Parshas Ki Savo 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Dressing a Young Child in Clothing of the Opposite Gender
Q: Many young parents ask me: they have several small children, and sometimes, because of the sheer amount of laundry (bli ayin hara), there are no clothes or pajamas ready for the baby. They wish to dress them in clothing of the opposite gender, and they are uncertain whether it is permitted to dress a boy in clothing meant for a girl, or a girl in clothing meant for a boy, or perhaps one may be lenient, since they are small children and at that age people are not particular about such things. What is the halachah in this case?
A: At first glance, one would say that it is forbidden. For even if the child has not yet reached the age of chinuch, nonetheless it is forbidden to cause a minor to sin, or to feed him with one’s own hands something prohibited (as ruled in Orach Chaim 343:1). This prohibition does not depend at all on the age of chinuch, but applies even to a newborn. Accordingly, it would be forbidden to dress pants on a baby girl, even if she has not reached the age of chinuch. Indeed, this is expressed in Minchas Yitzchak (vol. 2 §108), that it is forbidden to dress pants on a little girl. (We should note that some say that there is no prohibition of lo yilbash in women’s pants at all, but in any case, this opinion would maintain that it would be forbidden to dress them in a garment that certainly falls under the prohibition of lo yilbash.)
From this arises a similar question: since some poskim hold that women are prohibited from wearing pants due to lo yilbash, therefore one must examine whether a little girl under the age of three may be dressed in pants, even pants made for girls. This is especially common in a situation where one has a few boys and later a girl is born, and the parents do not want to constantly buy new clothing, since the girl can be dressed in the clothing of the older boys. Is this prohibited? According to what was brought in Kerem Shlomo (YD 182:17:3), that it is forbidden to dress a boy in a woman’s garment or vice versa, like all prohibitions in the Torah — that it is forbidden to cause a minor to transgress by hand, even younger than three years old — and he brought this from Minchas Yitzchak (vol. 2 §108), it would seem that one must be stringent.
However, I later found in Minchas Pri (vol. 2 §66), where he was asked about this matter, and he ruled that certainly there is a prohibition to dress a boy in a woman’s garment, or a girl in a man’s garment, like all prohibitions which one may not cause a child to transgress. And likewise, the rules of chinuch apply regarding the prohibition of cross-dressing. Nevertheless, in places where it is customary to dress even a small girl in pants until the age of three, and people are not particular about the color or type, then it is permitted at that age, for at this age pants are not considered men’s clothing. And as for chinuch, this does not apply to ages younger than three. And if there is a need to dress a girl in pants above that age, for health reasons and the like — for example, she needs to crawl a lot and strengthen her muscles because she cannot yet walk — one may permit dressing her in pants. But in such a case, it must be pants made for girls, or some other garment must make it recognizable that she is a girl. And likewise, I heard from R. Avigdor Nebenzahl shlita, who also ruled leniently in this manner.
In Sefer L’Binyamin Amar (p. 65), he brought a responsum from R. Chaim Kanievsky ztz”l, about a small boy of about two years old who constantly wets his clothes, and sometimes he has no clean clothing to wear. Is it permitted to dress him in his sister’s clothing, or is this a violation of lo yilbash? He answered “no” — that is, even in such a case it is forbidden to dress the little boy in his sister’s clothing.
However, in Igros Moshe (Even HaEzer 4, §62:4), R’ Moshe Feinstein discusses when children must be educated…
Food Cooked by a Non-Jew Who Later Converted
Q: I was asked by a Ger, who had cooked food while still a non-Jew before completing the process of conversion. Now he wishes to know: may he eat the food that he cooked for himself, or since at the time of cooking he was a non-Jew, it is considered bishul akum and forbidden? Or perhaps there is further reason to permit, since at the time he was a non-Jew, the prohibition of bishul akum did not apply to him, and therefore no prohibition took effect on the food, and he may indeed eat it?
A: We have mentioned in previous issues that the prohibition of bishul akum is based on two reasons: either because it will lead to intermarriage, or so that he does not become accustomed to eating and drinking with a non-Jew, and ultimately be fed something treif (see Avodah Zarah 38a). At first glance, both of these reasons do not apply to a convert.
