Parshas Chayei Sara 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Repairing Electricity in a Building Inhabited by Non-Jews, Out of Concern for Causing Bishul Basar B’Chalav
A question was raised in the Kollel LeHoraah of Yerushalayim, regarding a repairman who comes to repair an electrical problem in a building inhabited by non-Jews, or by Jews who do not observe the laws of basar b’chalav, since perhaps they are cooking with electricity and may have on their stove a dish of meat and milk, and by restoring the electricity he may cause the oven or stove to turn on, thereby transgressing the issur of cooking meat and milk together.
There are those who wished to argue that based on the stringency of the Rema (Yoreh De’ah 87:6), who rules that it is forbidden to stoke coals beneath a non-Jew’s pot lest one transgress the prohibition of bishul basar b’chalav through the absorption of taste from the gentile’s pot, it would follow that it should likewise be prohibited to repair an electrical outage in a neighborhood or building of non-Jews.
It is known that Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l ruled similarly in a somewhat related case that was presented to him: a non-Jew wished to rent a meat factory with all its machinery, intending to use it with milk, such that it would constitute basar b’chalav. The Jewish owners were not concerned it becoming treif, since he would later kasher the machinery before it was used again for meat. However, because the machines were designed in such a way that only the Jewish owner could activate them, the question was whether the Jew could operate the machines on behalf of the non-Jew when the latter wished to cook meat and milk together. Rav Elyashiv zt”l responded that it is forbidden for a Jew to operate the machinery, for by doing so he is effectively cooking meat and milk together, even though it is for the gentile’s purpose.
However, Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlita ruled to me that regarding one who lives in a building together with non-Jews and the power has gone out in the entire building, it is permitted for him to restore the electricity, and there is no need to be concerned that meat and milk are being cooked in the homes of the non-Jews, and he ruled explicitly that it is permitted. Similarly, I have seen in Shu”t Chayei HaLevi (Vol. VI §108:4) that there is no concern that one of the non-Jew happens to be cooking meat and milk together at that moment, since such a possibility is remote and need not be taken into account.
In the Sefer Likutei Avnei Yashfeh, he writes that it is not forbidden to repair the electricity in a building of non-Jews, since there are multiple doubts: Perhaps the non-Jews are not cooking at all at that time, and even if they are cooking, perhaps they are not cooking meat and milk. Furthermore, the act of the Jew is considered aino miskavein — unintended — since his purpose is only to repair the electrical system of the building, not to cook meat and milk. Since the concern is remote, the practice is to rule leniently, in accordance with those opinions that permit it.
A Rebbi Who Confiscated an Item from a Student and It Was Later Lost
Q: The following question was presented: A Rebbi confiscated an item from a student and placed it in the teachers’ room, in the area normally used for such items and considered a proper place for safekeeping. The item was subsequently lost or stolen. Is the Rebbi obligated to pay for the loss?
A: First and foremost, I have received from leading halachic authorities, that when a teacher must confiscate an item from a student because it is disturbing the class, he is permitted to do so according to halachah. However, to confiscate it permanently and not return it afterward is forbidden — unless it is an item that halachah prohibits anyone from possessing. See Imrei Yaakov, Hilchos Melamdim, Likutim §35.
At first glance, one might think that the teacher would be liable to pay for the lost item. Since he receives payment for his teaching (see Yoreh De’ah 246:5), he may be considered a shomer Sachar (paid guardian) who is responsible for loss or theft, as ruled in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 303). Even though he did not formally accept upon himself the obligations of a guardian (see Shulchan Aruch 291:1), since he physically took the item from the student — albeit with justification — it would appear that he assumed the status of a shomer, and being paid for his role as a teacher would make him a shomer sachar.
However, upon further analysis, it appears that the teacher is not obligated to pay, for several reasons:
Firstly, the student is a minor, and the Gemara in Shevuos (42a) states, “If a man gives to his fellow,” implying that a minor’s act of giving is halachically ineffective. The Rishonim debate the implications: According to the Rambam and his Rebbeim, if a minor deposits an item with someone, the person becomes a shomer and is bound by the regular laws of shomrim, even to the point of taking an oath. In their view, the exclusion of a minor applies only to the law of keifel (the double payment of a thief). The Raavad and the Remah, however, maintain that the act of a minor is entirely invalid.
