Parshas Emor 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Ask The Rav
Is it permitted to take Ritalin on Shabbos
Q: People often ask whether someone who needs to take Ritalin may take it on Shabbos, perhaps it should be considered like any other medication which is prohibited on Shabbos as is brought in שחיקת סממנים Hilchos Shabbos (siman 328:1) due to the decree of which is a problem of grinding on shabbos. Or perhaps one can ar-gue that since it does not cure a person, it is like food for healthy people, where we find that there is no prohibition of medicine on .שו”ע (סימן שכ”ח סעיף ל”ז) and in . ברכות דף לח Shabbos, as stated in
A: In practice, the poskim disagree on this matter. Some of the great poskim permitted taking Ritalin on Shabbos for those who re-quire it for concentration and similar needs. And although some wished to be stringent, nevertheless if the person cannot function without it, it is certainly permitted on Shabbos. The explanation is as follows: Ritalin is a medication for those suffering from attention and concentration disorders, known as ADHD, and it functions as a stimulant for such disorders. It appears that it may be permitted for those who require it for several reasons. First, the entire decree of Chazal prohibiting medicine due to concern of grinding applies spe-cifically to a choleh (a sick person). However, individuals suffering from attention disorders are not defined as sick. They function in all other areas like healthy people; they simply have excess neural ac-tivity affecting attention and concentration. The medication does not “heal” but rather stabilizes functioning. Although Chazal also de-creed in cases of minor discomfort ( מיחוש בעלמא ,) that is because even minor ailments are considered a partial illness. However, ADHD is not defined as illness at all, since such individuals are oth-erwise fully functional. Even though focusing and sitting still is dif-ficult for them, this is not considered a bodily illness. Therefore, even those who prohibit vitamins (as in strengthening the body, מג”א סי’ שכ”ח see( , שחיקת סממנים which falls under the decree of would agree here. It is also not comparable to mental ) סעי’ ל”ז illness, which is a separate category; here the mind is healthy. This may be compared to the discussion among later poskim regarding sleeping pills on Shabbos. Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach Zt”l permitted taking sleeping pills for someone with insomnia, since they do not heal illness but merely induce sleep. He brings proof from the )אשל אברהם מבוטשאטש (סי’ שכ”זregarding using wine vapor to induce sleep, which is not considered healing. Similarly, the permits sleeping pills, since lack of sleep קצות השלחן (סוף סי’ קל”ח) is not a disease, and the medication merely induces sleep. He also brings proof from Shulchan Aruch (siman328:41) regarding a drunk person whose “treatment” is not considered healing. He adds that nowadays the decree of שחיקת סממנים is somewhat weaker since people are not skilled in preparing medicines. Additionally, there is a הגר”ש קלוגר lenient view of ) and cited in later poskim) that when a שחיקת medication was already started before Shabbos, the decree of does not apply. The Chazon Ish is also cited similarly thatסממנים regular use of medications removes concern that one will come to אגרות משה או”ח ח”ג סי’ grind medicines. There is also the opinion of who is stringent even in cases where the medication was started כ”ג before Shabbos if the person is not considered truly ill. However, in the case of Ritalin, since lack of medication can lead to significant behavioral issues that may affect dignity and social functioning, it כבוד הבריות may be considered a matter of , which is a significant factor in halacha. We find a similar principle in the ruling of Harav Auerbach ZT”L regarding nasal conditions causing noticeable dis- .כבוד הבריות comfort, which may be treated on Shabbos due to Another additional consideration is that if the medication is needed תלמוד תורה or תפילה for proper , some poskim allow taking שו”ת שבט הלוי medication on Shabbos for the sake of a mitzvah. See ח”ט סי’ ס”ז שחיקת that a decree of Chazal such as , רדב”ז based on , is lighter than other rabbinic prohibitions in certain contexts סממנים especially when needed for a mitzvah. There is also a well-known practical solution: one may prepare the medication before Shabbat by crushing or dissolving it into food or drink so it is not recogniza-ble as medicine. The basis is the ruling of Shulchan aruch (328:21) regarding applying medicinal eye drops prepared before Shabbos, .שחיקת סממנים where the presence of a heker removes concern of From this principle, later authorities derived that when the act is not recognizable as medical treatment, the decree does not apply. There-fore, if one mixes the medication into food or drink before Shabbos in a way that is not noticeable, it may be permitted to take it on Shabbos, though ideally this should be prepared before Shabbos. Based on all of the above, one who needs to take Ritalin daily, is allowed to do so as well even on Shabbos.
Covering a Disposable Knife and Scissors During Birkas HaMazon
Q: Is it customary to cover a disposable knife during Birkas HaMa-zon? And if so, must scissors also be covered during Birkas HaMa-zon?
