Parshas Nitzavim 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Changing the Edei Yichud After Two Minutes
Q:
An incident occurred where Reuven, who was one of the two witnesses for yichud, after already standing two minutes outside the Yichud room where the chosson and kallah seclude themselves, received an urgent phone call that he had to return home immediately. With no choice, he appointed Levi to stand there as a witness in his place, together with Shimon, the second witness. Afterwards, however, they wondered: could Levi join with Shimon to complete the testimony, or perhaps since each one is considered only “chatzi davar—half a matter,” and neither of them testified about the entire yichud, but only on half a yichud, therefore they cannot combine for valid testimony?
A:
We must analyze whether there is a need for witnesses at the chuppah at all. For the Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 10:1) writes:
“The betrothed woman (arusah) is prohibited to her husband m’divrei sofrim as long as she remains in her father’s home… And even if he betrothed her through intimacy, it is forbidden for him to have intimacy with her a second time in her father’s home, until he brings her into his house, and they seclude themselves, and he designates her for himself. And this seclusion is called ‘bringing into the chuppah,’ and that is what is called ‘marriage’ in the vernacular.”
The Ohr Sameach (ibid. 2) is uncertain whether chuppah requires witnesses, or perhaps it suffices with the acknowledgment of both [the chosson and kallah]. On the one hand, one could say that chuppah is like kiddushin, which requires witnesses, and just as there she is not mekudeshes by their mutual acknowledgment without witnesses, so too with chuppah she would not be considered married without witnesses. After his analysis he concludes:
“This matter is still very much unresolved to me in halacha; may Hashem show me the truth in His holy words.”
Others also raised the point that since the chosson designates the witnesses by saying “You are witnesses,” and in our case the chosson designated Reuven and Shimon, and not Levi, perhaps this is a concern as well.
The Aruch HaShulchan (Even HaEzer 42:31) writes that if one is mekadesh in front of witnesses, even if he did not say “You are witnesses,” she is mekudeshes. For the witnesses need not be formally designated, as is explained in Choshen Mishpat 39; rather, once they saw the act, they may testify to it. According to this, even if he designated witnesses, others who saw the act may testify as well. Nevertheless, it is proper to designate witnesses for kiddushin under the chuppah, and this the practice in many communities, for several reasons:
Because most of those standing there are distracted with the simchas chosson and kallah, and they do not look carefully at the main act of kiddushin to see it properly with two witnesses as required by Torah law.
Usually those standing close to the chosson and kallah are relatives, who are invalid as witnesses, while those who are valid are standing further away, and they do not see the kiddushin at all because of people blocking — and it would then be kiddushin without witnesses.
According to several poskim, when relatives and non-relatives together observe a testimony, even the non-relatives are invalidated (based on the halachah of “if one is found to be a relative or otherwise invalid, the entire group is invalid”). But when witnesses are formally designated, the relatives do not invalidate them, as explained in Choshen Mishpat 36. Therefore, it is proper to designate the witnesses; however, it is difficult to burden the chosson with this at this time, so it is proper that the rabbi officiating at the kiddushin should designate the witnesses.
It would seem that in our case the third concern is not relevant, since generally only the witnesses stand outside the yichud room, and not other people.
One may also add that according to many poskim, the designation of witnesses is not meakev (Beis Shmuel EH 42:8; Pischei Teshuvah there 11 in the name of the Avnei Miluim; Teshuvos R’ Akiva Eiger §94).
I further saw in Shevet HaLevi (vol. 11, siman 294), who discusses this and rules, regarding our very question, that there is no need to be stringent here, because there are several doubts in this case, as follows:
Even according to the Rambam, that the essence of chuppah is seclusion fit for intimacy, nevertheless, the Poskim dispute whether chuppah requires testimony like kiddushin. According to many Poskim (including the Meiri, beginning of Kesubos), it suffices with the acknowledgment of the couple, and there is no explicit source in Shas or early authorities requiring testimony.
In practice, we rule like the Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 10:2) that seclusion fit for intimacy is only required ideally (see Even HaEzer 55 with Pischei Teshuvah; Beis Shmuel 64:6; Pischei Teshuvah 64:9). The Chavas Daas in Siddur Derech Hachaim likewise wrote that “fit for intimacy” is not essential, since we hold that consummating a marriage with a besulah who was a niddah at the time of yichud is permissible on Shabbos, even though the yichud was not fit for intimacy. And this was established as halacha throughout the generations, following the Rosh (Kesubos 5:6), against the Rambam (see the Poskim 61:2, and Shach YD 192:8 that the universal custom is to perform marriages even when she is a niddah). Likewise, the Mishnah Berurah (339:32) rules that with a besulah, even yichud not fit for intimacy suffices; we are only stringent lechatchilah, to fulfill also the Rambam’s view when possible. (And it is known that often, in nearly all communities in chutz la’aretz, no concern was given at all to appointing witnesses for yichud.)