The Shulchan Aruch rules like the Rambam, while the Rema (CM 296:1) cites an opinion that we do not require a shomer to make an oath regarding property of a minor — and this is the primary view. The Shach (ibid. §2), quoting the Ran and Rashba, writes that the guardian is exempt even if the loss occurred through negligence, since the Torah entirely exempted one who holds the property of a minor from such liability. Nevertheless, the Shach concludes that if the guardian admits or it is proven that he was negligent, he would indeed be liable.
The Imrei Yosher (vol. 2 §35) writes that according to the Rema, cited by the Tur, since there is no Torah-based concept of shemirah regarding a minor, there is likewise no rabbinic obligation of shemirah. If so, according to these opinions, the teacher would not be obligated to pay for the lost or stolen item — so long as he was not negligent in its safekeeping.
However, we must still consider the following point: Who is the true owner of the item? Even if the child’s father gave it to him as a gift, it is possible that the child has no legal ability to acquire it independently, since he is still dependent upon his father. In that case, the object would belong to the father, and the teacher would be considered a shomer sachar for the father’s property, in which case he would be liable for loss or theft.
On this issue, the Rema (CM 270:2) rules, based on the Nimukei Yosef, that if a gift is given to a minor who is supported by his father, it belongs to the father — though not if the child is self-sufficient. The Shach there cites the Ritva in the name of the Ramban to the same effect. The Nimukei Yosef adds that even if the father himself gave the gift, the child does not acquire it, since he has no independent legal capacity. Thus, according to these opinions — which the Rema rules as halachah — the teacher cannot be exempted on the basis that the item belonged to a minor, since in truth it belongs to the father.
However, the Gra (ad loc. §6) questions the Rema, arguing that just as a husband’s gift to his wife is hers, so too a gift given to a minor by another party should transfer ownership, for “another’s intent can effect acquisition for him.” From the Gra’s words it seems he holds that even a minor dependent on his father can acquire through the intent of another.
However, even according to the Rema and those who side with him — that the item in question actually belongs to the father — there is still another reason to exempt the teacher. The Machaneh Ephraim (Hilchos Shomrim §31) cites the Maharshach, who rules that a household servant is not deemed a shomer sachar in relation to his employer’s property, even though he receives wages, because his pay is for his general service, not for guarding. Therefore, unless one is specifically paid to watch an item, he does not assume the obligations of a paid guardian.
By the same logic, one may say in our case that although the Rebbi is a paid employee, his salary is for teaching — not for guarding confiscated items. His act of removing and holding the object was incidental to classroom management, not part of his paid duties. Accordingly, he would not have the halachic status of a shomer sachar. (See also Pischei Choshen, Pikadon ch. 1 n. 16–17.)
In Conclusion: A Rebbi who confiscates a student’s object and places it in the teachers’ room, in a proper and accepted manner of safekeeping, and the item is later lost or stolen — is not required to pay for it.
A Shabbos Hotplate That Was Unplugged, and a Non-Jew Plugged It In — Does the Food Become Forbidden Because of Bishul Akum?
Q: A question was raised to me by avreichim of Beis Medrash Gavoha who were learning the halachos of bishul akum (food cooked by a non-Jew):
A woman placed her Shabbos foods on the hotplate before Shabbos — cholent, kugel, and other dishes that were already cooked — and also placed raw salmon fillets there for Shabbos. After lighting candles and accepting Shabbos, she noticed that the hotplate was unplugged. She then called a non-Jew, who reconnected it. The fish cooked by the time of the Shabbos meal.
The question is: does the fish become assur because of bishul akum?
I
Is Salmon Considered a Food “Eaten Raw”?