A: It is customary to cover the knife at the time of reciting birkas hamazon, and the practice is not to cover it on Shabbos and yom tov. So writes the Shulcha Aruch (siman 180:4-5)
In the בית יוסף there are two reasons brought down for this: one, that iron shortens a person’s life, and therefore it is not fitting that it be placed on the table, which is com-pared to the altar that lengthens a person’s life, as it is writ-ten לא תני”. ליהם ברזלten
Therefore, after finishing the meal and wanting to recite ברכת המזון , one covers the knife. The second reason is in the name of רבינו שמחה , that once a person reached the bracha of ” בונה ירושלים “ and remembered the חורבן הבית , he stabbed a knife into his stomach; therefore, they instituted removing it at the time during birkas hamazon. The Magen Avrahom (4) writes that if the reason for removing knives is because iron shortens life, then the stringency applies specifically to an iron knife and not to a knife made of other metals. However, see Shu”t Shevet Halevie (1:205) who brings various opinions, and according to the second reason there is certainly no distinction between iron and other metals; anything with which a person could harm himself must be covered. There is discussion regarding different types of knives and whether they require covering. Regarding disposable knives, it would seem they cannot truly be used to kill; nevertheless Harav Avigdor Neventzhal Shlit”a wrote to me to be stringent in this as well.
Incidentally, I found it appropriate to collect several halachos that arise from the words of the poskim, which are already discussed at length in other sefarim. One should analyze all the laws of removing a knife from the table during ברכת המזון whether it requires actual removal from the table or whether covering suffices. And if covering suffices, whether one must cover the entire knife—including the handle which may be wood—or only the metal blade. According to the reason of concern for killing, covering alone is not sufficient and the knives must be removed from the table. However, in אשל אברהם מבוטשאטש it appears that removal is not necessary and covering is sufficient. Likewise, some poskim ruled that only the metal portion needs to be covered. Regarding what is written in שו”ע that there is no need to be stringent about covering knives on שבת and יום טוב , it is brought in the name of harav Chaim Kanievsky Zt”l that even seudah shlishis there is no need to remove them, even if ברכת המזון is recited after שבת. However, on חול המועד he held that they should be covered. Some poskim write that according to the reasons, scissors would seemingly have the same status as knives, but he never heard of such a practice. It is also brought there that the above laws of covering knives apply even to knives used primarily for spreading (such as butter or spreads) and not for cutting, with no distinction between them. It is also brought by the poskim that we are not particular to cover other iron utensils such as spoons or forks, even though the משנה ברורה brings the reason that iron should not be placed on the table. The reason is that such utensils are generally not made of iron, and furthermore the custom mentioned in שו”ע applies specifically to knives.
Asking a Non-Jew to Do Something on Shabbat and He Did Not Do It
Q: What is the practical halacha regarding someone who asked a non-Jew to perform a melacha on Shabbos in a way that was forbidden to say to him, but in the end the non-Jew did not do it—did he violate only the prohibition of amirah, or is liability only when the instruction is actually carried out by the gentile?
A: It appears that if one spoke to the non-Jew on Shabbos, he still transgresses the prohibition of amirah lenachri. This matter seems to depend on the underlying reason for the prohibition. If the prohibition is because of ודבר דבר , then he has already violated ודבר דבר even though nothing was ultimately done. If the prohibition is because of agency ( שליחות ) , then certainly nothing has been violated if the act was not performed. If the prohibition is due to a concern that he may come to do it himself, one must analyze the matter, since perhaps as long as the non-Jew did not act, we are not concerned that the Jew will come to do it himself. However, in simple terms, according to this reason as well it would still be forbidden. This is also written in שו”ת התעוררות התשובה (חלק א’ סימן קל”ד): “Since Chazal were concerned that if he instructs him he may come to do it himself, therefore in all cases he has already done an issur through his speech… but according to the derivation brought in the סמ”ג that ‘ כל מלאכה לא יעשה ע”י אחרים ’, which the poskim write is only an אסמכתא , and since the Rabbis relied on this to forbid instructing a non-Jew, that would mean only if the non-Jew actually performed the melacha for the Jew is there a rabbinic prohibition, but if not, then not…” However, see in Shut Shevet Halivie (3:115) that wrote, Regarding amirah le’akum: if one told a non-Jew to do a melacha and he did not do it, whether he has violated the prohibition—there are three reasons for amirah le’akum. Rashi in Avodah Zarah writes it is because of ודבר דבר , the Rambam writes it is a gezeirah lest he come to do it himself, and there is also the reason of agency as a stringency. According to the reason of agency, the prohibition applies only when the act is actually done. But according to ודבר דבר , clearly even without action the speech is already weekday speech. And according to the Rambam’s reason there is room to discuss. And see the Teshuvos of the )’חת”ס (או”ח סימן ס that the reasons do not disagree, and all include Rashi’s reason; therefore, it is clear that the prohibition is in the speech itself.”