Parshas Vayechi 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
May a Man Use Makeup to Conceal Blemishes for Simchah Pic-
tures?
Q: I have been asked many times by men—chassanim, bar mitzvah
boys, and the like—who have various forms of acne or other facial
blemishes that bother them. At a simchah, where family pictures are
taken, they feel uncomfortable and embarrassed because the blemishes
are noticeable. On occasion, the only effective way to conceal them is
through the use of a cream or makeup that is generally designated for
women. Is it permissible for a man to use women’s makeup in such a
case, or is this prohibited under the prohibition of lo yilbash?
A: It would appear to me, in my humble opinion, that in such a case it
is permitted for a man to use a cream or makeup in order to conceal
blemishes, and there are several grounds for leniency, which we will
briefly outline, b’ezras Hashem. The Gemara in Shabbos (50b) cites a
dispute as to whether it is permitted to remove scabs from a wound on
the body, lest this involve a violation of lo yilbash, since it may appear
as though one is imitating women. The halachah follows the opinion
that permits it, and there is no concern of lo yilbash. Nevertheless, one
might question our case, since here he is using makeup designated for
women, which is certainly considered a womanly practice, as we find in
several places in Shas. If so, how can it be permitted to use such
makeup to conceal blemishes for pictures? However, Tosafos there al-
ready explains that even according to the opinion that prohibits remov-
ing scabs, this is only when one does so in order to resemble women.
However, when one’s intention is merely to spare himself embarrass-
ment, there is no prohibition of lo yilbash at all. According to this, it
would seem that in our case as well, one may permit the concealment of
blemishes even through the use of women’s makeup, since his sole in-
tent is to avoid embarrassment and not to resemble women. This ruling
is found as well in Teshuos Levushai Mordechai, Mahadura Tinyana
(§100), who permits such a case, and he further cites proof from the
Gemara in Shabbos and from the Meiri, who writes that anything done
for the honor of Hashem does not fall under the prohibition of lo
yilbash. An additional basis for leniency is that these blemishes are con-
sidered a mum (a defect), and it is permitted to remove them as a form
of medical treatment. I have cited elsewhere the opinion of Rav Shlomo
Zalman Auerbach, zt”l, who permits this when the intent is merely to
remove a defect. Similarly, the sefer Kerem Shlomo (s.k. 25:3), based
on the rulings of leading poskim, rules leniently even regarding other
blemishes that are removed because they are unsightly. This is also the
view of the Rivevos Ephraim, zt”l, that a man who has facial blemishes
and is embarrassed by them may remove them, and this does not consti-
tute a violation of lo yilbash. In Teshuvos Bigdei Chamudos, Vol. 2
(Kovetz Halachos), the ruling of Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky, shlit”a, is
cited: if a young man has acne on his face and a physician wishes to
remove it through cosmetic treatment that is generally designated for
women, it is permitted to do so and does not constitute lo yilbash.
In practice: A bochur or a man who has facial blemishes and is at-
tending a simchah where pictures will be taken, and is embarrassed by
them, may apply women’s makeup to conceal the blemishes. This is
entirely permitted and does not involve any prohibition of lo yilbash,
since his intention is solely to avoid embarrassment and not to resemble
women.
A Grandfather Who Hired a Shadchan for His Grandchild—Who
Has to Pay the Shadchanus?
Q: Based on an actual story: If a grandfather engaged a shadchan on
behalf of his grandchild, who is required to pay the shadchanus? Does
the obligation fall upon the grandfather, since he was the one who en-
gaged the shadchan, or does it fall upon the parents?
A: It is clear that if, at the time he engaged the shadchan, the grandfa-
ther explicitly stated that he would pay the shadchanus fee, then he is
certainly obligated to do so. This is as explained in Shulchan Aruch
(Choshen Mishpat 336:1), that one who hires a worker to perform work
for another and tells the worker, “Your wages are upon me,” is himself
obligated to pay. Moreover, according to several poskim, in such a case,
if he does not pay as he promised, the shadchan is not even able to col-
lect the shadchanus fee from either the parents or from the couple, since
the shadchan entered the arrangement with the understanding that the
grandfather would pay him. For according to these poskim, when one
says “your wages are upon me,” the worker cannot claim payment from
the owner of the field even under the principle of yored, and the obliga-
tion rests solely upon the one who undertook to pay. The question arises
only in a case where the grandfather said nothing at all regarding pay-
ment of the shadchanus fee. In such a situation, does the obligation fall
upon him because he engaged the shadchan, or does it fall upon the par-
ents, in accordance with the common practice that the parents pay the
shadchanus fees? It appears from the majority of poskim that the pre-
vailing custom is that the parents pay the shadchanus fees, just as they
bear the other expenses of the wedding. In the sefer Halichos Yisrael
(siman 3), a dispute is cited between the Avnei Nezer and the Erech
Shai as to whether the obligation to pay shadchanus falls upon the par-
ents or upon the couple themselves. The Halachah is ruled in accord-
ance with the view of the Erech Shai, that the custom is for the parents
to pay, and two reasons are given for this ruling:
Since the custom of the place is that the parents-in-law pay, the shad-
chan works with the understanding that they will be the ones to pay him.The parents themselves derive benefit
from the shadchan’s efforts, for the completion
of a shidduch is something that personally affects
and benefits them.
