Parshas Haazinu 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers

Carrying a Cell Phone from the Sukkah into the House Before It Rings on Yom Tov

Q:
I have the privilege, with Hashem’s help, of sleeping in the sukkah. We live in an apartment building with many neighbors, and there are several other sukkahs situated very close to mine. I generally use my phone as an alarm clock each Shabbos. I know that once it begins to ring, I am permitted to move it in order to remove the noise, as you have written in previous newsletters that doing so is allowed and there is no concern of muktzeh.

My question is the following: Sometimes I stay up late at night, and in such a case I do not want to use the alarm early the next morning, or I am worried that it may wake up the neighbors. May I therefore take the phone out of the sukkah already at night—before it begins ringing—in order to prevent the disturbance? Or is this leniency only once the phone is already making noise, at which point it may be removed?

A:
We have already written in the past that a cell phone is considered a kli she’melachto l’issur (an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use), and not muktzeh machmas chisaron kis (muktzeh due to their value), since people are not overly particular about it and make use of it for other functions such as an alarm clock. Accordingly, it may be moved l’tzorech gufo u’mekomo—for its use or its place. The question here is whether it may be removed even before it starts making noise.

I saw in the journal HaYashar VeHatov a teshuvah quoted from the author of the Sefer Minchas Pri shlit”a, who is inclined to forbid. His reasoning was as follows: This would depend on how we understand the leniency of l’tzorech gufowith regard to kli she’melachto l’issur. Is this type of muktzeh essentially a matter of hesech ha’daas, and therefore l’tzorech gufo u’mekomo we say that it is only a partial hesech and for this he was not mesiach daas, as the Chayei Adam writes? Or perhaps it is that it is only a gezeiras keilim, which was never applied when needed for their place or use.

If it is like the first reasoning, then we may suggest that as long as there is any doubt whether it may be moved, we would say that he did not intend to set it aside as muktzeh at the beginning of Shabbos. Furthermore, we may add to this rationale the view of the Tzelach, who rules that in cases of doubt of muktzeh, one may be lenient.

In my humble opinion, however, the reasoning that this depends on the nature of the prohibition of kli she’melachto l’issur is not entirely clear—for what difference would it make? In practice, if one has no intent to use it, it has indeed been set aside.

Still, since the matter involves a Rabbinic prohibition, there is room to be lenient. One might ask, though, according to R’ Akiva Eiger who holds that regarding tiltul muktzeh we apply the rule of davar sheyesh lo matirin (“an item that will become permitted later”), then we would not be lenient even in doubt. However, it is well known that the Tzelach disagrees and holds that this principle does not apply to tiltul muktzeh, since this usage at this time of the muktzeh will not become permitted later.

In fact, there seems to be proof from the words of the Rif that it is permitted. The Gemara (Shabbos 124b) relates that Rav Mari bar Rachel had certain pillows lying in the sun, and he asked Rava if he could move them. Rava permitted it, saying they were fit for him, to which Rav Mari responded that he had others. Rava still permitted, since they were fit for guests. Rav Mari responded that he had enough for guests as well. The Rif (48a) explains: “…for surely they are fit for anyone who might enter.” From his wording it appears that even when guests are not known to be coming, but only might come, the mats are still considered usable, and therefore not muktzeh.

This is likewise ruled in Orchos Shabbos (19:10):
“Even if one does not need the utensil right now, but takes it along because there is a reasonable possibility he may require it in the place he is going, this is also considered l’tzorech gufo.”

In the notes he cites the above Gemara—“fit for guests”—which clearly refers to guests who may or may not come.

It would thus appear that moving the phone before it rings is permitted. Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a concurred with this ruling.

Yichud with a Non-Jew out of Concern for Murder

Q:
I have often been asked about a situation where one needs to hire a non-Jewish foreign worker—for example, as a caretaker for an elderly widower, where the worker lives together with him in the apartment. Similarly, when a foreign worker is hired to assist in a home, and at times he may be alone with the owner of the house, the question arises: is yichud with a non-Jew permitted?

For we find in the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 22a) and it is ruled in Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 153:2): “A Jew may not be secluded with an idol-worshipper, because they are suspected of bloodshed.” If so, how is it that this practice is so widespread nowadays, without any apparent concern or stringency on the matter?

A:
The Mishnah Berurah (20:7) cites the Chayei Adam (klal 11:42), who writes that in our times non-Jews are no longer suspected of bloodshed. Accordingly, although the Shulchan Aruch rules (Orach Chaim 20:2) that one may not sell a tallis katan to a non-Jew—lest he accompany a Jew on the road and kill him—the Chayei Adam explains that in our times there is no such concern, since governments punish murderers. (Nonetheless, selling a tallis katan to a non-Jew remains forbidden for other reasons, as he writes there.)

Similarly, Teshuvos Chavos Yair (66) and the Tiferes Yisrael (Avodah Zarah 2:5) are both lenient nowadays. This also has practical ramifications in regard to yichud with a non-Jewish doctor.

