Parshas Noach 5786- Intriguing Questions & Answers
Q: A bar mitzvah boy who struggles with reading (due to dyslexia) wishes to lein from the Torah at his bar mitzvah. There is concern that, because of this difficulty, he may inadvertently recite certain words by heart rather than directly from the written text. On the other hand, preventing him from reading could cause him great embarrassment, especially considering that he has worked diligently for a long time to prepare for this moment. What is the proper course of action?
A: The Gemara (Gittin 60b; Temurah 14b) teaches that “devarim she-b’ksav ei efshar l’omram ba’al peh” — matters that are written may not be recited by heart. Accordingly, the Torah reading must be read directly from the written text in the Sefer Torah, and not from memory. We must therefore examine whether there is any basis to be lenient in a case such as this.
Indeed, the Rishonim and Acharonim (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 49) discuss this very rule. However, in this particular situation, it would seem that leniency is warranted. This is based on that which several Acharonim write, that bedi’eved — after the fact — one fulfills the obligation of Torah reading even if a few words were said by heart.
Therefore, in this case, since the boy has a genuine reading difficulty, and since preventing him from reading could cause him great embarrassment before the entire tzibbur — especially after his sincere effort and preparation — it is proper to allow him to read. Such a situation may be regarded as bedi’eved from the outset, and thus permissible even lechatchilah. Moreover, public humiliation can cause real agmas nefesh and lasting harm — and who knows how far-reaching this could be?
For we find that sha’as hadechak k’bedi’eved dami — in pressing circumstances, one may rely on the standards of bedi’eved (see Get Pashut 129:43; Sdei Chemed, Pe’as HaSadeh, Mareches 4, Klal 30, and Klalim, Mareches Shin, Klal 83). In such cases, we may rely even on a minority opinion, as cited in Sdei Chemed (Mareches Yud, Klal 32; Mareches Kaf, Klal 106).
Furthermore, the Birkei Yosef (Orach Chaim 49:2) explicitly writes that in a case of necessity, and bedi’eved, one has fulfilled the obligation even when verses were read by heart. Therefore, in our case, it appears clear that the bar mitzvah boy may be permitted lechatchilah to read from the Torah.
May Two Brothers Who Are Geirim Receive Aliyos One After Another?
Q: A Rav of a Shul inquired about a family Simchah held in his shul on Shabbos. Nearly all the mispalelim that week were fathers with their sons. The question arose whether it is permissible to call up a father and son consecutively to the Torah, or two brothers one after another.
We have discussed this issue previously. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 141:6) rules that, in principle, two brothers or a father and son may be called up one after the other. The only reason to refrain from doing so is because of ayin hara. The Mishnah Berurah (141:18) explains that in principle, there is no prohibition involved. Therefore, if the person has already been called up, they should not step down. However, lechatchilah, one should avoid consecutive aliyos of close relatives because of ayin hara.
In the case at hand, however, there is a different angle to the question. This particular situation involved two twin brothers — but they are gerei tzedek (converts) who were celebrating their bar mitzvahs after conversion. Because of the limited number of available kibbudim, it would be most convenient to call the twin brothers for consecutive aliyos. The question is: since, according to halachah, converts are not halachically considered siblings, perhaps the concern for ayin hara does not apply. On the other hand, since the concept of ayin hara is somewhat hidden from us, perhaps it is best to be cautious nonetheless.
A: As we have noted elsewhere, the Mishnah Berurah (141:19) rules that one should not be lenient even if the participants claim not to be concerned about ayin hara. The Shaarei Efraim (1:31), Birkei Yosef (O.C. 141:6), and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (23:13) all concur, in contrast to the Aruch HaShulchan (141:8), who was more lenient.
Additionally, Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l ruled (Mesoras Moshe, vol. 1, p. 42) that even in a private minyan, one should be concerned about ayin hara, and that even in a situation of sha’as hadechak (necessity), there is no basis for leniency in this regard. This differs from the case of calling up two Levi’im consecutively, where Shulchan Aruch (135:10) does record a leniency in pressing circumstances.
One might still question whether the concern of ayin hara depends on the mention of the names (father and son, or two brothers) when calling them up, or whether it is simply a matter of being visibly consecutive in the eyes of the congregation. This distinction has practical relevance in a case where the entire minyan consists of one family — such as a grandfather, father, and grandsons.
Indeed, the Elyah Rabbah (141:107), citing the Emunas Shmuel, notes that according to the Ashkenazic custom, where the gabbai calls out, “Ya’amod Shevi’i,” without stating the person’s name, it is permissible for two brothers to receive consecutive aliyos. The Mishnah Berurah (141:21) clarifies that this applies only where it is not the custom to announce the name of the person called up. If, however, omitting the name would itself appear unusual, that very deviation would draw more attention — and thus should not be done.
Many Acharonim quote the Shiyarei Knesses HaGedolah (glosses to Beis Yosef, O.C. 141:5–7), who explains that the concern of ayin hara arises from the two of them reading from the Torah consecutively, not from the similarity of their names. This leads to several practical distinctions:
Two brothers from the same mother but different fathers should also not be called up consecutively.
A brother who is a katan may follow an older one, even though their father’s name is the same.
A grandfather and grandson should not be called consecutively, even though their names differ.
If two Sifrei Torah are used (as on Rosh Chodesh or Yom Tov), there is room to be lenient even if both are called by name.
I discussed this matter with Maran HaRav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, who ruled that in this particular case one may be lenient. Since the twin boys are gerei tzedek, they are not halachically considered brothers with respect to Jewish lineage. They are “brothers” in the colloquial sense, but not in the halachic definition that forms the basis for this concern. Therefore, the classic reason for avoiding consecutive aliyos does not apply.
