Sukkos 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Q: I receive the following question nearly every year: A father asks his son to purchase an esrog for him, and the son, wishing to fulfill the mitzvah properly, buys two — one for himself and one for his father. One of them is more mehudar and beautiful than the other. Is the son obligated, based on kibbud av, to give his father the more mehudar esrog, or may he keep it for himself?
A: In practice, I usually rule that although there is some discussion among the poskim regarding this question, it is certainly praiseworthy for one who is able to be stringent in the mitzvah of kibbud av — even when the issue concerns only the hiddur of another mitzvah. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, he is not obligated by the laws of kibbud av v’eim to give the more mehudar esrog to his father. Nevertheless, I feel that it is preferable to do so, as we will now explain.
The Sha’arei Teshuvah (Orach Chaim 658:2) quotes the Sheyarei Knesses HaGedolah who writes that if one wishes to buy a lulav and esrog, and another person desires to buy it on behalf of a gadol hador, there is no need to defer to the gadol. For in this matter we say, “ein cholkin kavod laRav” — no special honor is due to a teacher — since the mitzvah is incumbent upon him, one’s own obligation takes precedence.
Similarly, the Bikurei Yaakov (end of siman 656) cites this ruling and adds that the same applies regarding one’s father. A son is not required to sacrifice his own mitzvah out of respect for his father, because the obligation to honor parents applies only “mi’shel av—with the father’s own resources,” not the son’s. Consequently, there is no halachic requirement to honor one’s father by relinquishing one’s own mitzvah.
This view was accepted by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, ztz”l, as recorded in Halichos Shlomo (Hilchos Sukkah, ch. 11, note 4), and likewise by Rav Chaim Kanievsky, ztz”l, cited in Sukkas Chaim (Hilchos Daled Minim, p. 265). The above Sefer further quotes Teshuvos Chukei Chaim (vol. 4, siman 131), who writes that if the mehudar esrog is more expensive than the simple one, the son certainly need not give up the better one for his father, since the mitzvah of honoring parents is to be done at the father’s expense, not the son’s. And even if the father is willing to pay the difference, or the two esrogim cost the same, the son still need not give up the mehudar one. For according to many poskim, hiddur mitzvah is itself a Torah-level obligation, and even according to those who hold it is m’drbanan, we do not find that one must sacrifice a mitzvah — even m’drabanan— because of kibbud av.
However, there are other poskim who maintain that the son should indeed give the more mehudar esrog to his father. The Chashukei Chemed (Sukkah, p. 357) writes that since kibbud av is a Torah commandment, and in this case the son can fulfill both — his own mitzvah of taking an esrog, and the mitzvah of honoring his father — by giving the more mehudar one to his father and using the other for himself, that is the preferable course, as this does not infringe on the principle of “chayecha kodmim.” This was also the ruling I heard from my teacher, HaRav Avigdor Nebenzahl, shlita.
Furthermore, several poskim note that even according to the Sha’arei Teshuvah, if the father is a talmid chacham who himself is particular about hiddur mitzvah, it is proper for the son to give his father the more mehudar esrog and take the lesser one for himself. But if the father is not a talmid chacham and would have purchased a simpler esrog for himself in any case, the son is not obligated to give up his own mehudar esrog.
In conclusion: If one bought two esrogim, both mehudar, but one of them more than the other, and the father wishes to have the more mehudar one — although strictly speaking the son is not halachically required to give it to him based on kibbud av — it is certainly fitting to do so.
An Esrog Mistakenly Hung as a Sukkah Decoration
Q: A true story occurred with a man who bought two esrogim: one mehudar, which he had purchased at great expense for the mitzvah of daled minim, and another basic one that he intended to hang as a sukkah decoration. On the morning of Yom Tov, when he was about to fulfill the mitzvah, he realized to his shock that he had mistakenly hung his mehudar esrog as a sukkah decoration!
