choose the taxi, since an alternative route does exist. In our case, where avoiding improper sights constitutes a mitzvah, and this is the true desire of the questioner, it would appear that he may use maaser funds to cover the portion of the taxi fare that exceeds what he would have paid in any case for public transportation. This ruling was confirmed to me by HaGaon Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, and other contem-porary poskim concurred. The reasoning is explained in Shu”t Meishiv Nevoneim (Vol. 6, siman 48): this expense is not an absolute obligation for which he would not be permitted to use maaser money, but rather a mitzvah expenditure. Many authorities permit using maaser funds for mitzvah purposes (see Yoreh Deah 249:1, in the words of the Rema, Taz, and Shach). Accordingly, there is clear basis for leniency. Further-more, even if one has already followed this practice three times, which according to some opinions may create a status akin to a vow, the Aru-gas HaBosem writes that this applies only to funds that have already been formally designated as maaser. Funds not yet set aside are not sub-ject to this concern, as they are considered davar shelo ba la’olam. Therefore, if one knows that taking a taxi will significantly assist him in watching his eyes, and he has no practical alternative other than to rely on maaser funds for the additional expense, he may do so.
“Mitzvah Kinder” Dolls: May One Employ Non-Jews to Manufacture Them?
Q: I have been asked many times regarding children’s figurines produced by companies owned by Jews, who hire non-Jewish work-ers to manufacture these figurines fashioned in the likeness of Jew-ish figures — for example, a man with a beard, peyos, and a shtreimel, or a woman with a head covering, and the like — mar-keted under names such as “Mitzvah Kinder” and the like. The question raised is as follows: There are two prohibitions regard-ing a human image 1) The prohibition of keeping a human form. 2) The prohibition of creating a human form. If so, how is it permissible for a Jew to request that a non-Jew transgress an issur d’oraisa for the sake of livelihood? This matter requires serious analysis.
A: In order to answer this question, it is important to dis-tinguish between these prohibitions. In my sefer Ohel Yaakov, Hilchos Avodah Zarah, I cited Acharonim who main-tain that dolls that are intended for play are permitted to keep in one’s home, since the entire concern is lest they be used for idolatry, items designated for play do not raise such a concern, as people do not worship them. Accordingly, leading Poskim have ruled that one may keep such dolls at their home without defacing them, based on the Chochmas Adam and other Acharonim that items made for play are not of concern. Although some are strict and require that the doll be defaced to permit keeping them, the accepted ruling follows the lenient opinions. However, all of this addresses only the prohibition of keeping — mean-ing, it is permitted to purchase items that have already been produced, as there is no issue of lifnei iver, since the non-Jew manufactures them independently in a factory. The more difficult question, however, is how it is permitted for a Jew to own such a compa-ny and instruct non-Jewish workers to produce full human forms, which would seemingly violate an issur d’oraisa?
We must first consider whether the prohibition of instructing a non-Jew (amira l’nochri) applies to other prohibitions beyond Shabbos. In the Gemara (Bava Metzia 90), this question is left unresolved. Practically speaking, Tosafos and the Shach (Yoreh Deah 141:23 and 296) rule stringently that amira l’nochri does apply to other prohibitions. According to this, it would be pro-hibited for a Jew to establish such a business and instruct non-Jewish workers to produce complete human-form dolls, due to the prohibition of amira l’nochri. It would only be permitted if the production process includes a defect that renders the form incomplete. Indeed, many later authorities adopt this stringent view regarding amirah l’nochri regarding other prohibitions. Although the Chasam Sofer (Yoreh Deah 128) is lenient, the Darchei Teshuvah (141:32) and others question his ruling and do not rely on it broadly.
Nevertheless, there is room to be melamed zechus on operate such a business through non-Jewish labor. In Mechzeh Eliyahu (Vol. 3, siman 73) it is stated that one should not be lenient to produce dolls, especially when formed as a single solid piece. He therefore is puzzled that there are Jews who manufacture small figu-rines resembling Yerushalmi Jews with shtreimels, sometimes holding instruments, made of glass, plastic, or wood, used as decorations. It would seem obvious that producing such full human forms is prohibited, and purchasing them may involve lifnei iver, as it encourages further production on the owner’s part. Nevertheless, if one already owns such an item, there is no prohibition in retaining it, as it will not be wor-shipped.
However, it appears to me that the commonly found “Mitzvah Kinder” or similar dolls today — although shaped like small human figures and produced specifically for Jewish markets — still, there is strong basis for leniency. Most of these figurines are not complete, as they lack true articulation of limbs, and their hands, feet, and fingers are not fully formed. Even when finger impressions exist, they are merely superficial markings, not true sculpted digits. Similarly, other features — ears, nose, etc. — are not fully detailed forms, but rather simplified shapes suggesting these features. Such forms are not considered com-plete human representations, and there is room to permit them, especial-ly when produced by non-Jews. Indeed, I have seen in Cheshov Ha’Efod (Vol. 2, siman 115) that even one who is generally stringent regarding near-complete human forms may rely on non-Jewish production to be lenient.
Accordingly, since these dolls lack full completion, there is basis to be lenient when they are produced by non-Jews. Additionally, there are opinions that are lenient altogether regarding amirah l’nochri in oth-er prohibitions. Even the Beis Shmuel (Even HaEzer 5:16) who is strin-gent, maintains that it is only a chumra. Therefore, in cases involving financial loss or livelihood, one may combine these leniencies in a case where the form is not fully complete. Furthermore, even for those who would dispute this description and consider these dolls to be complete human forms — which would only be permitted if defective — there may still be an additional basis for leniency: instructing one non-Jew to instruct another non-Jew.
In the laws of amirah l’nochri on Shabbos, where all agree the prohibition exists, the Mishnah Berurah (307:25) cites a major dispute among the Acharonim whether amirah l’amira (instructing a non-Jew to instruct another non-Jew) is prohibited. Alt-hough we are generally only lenient in cases of financial loss, in our case there is further basis to be lenient, as the entire application of amira l’nochri to other prohibitions is itself a stringency. Therefore, when we combine this with the dispute regarding amira l’amira, along with the argument that the forms are not complete, there is room to be lenient. Accordingly, there is legitimate basis for Jews to own such factories that produce such dolls and figurines.