Indeed, the Gedolim of our generation—the Steipler ztz”l (brought in Dvar Halachah 15:4) and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (cited in Nishmas Avraham, 2nd ed., vol. 2, Yoreh Deah 153:1)—ruled that nowadays one need not fear that a non-Jew will kill, since such an act would be publicized and punished by the authorities.

On the other hand, the Kaf HaChaim (Orach Chaim 20:12) brings the words of the Chayei Adam but disagrees with the leniency. He writes that even nowadays one must be concerned, since there have indeed been cases where such acts were carried out, and there have been many other attempts as well, r”l. “The words of Chazal do not move from their place,” he concludes.

In practice, the distinction may depend on country and circumstance. The Shevet HaKehasi (4:326) writes that it all depends on the law of the land. Where the government enforces its authority and murder is punishable by death, then non-Jews are not suspected of bloodshed. But in places where the government lacks control, and even if caught a murderer is only imprisoned but not executed, then the concern of bloodshed remains, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch, and one must be careful not to be secluded with them.

There is, however, another basis for leniency in the case of a foreign worker who is hired and paid as a caretaker. The Rema (Yoreh Deah 155:1) writes with regard to the prohibition of being treated by a non-Jewish doctor out of fear of bloodshed, that this applies only when the doctor works for free. But if he is paid, it is permitted, since he fears losing his livelihood. The Rema concludes that such is the common practice.

Although the Shach (6) cites the Maharshal and Bach, who dispute the Rema—arguing that the Gemara itself makes no distinction between a paid and unpaid doctor, and that the hatred of Jews is great—the Shach defends the Rema, and rules that the halachah is like the Rema.

Accordingly, in our case as well, since the foreign worker is earning his livelihood from this employment, there is no reason to suspect him of bloodshed, and one need not be concerned about seclusion in this regard.

Facing Yerushalayim for Tefillah

Q:
I am often asked by people who are unsure which direction they should face toward Eretz Yisrael when davening outside, such as when standing on an airplane or in an airport. I would like to outline here some practical guidelines for the halachah of facing east during Shemoneh Esrei.

A:
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 94:1) writes:
“When one rises to pray, if he is outside Eretz Yisrael he should turn his face toward Eretz Yisrael.”

The Rema adds (ibid. 2):
“We turn our faces to the east, since we are situated to the west of Eretz Yisrael, and thus our faces are directed toward Eretz Yisrael, etc. One who wishes to fulfill what Chazal said—‘one who wishes to become wealthy should face north, and one who wishes to become wise should face south’—should nevertheless turn his face eastward.”

See also the Levush, cited by later Acharonim, that one should incline his face southward. However, if he is davening in a Beis Knesses where the congregation faces another direction, he should daven together with the congregation but turn his face toward the east. See Mishnah Berurah (94:10).

If the congregation faces west, and he were to face east it would mean turning his back to both the Aron Kodesh and the congregation, he should angle himself either southward or northward. This I have heard in the name of several of the leading poskim of the previous generation. Although according to the Taz, if one is davening facing west there is no need to turn at all, nevertheless, the Kaf HaChaim (94:1) writes that even if one faces west, by angling slightly southward he is still considered to be facing somewhat toward Eretz Yisrael, since from our country Eretz Yisrael lies to the southeast.

And see further (ibid. 7), quoting the Zohar (Shemos 5b), that the Shechinah never departs from the Kosel Maaravi of the Beis HaMikdash. Those who live west of Eretz Yisrael, however, may not face west in prayer; only those living in a land that lies to the east of Eretz Yisrael should do so.

Therefore, if one stands facing west, he should turn his face away. Yet it is also likely that if the entire congregation is davening westward, even according to this opinion he should not turn his body differently from the congregation, but rather angle his face slightly southward.

It would seem that in the United States, there is no need to turn toward the south as in Europe, since when one is far away, even a slight turn places one’s face toward Yerushalayim. By contrast, countries closer to Eretz Yisrael must turn more noticeably, and the nearer the country, the more one must angle in order to be facing Yerushalayim.

In Japan, one must face west. Even according to the view of the Chazon Ish that regarding Shabbos and Yom Tov (with regard to the halachic date line), Japan is considered to be to the west of Eretz Yisrael, it is clear that this pertains only to the calculation of where the day begins. For tefillah, however, it is obvious that Eretz Yisrael is considered the center of the world and thus half the world east of Eretz Yisrael should pray facing west, and half the world west of Eretz Yisrael should pray facing east.

Regarding one who is traveling on an airplane: It would appear from Magen Avraham (94:14) and from the simple reading of Shulchan Aruch (94:4–7) that if one is able to have better kavanah while sitting, he may do so and daven in that way, especially if this will also avoid any question of davening in front of an ervah by turning his face the other way.

In any case, everything depends on the circumstances. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l already ruled that one should daven seated, so as not to cause disturbance or disruption. See also Teshuvos Chayei HaLevi (vol. 6, siman 17).