In addition, beyond the basic Halachah that a father is
obligated to marry off his sons and daughters, it is impossi-
ble to overstate the magnitude of the benefit that parents re-
ceive through a successful shidduch. Accordingly, even if they
did not state this obligation explicitly, they are nonetheless re-
quired to pay, since this is the accepted custom. By contrast, with
regard to the grandfather, it would seem clear that no obligation
rests upon him at all. Support for this may be drawn from the Re-
sponsa of the Chasam Sofer (Even HaEzer, siman 145), who writes
that the obligation of a father to marry off his son does not extend to
the father’s father. Regarding the obligation to teach Torah, we
learn in the Gemara (Kiddushin 30a) that a grandfather is obligated,
as derived from the posuk (Devarim 4:9), “And you shall make
them known to your sons and your sons’ sons.” This implies that
without a specific verse, there would be no such obligation, for the
primary obligation rests upon the father, as the Torah says (Devarim
11:19), “And you shall teach them to your sons”
—your sons, and
not your sons’ sons. Similarly, since the obligation to marry off
one’s children is derived from the verse “Take wives for your sons,”
it means: “your sons,” and not “your sons’ sons.” Accordingly, it is
clear that the expenses of shadchanus are not incumbent upon the
grandfather, for even the basic obligation to marry off the child
does not rest upon him, all the more so the extra expenses of
shadchanus. Therefore, if he did not explicitly state that he would
pay, he is not obligated to pay the shadchanus fee, and the obli-
gation rests upon the parents, as with other shadchanus fees.
However, after further study, I have heard that in many such
cases the grandfather does, in practice, pay the shadchanus fee
for his grandchild. If so, it is not entirely clear what the true
prevailing custom is in this regard, and a competent Rav
should be consulted. This is especially so if the grandfather
is a man of means and financial stability, in which case
there is room to argue that the shadchan undertook the
work with the understanding that the grandfather himself
would pay. Additionally, the matter may depend on the
manner in which the grandfather engaged the shadchan.
At times, the wording implies that he is directly hiring
the shadchan—for example, if he says, “Find a shid-
duch for my grandchild.” At other times, he may say,
“Help my son find a shidduch for his child.” There-
fore, it would seem that no definitive practical ruling
can be given, and each case must be evaluated on
its own merits.
Nonetheless, it is certainly proper and advisable
that the shadchan stipulate clearly at the outset,
before proposing any shidduchim, that he is act-
ing on the condition that the grandfather will pay
the shadchanus fee.
Is One Obligated to Pay a Driving Instructor
for Hours Spent Stuck in Traffic?
Q: When large hafganot (demonstrations)
take place throughout the country and cause
severe traffic disruptions in many areas, there
have been instances where people were stuck in traffic jams for
many hours without any possibility of escaping. This is not the
proper format to discuss the merits of those demonstrations them-
selves; however, since at least one halachic question arose as a re-
sult, I found it appropriate to address it here. A driving instructor
posed the following question: He went out with a student for a driv-
ing lesson and they got stuck in a traffic jam. Is the student obligat-
ed to pay the instructor for the hours during which they were stuck
in traffic, or, since the student did not actually learn anything during
that time, is he exempt from payment?
A: It is obvious that if they were stuck for several hours, the stu-
dent is not required to pay more than the number of hours that were
originally agreed upon for instruction. The question concerns only
those agreed-upon hours themselves—for example, if they agreed
on two hours of instruction, but in practice only twenty minutes of
actual driving instruction took place.
It would appear that in such a case, where the student was only able
to receive twenty minutes of instruction, he would seemingly be
exempt from payment. His status is comparable to that of a baal
habayis who hires a worker to perform a task, and an oneis
(unavoidable circumstance) arises that prevents the worker from
performing his work, in which case the baal habayis is exempt from
payment. As the Rema rules in Choshen Mishpat (334:1): “In any
case of an ones that befalls the worker—whether both parties knew
that such an ones commonly occurs, or whether neither knew—the
loss falls on the worker.”
However, one must consider why this case should not be treated as a
makas medinah (a widespread calamity), which the Rema there re-
fers to Siman 321, and see the Sema (s.k. 2) and Nesivos HaMishpat
(s.k. 1), who discuss various distinctions regarding whether, in such
circumstances, the employer must pay the worker.
I have seen that the author of Imrei Yaakov, shlit”a, addressed this
issue and ruled that driving lessons should be classified as kablanus
(contract work). The instructor is effectively a contractor hired to
teach the student how to drive, with the payment structured accord-
ing to individual lessons. Nevertheless, the overall agreement be-
tween them is one of kablanus rather than simple hourly employ-
ment. A contractor does not receive payment from the employer
even in a case of makas medinah. This view is shared by many con-
temporary poskim, shlit”a.
One may further add that the rationale of makas medinah does not
truly apply in our case, as it is relevant only to a circumstance that
affects the majority of people. Here, however, this is a private mat-
ter affecting a particular instructor; not everyone is a driving in-
structor, and even among driving instructors, not all chose to teach
in the specific locations where the traffic jam occurred. Therefore, it
would seem that the student is exempt from payment in such a case.
There are, however, those who argue that the ruling in this case de-
pends on the nature of the agreement between the instructor and the
student. If they agreed that the instructor would teach the student for
a set period of time—such as one hour—then the student would be
required to pay for that hour, even if no instruction was actually
given due to the traffic jam. However, if they agreed that the in-
structor would teach specific driving skills or topics, then if the in-
structor was unable to teach those topics due to the traffic jam, the
student would not be obligated to pay.
Nevertheless, as stated above, the consensus of the majority of
poskim is that in such a case, the student is exempt from paying.