In our case, Reuven and Shimon already stood there for two minutes. The Gemara in Sotah (4a) discusses the shiur of yichud; according to many opinions three minutes is already the measure of yichud. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 178) rules that regarding prohibiting a woman to her husband, we hold like R’ Akiva that the measure of yichud is the time it takes to roast an egg and swallow it, and so ruled the Rambam — which may be more than three minutes. However, this was said in order not to forbid a woman to her husband. Here, the opposite, to draw a woman close to her husband, we could rely on the other views in Sotah that it is a shorter time. Since the entire matter of chuppah fit for intimacy is itself disputed, and even for us it is not meakev, it would seem that we may assume that even three minutes suffices as the measure of yichud. Even without this additional point, it seems there is room to be lenient. However, regarding yichud of a widow, it is more of a question, since many poskim hold that there indeed yichud fit for intimacy is required.
In Conclusion:
If two witnesses saw the beginning of the yichud of the chosson and kallah, and after two minutes one witness was replaced by a third person, and they remained there only for three minutes more, so that there were not two witnesses together for five consecutive minutes, there is room to be lenient.
Concern of Ayin Hara for Expectant Mothers
Q:
I am often asked by pregnant women whether it is true that they must be especially careful during pregnancy because of ayin hara. For example: one may not inform parents that they are expecting right away, or that it is forbidden to buy things for the baby before birth. Likewise, women ask whether they may attend a levayah or visit a cemetery during pregnancy, or if this is prohibited.
A:
We do find certain practices observed during pregnancy due to concern for ayin hara. There are those who do not announce a pregnancy publicly until it is physically noticeable. We already find precedent for this in the Taz (Yoreh De’ah 285:2), who cites a responsum of the Rema regarding a woman who had given birth three times in the eighth month, and suspected ayin hara to be the cause. She therefore wished to conceal her pregnancy even from family and neighbors, and with her husband’s agreement she would say she was in a state of impurity in the early months so that people would not know she was expecting, etc. [In that case, the discussion is whether she actually becomes impure based on her statement or not.]
Nevertheless, it seems that even for those who are careful about this, there is no reason not to inform one’s parents or close relatives, for they would certainly not cast an ayin hara. Still, some have the practice to delay even informing parents; it depends on the circumstances and should be guided by the family’s Rav.
There are also those who, out of concern for ayin hara, refrain from purchasing baby items before the birth. However, where there is a reason to buy earlier—such as a significant sale, or if something may not be readily available later—they may purchase, for since this is only a relatively small concern, when there is a need, one need not be stringent.
In Ohel Yaakov (Hilchos Chuppah V’Kiddushin), I cited the minhag that some avoid having a pregnant woman serve as a shushbinah to escort a chosson or kallah to the chuppah. The reasoning is that since many people are gathered and many people see her, there is concern for ayin hara. Others maintain that while there is no source at all for this practice, nevertheless since it has become widespread, it becomes a basis for concern. In practice, it seems that as long as her pregnancy is not yet visible, there is no concern. This is also brought in Teshuvos Be’er Moshe (3:184).
In the Sefer Pninei Rabbeinu HaKehilos Yaakov (II, p. 69), it is cited that the Steipler Gaon zt”l said he had never heard of avoiding appointing a pregnant woman as kvatter—and even though many claim such a minhag, in truth it has no basis. And certainly, for a pregnant woman to serve as shushbinah in escorting her own child to the chuppah, there is no concern whatsoever.
Expectant Mothers Entering a Cemetery
Q:
Often women who are expecting ask me if they are permitted to enter a cemetery for a funeral or a yahrzeit etc, since some say there is a ruach raah (impure spirit), and could have a negative effect on the child?
A:
As to whether a pregnant woman may enter a cemetery: many Sefarim indeed record the minhag that a pregnant woman does not attend funerals or visit cemeteries. Many have searched for a source for this practice.
Teshuvos Minchas Yitzchak (vol. 10, 42:2) writes that he did not know the origin of this custom, but we need no more than what the Rashba wrote (Teshuvos, 1:9): that one should not reject the traditions held by the elderly women of our nation. I also heard from my Mori V’Rabi Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, that based on the warning of the Vilna Gaon in his famous letter—that “one must be most careful never to go to a cemetery at all, for there the klipos (forces of impurity) cling most strongly, and all the more so for women”—there is room to say that at the very least, pregnant women should be careful about this so that the fetus should develop in purity.
Nevertheless, in Chukei HaChaim, R’ Noach Isaac Oelbaum writes that if there is a yahrzeit or the like (any pressing need), a pregnant woman may attend, but she should try to stand at a distance of at least four amos.