Although some people do eat raw salmon — for example, in sushi, where it is sliced thin and seasoned — I have heard from several leading halachic Poskim shlita that this does not render salmon a food that is “nechal chai, normally eaten raw,” which would exempt it from the prohibition of bishul akum. This is evident from the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 113:12), who rule that fish — although they can be eaten through the method of salting —are nevertheless still subject to bishul akum if cooked by a non-Jew. Only if the Jew himself first salted the fish to make them edible, and the non-Jew merely cooked them afterward, would they be permitted.
Accordingly, in our case, salmon — especially thick fillets, not thin seasoned slices — is not considered a food normally eaten raw, and therefore remains subject to bishul akum.
II
May a Non-Jew Perform This Act on Shabbos?
Even though the woman had already accepted Shabbos, and likely the community as well, and it is already bein hashemashos, there is no issue in her asking a non-Jew to plug in the hotplate, since it was done during bein hashemashos for the sake of a mitzvah — the Shabbos meal — or in a situation of great need.
Thus, having the non-Jew plug in the hotplate certainly was permissible.
III
Did the Non-Jew’s Action Constitute Bishul Akum?
The main question here is whether the prohibition of bishul akum applies when the non-Jew does not intend to cook. Here, the non-Jew was asked only to reconnect the plug — not to cook raw food. He likely assumed the food was already cooked and was merely keeping it warm for Shabbos.
In this regard, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 38a) and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 113:5) rule that if a non-Jew cooked unintentionally — that is, he had no intention to cook — the food is permitted. For example, if a non-Jew lit a fire to clear reeds from a pond and grasshoppers happened to be roasted in the flames, they may be eaten. Similarly, if he singed the head of an animal to remove its hair, one may eat the roasted ear-tips that were incidentally cooked in the process.
The Cheker Halachah (quoted in Darchei Teshuvah 113:41) explains that this applies whenever the non-Jew’s intention was not for cooking — for instance, if he heated something already edible or partly cooked (ma’achal ben derusai), or performed an action meant for another purpose entirely.
Based on this, the halachah in our case seems clear: since the non-Jew’s intent was only to reheat already-cooked Shabbos foods, and not to cook the raw fish, his act is considered she’lo l’shem bishul — unintentional cooking — and the fish would therefore be permitted.
IV
When the Non-Jew Sees the Raw Food
However, this leniency applies only when the fish were covered — for example, wrapped in foil — so that it was not apparent that they were raw. If, however, the fish were uncovered and the non-Jew could see that they were raw, the leniency no longer applies. Even if other foods on the hotplate were already cooked, since he knowingly heated a surface that included raw food, this is regarded as intentional cooking, and the fish would indeed be forbidden due to bishul akum.
We cannot rely on the fact that a majority of the food on the hotplate was already cooked (batel berov), since the non-Jew knows that uncooked food is present, and therefore we are concerned that perhaps he intended to cook this as well. This is evident from the language of the Tur (113), that as long as there was uncooked meat in the oven, then even if he heated the oven for other reasons, it becomes forbidden, since perhaps he intended for the meat as well.
The fact that the Jewish woman placed the raw fish on the cold hotplate before Shabbos does not suffice to permit them.
Although one might argue that since the Jew initiated the act, it should be considered as if she participated in the cooking, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 113:10) rules otherwise:
“If a Jew placed food on dying coals not hot enough to cook even to the stage of ben derusai, and a non-Jew came and stirred them, causing the food to cook, the food is forbidden.”
The Pri Chadash (§13) and Pri To’ar (§10) both rule stringently, even bedi’eved.
Although the Rema (§7) brings opinions that stirring the coals (chitui ha’eish) by a Jew is sufficient to remove the prohibition, this itself is subject to dispute, including the Gra, who is stringent in such a case.
Moreover, in our case, the Jew placed the fish on a cold surface — not merely dim coals — and this certainly cannot be equated with an act of chitui (stoking), which presumes an existing flame.
In Conclusion
If the salmon was covered — as is commonly done with foil — so that it was not apparent to the non-Jew that the fish were raw, then even though they later cooked through the non-Jew’s act of plugging in the hotplate, the fish is permitted.
This is because the non-Jew had no intention to cook, only to restore the heat for the already-prepared Shabbos dishes. Mori V’Rabi Rav Avigdor Nebenzhal shlit”a agreed to this.