Although one could argue that ayin hara might still be a concern simply because people see one brother following another, in a situation of genuine need — especially here, where their halachic status as “brothers” does not exist — it is proper to permit it.
Giving a Bar Mitzvah Gift to The Lender’s Son
Q: I am often asked by those who have lent money to others: at times, when the lender celebrates a simchah, some of the borrowers — even those who had not known the lender prior to the loan — wish to attend and bring a gift or participate in the celebration. Is this permissible, or does it constitute ribbis devarim (ribbis in the form of expressions of honor or gratitude)?
A: The Shulchan Aruch rules (Yoreh De‘ah 160) that it is forbidden for a borrower to send a gift to a lender on the occasion of a personal celebration, unless such gifts were customary between them prior to the loan. Nevertheless, it is permitted to give a bar mitzvah gift to the son of the lender, provided that it is given after the boy has reached the age of maturity, at which point the father no longer has ownership over his son’s gifts (see Rema, Choshen Mishpat 270:2).
However, even in this case, it is permitted only if the gift is not something the lender himself would ordinarily have purchased for his son — for instance, a Gemara needed for yeshivah study — since in such a case, the gift does not bring the lender any monetary benefit. Otherwise, it would be considered that the lender has indirectly profited from the transaction (Bris Yehudah, Ikarei Dinim, 10:43).
However, the Chelkas Binyamin (160:198) notes that if giving the gift to the son is primarily a mark of honor to the father — which is very common, as the intent is often to show respect to the parent rather than to the child — it is prohibited as ribbis devarim, unless the borrower has in the past given similar gifts to the lender’s family at previous celebrations. In such a case, it is viewed as part of their ordinary social conduct, and therefore permitted.
The Bris Yehudah (ibid.) further questions why the borrower’s mere attendance at the lender’s celebration is not considered ribbis devarim, since his presence is itself a show of honor — unless he customarily participates in the lender’s family celebrations, or if the bar mitzvah boy or chassan is his personal friend, in which case his attendance would be permissible, since the benefit to the lender is only incidental.
However, one could also argue that since, following the loan, the borrower and lender have developed a friendship, his coming to the simchah stems from friendship rather than from the loan itself.
Paying Extra Out of Uncertainty
Q: It often happens that borrowers are unsure of the exact amount owed. They therefore wish to add a small amount to avoid any possibility of underpayment. Is this permitted, or is it considered ribbis?
A: The Raavad (Tammim De’im, §60) writes that if one pays an additional amount out of doubt — to ensure he has fully repaid his obligation — this is not considered payment for the loan’s delay, but rather the removal of a possible debt, and thus does not constitute ribbis. Nevertheless, some authorities recommend that the borrower explicitly state that if it turns out he does not, in fact, owe the extra sum, he is giving it as a full and unconditional gift (Bris Yehudah, ch. 1 n. 13).
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 160:5) rules that when one gives interest and calls it a “gift,” it remains forbidden even if the interest is rabbinic in nature (Shach 6), the later Acharonim (see Teshuvos Avnei Nezer, C.M. 23; Minchas Yitzchak 6:161, 9:88:2) explain that this prohibition applies only when the money is given as interest on the loan. When it is given out of doubt regarding the true balance, however, it is permissible to stipulate that it be regarded as a gift.
Paying Extra to Avoid Dispute
It is further reported in the name of the Chazon Ish zt”l that there is room to be lenient even when the borrower knows he has fully repaid his debt, yet chooses to pay again in order to quiet the lender’s complaints and avoid machlokes — especially if he does so to save himself the trouble and unpleasantness of a din Torah (Nachalas Eliyahu, p. 323, §84).
The Chazon Ish cites support for this from the following Gemara (Bava Basra 30a): one man accused another of seizing his land. The latter replied, “I purchased it from so-and-so and held it in possession for three years.” The claimant retorted, “He is a thief!” The possessor said, “But I have witnesses that you offered to buy the land from me!” He replied, “I preferred to pay for it rather than engage in a legal dispute.” Rava concludes, “A person sometimes buys his own rights” — that is, a person who prefers shalom may choose to spend money to avoid argument.
Thus, when a borrower pays additional funds to avert contention or litigation, it is not considered ribbis, but rather a reasonable expense made to preserve peace.
“Keep the Change!” — Ribbis?
Q: If a borrower repays his lender with a sum slightly greater than the amount borrowed — for example, he borrowed 99 shekels but only has a 100-shekel note — and tells the lender to keep the extra, is this permissible, or does it constitute ribbis?
A: The poskim write that if it is evident to all that the borrower’s intent is not to grant the lender payment for the usage of the payment, but simply to avoid the inconvenience of seeking change, it is permitted.
Similarly, the common practice of “rounding off” small amounts, even when this results in returning slightly more than was borrowed, is also permitted, since such conduct is customary and understood as a matter of convenience rather than compensation (see Bris Yehudah, Ikrei Dinim ch. 4 n. 9; Nesivos Shalom, p. 87 s.v. loveh; Chelkas Binyamin 160:33).
The Minchas Yitzchak (9:88:1) adds that if the borrower instructs the lender to give the extra amount to tzedakah on the borrower’s behalf, there is certainly no concern of ribbis, since the lender derives no personal benefit from the additional sum.
However, She’eilos u’Teshuvos Lehoros Noson (6:76; 13:65:2) is more stringent, permitting such practice only when it is common in that locale for people not to be particular about such small differences.