He now wondered whether he may remove it from the sechach on Yom Tov and use it for the mitzvah. His doubt centered on two halachic concerns:
Is the esrog considered huktzah l’mitzvaso — “set aside for its mitzvah use” — and thus muktzeh, forbidden to handle on Yom Tov?
Does removing an object that was affixed to the sukkah, such as taking a picture off the wall, constitute an act of soser (demolition), which is prohibited on Yom Tov?
A: Regarding the first question — whether the esrog is considered hukzah l’mitzvaso — we find a related discussion in Shu”t Chasam Sofer (Orach Chaim 184), as cited by the Beur Halachah (Orach Chaim 638, s.v. Kol shmonah). The Chasam Sofer discusses one who had an extra esrog and hung it in his sukkah as a decoration. Later, on Yom Tov, someone from a nearby village who had no esrog came and asked to use it. The Chasam Sofer ruled that it was permissible to take the esrog used as a sukkah decoration and fulfill the mitzvah with it.
He explained that although on Yom Tov itself the esrog would be muktzeh and therefore may not be handled, on Chol HaMoed it may be taken and used for the mitzvah. He explains that “mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu — mitzvos are not given for our pleasure” — and since the esrog is being used for a mitzvah rather than personal pleasure, it is permitted. Moreover, there is no element of bizayon mitzvah (disrespect of the mitzvah) here, for it was originally hung as a noy mitzvah (mitzvah adornment), and now it is being used for the mitzvah itself, with a berachah recited over it. He adds that the owner may even accept payment for the esrog in such a case.
From his words it appears that on Yom Tov itself, one may not remove the esrog from the sukkah to use it for the mitzvah, since it is considered muktzeh.
However, the author of Shevet HaKe’hasi, as cited in Shu”t Vayishma Moshe, distinguishes our case from that of the Chasam Sofer. In the Chasam Sofer’s case, there was no error — the esrog was intentionally designated as a sukkah decoration, and thus its designation was complete. Here, by contrast, the designation was made in error, since he mistakenly thought this was the esrog he intended for decoration. Therefore, the designation never took effect, and the esrog is not muktzeh at all, and he may remove and handle it even on Yom Tov.
Regarding the second issue — whether removing it would constitute soser: We are discussing a case where the esrog was placed inside a small bag with handles, and that bag was either pinned to the wall or hung by its handles on a nail protruding from the sukkah wall or sechach. In the latter case, the bag was not actually affixed to the structure.
The Chazon Ish is known to have ruled that removing a picture from the wall on Shabbos constitutes soser, for since the picture is treated as part of the wall, detaching it is considered dismantling. According to those who disagree with the Chazon Ish, at least in the first case — where the bag is actually attached to the wall with a pin — there remains room for doubt.
The question depends on whether a sukkah is considered a binyan arai, a temporary structure, for which there is no prohibition of boneh or soser except in a full-fledged act of construction or demolition. If so, removing the esrog would certainly not be deemed soser. On the other hand, since the sukkah is intended to stand for the entire Yom Tov, it might be considered a binyan keva for the duration of the Chag, and therefore even minimal soser would then be prohibited.
The Mishnah Berurah (638:24) writes:
“One who intends to remove the sukkah decorations on Yom Tov, for fear of rain or theft, should take care initially not to tie them with a permanent knot, since it would be forbidden to untie them on Yom Tov. Rather, he should fasten them with a bow.”
From his words it appears that there is no concern of soser in simply untying or removing decorations; the only issue is the knot itself.
Still, it is uncertain whether the Mishnah Berurah would extend this leniency even to a binyan keva (in contrast to the Chazon Ish), or whether it applies specifically to a sukkah, since it is a binyan arai.
In Shu”t Vayishma Moshe, Rav Moshe Fried, shlita, writes two practical solutions that he heard from Rav Nissim Karelitz, ztz”l, for such a situation:
It is permitted to ask a non-Jew to remove the esrog from the sukkah, since this constitutes a shvus d’shvus — a double Rabbinic prohibition — done for the sake of a mitzvah.
If the esrog is in a bag hanging from the wall or sechach, one may tear open the bag and remove the esrog. This is not considered soser, for the bag remains attached to the sukkah as before. Nor is there an issue of korea (tearing), since it is comparable to tearing open a package in order to reach the food inside — something that most contemporary poskim permit.
Finally, Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein, shlita, ruled that in such a case: If one mistakenly hung his esrog as a sukkah decoration — muktzeh b’ta’us eino muktzeh — an object set aside by mistake is not considered muktzeh.
A Sefer Torah Found to Be Pasul on Simchas Torah — Must the Entire Tzibbur Receive Aliyos Again?
Q: An incident occurred on Simchas Torah in a Shul where the Sefer Torah used for the reading of V’zos HaBerachah(which is read repeatedly so that everyone is called up to the Torah) — was later discovered to be invalid. One of its letters, a lamed, was completely broken into two separate parts: the vav and the kaf were disconnected. The question arose: must the entire tzibbur be called up again and read from a different, kosher Sefer Torah, or does everyone fulfill their obligation with the original kriah despite the pesul?
A: Before addressing the practical ruling, let us first clarify the halachic ruling concerning a broken letter.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 32:16) states:
“If one of the letters becomes split— Hagah: for example, a vav or zayin, or the leg of a nun — if a child, neither exceptionally bright nor foolish, can read it correctly, it is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid.”
The Rema adds:
“However, if it is clear to us that the shape of the letter is no longer intact, the Sefer Torah is invalid — even if the child can still identify it correctly.”
The Mishnah Berurah (32:52) explains that the Shulchan Aruch refers to cases where it is unclear whether the letter has the proper shiur— for instance, a vav that became shortened, leaving it unclear whether it still looks like a vav or more like a yud, or a nun peshutah versus a kaf peshutah. In such cases, we may rely on the reading of a child.
But where the letter’s basic form is composed of several distinct parts — such as an alef, which has two yuds connected by a diagonal line, or a peh, which has a small yud within it — if one of those parts is missing, the letter’s essential form is lacking. In such a case, the Sefer Torah is pasul, and the reading of a child does not help; only an actual repair can restore it to kosher.
In our situation, where the vav of the lamed is completely separated from its kaf, the lamed is unquestionably invalid. It cannot be rendered kosher by a child’s reading; it must be corrected before use.
Despite this, most contemporary poskim have ruled that in such a case those who were called up to the Torah have nevertheless fulfilled their obligation, and there is no need to call everyone up again. Three primary reasons are given:
The Rambam maintains that whenever it is discovered after the kriah that a Sefer Torah was invalid, there is no need to reread from a kosher one.
The Panim Meiros (2:16) holds that even in such a case, the Sefer Torah can be validated by a child’s reading. The Mishnah Berurah (Orach Chaim 143:25) writes that when kriyas hatorah has already taken place, we may rely b’dieved even on a daas yachid, and there is no need to repeat the kriyah. Thus, if a child can read the broken lamed correctly, one may rely on the Panim Meiros and consider the reading valid.
The Chida writes in Machzik Berachah that when a newly written Sefer Torah is found to have a defect the first time it is used, the reading is still valid, and there is no need to repeat it. He explains that we apply the principle stated regarding a chosson: “A groom during his shivas yemei mishteh — we do not examine his negaim, nor those of his garments or his home.” A new Sefer Torah, he says, is like a chosson during his week of Sheva Brachos — we do not look for its flaws.
By extension, Simchas Torah itself — the celebration marking the completion of the entire Torah — is like a Chasunah between Klal Yisroel and the Torah. On this day of joy, we do not look for pesulim in the Sefer Torah. Therefore, if the Torah was read from a pasul Sefer Torah and the mistake was discovered only afterward, the reading is accepted b’dieved and need not be repeated.