However, one must consider: when the Sages decreed bishul akum, did the decree take effect at the time of cooking, or only at the time of eating food that had been cooked by a non-Jew? With regard to a convert who cooked food while he was still a non-Jew, and now has converted, this would seem to be the practical difference between the two approaches: If the decree takes effect at the time of cooking, then he wasn’t Jewish at the time for it to become forbidden to him; if, however, it becomes forbidden when he wishes to eat it, then right now he is a Jew. On the other hand, one might argue that “lo plug — the Sages did not differentiate,” and their decree applies without exception.
We find that the Ra’ah in Bedek HaBayis (Bayis 3, Shaar 7) wrote that if a non-Jew cooked for a sick person on Shabbos, there is no concern of bishul akum, and it is permitted even for a healthy person to eat that food after Shabbos. For there is no relationship formed through food prepared for the sick, and Chazal did not apply their rules consistently in this matter — sometimes they prohibited, sometimes they permitted. The Rema brings this as halachah (113:16).
From this, it appears that the Sages did not prohibit in every case by reason of lo plug (not distinguishing), but the halachah varies according to circumstances. So too it seems from the Rashba in Mishmeres HaBayis, who analyzes at length the Ra’ah’s words that closeness is not created by cooking for the sick. It would appear that he essentially agrees with him, that if the concern of closeness does not apply, there is no reason to prohibit. According to them, the same reasoning applies to a convert.
In fact, I found a dispute among later authorities on this very matter. Lev Aryeh (vol. 2 §25) rules stringently. But Avnei Zikaron (88:1) rules leniently. The reasoning of the lenient view is that one cannot say in this case, “once it was forbidden it remains forbidden,” because for him it was never forbidden at all. For while he was a non-Jew, it was permitted for him to eat his own food, and therefore the food that was cooked remains permitted. The Avnei Zikaron is even inclined to say that not only for the Ger himself is it permitted, but even for others it is permitted to eat from his food, since there is no prohibition of intermarriage in food cooked by him.
Chayei HaLevi (vol. 4, §54:7) discusses a Ger who converted and had keilim in which he had cooked only vegetables and kosher foods. He discusses whether the decree of bishul akum applies in such a case, that the utensils would need kashering. He concludes in practice, the keilim should be kashered, since most likely they were used also for real issur.
In Practice: Since the Acharonim disagree, ideally, when there is no financial loss, it is proper for the Ger to be stringent. However, one who is lenient in this has upon whom to rely.
Heter Iska for Purchasing a Home
Q: I have been asked many times, both here in Eretz Yisroel (where banks owned by Jews are common) and chutz la’aretz, regarding loans for business purposes between friends, partners, and the like. Often, such loans involve interest, which can only be permitted through a heter iska.
The question then becomes: since the whole basis of permitting a loan through heter iska is only when the borrower actually engages in business with the funds he received from the lender (because then the money received higher than the principal loan is not viewed as interest, but rather a return on their investment) — it would seem that there is no basis to borrow from the bank under a heter iska for purposes such as buying a house. Accordingly, we must analyze what the basis is to borrow money through a heter iska in order to buy a home, when no business is actually being done with the mortgage funds.
This week we added an additional discussion in regards to Heter Iska for purchasing a house, please refer also to last week’s discussion where we elaborated on the topic of Heter Iska.
A: In Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Hilchos Ribbis 42) it is written:
“All of this applies when the money that one receives is itself the iska with which he engages in business to earn profit, and he does not spend it on personal expenses. But if he used more than half of the funds (which are classified as the loan portion) for expenditures that do not generate profit — such as food and other household needs, or a residence, or repayment of debts — then this constitutes actual ribbis.”
In Teshuvos Cheshev Ha’ephod (Vol. 1, §53), this very question is discussed. He cites that many are lenient, reasoning that even though the loan is for household needs, he profits indirectly since by using the loan for his household, other funds remain available for use in business. In that sense, it is considered indirectly as a business loan. He acknowledges that this is a weak justification, but adds further room for leniency: when one borrows money from a bank, there is no individual lender who is personally responsible for the funds, such that the prohibition of ribbis would apply to him. Neither the shareholders, directors, nor the treasurer bear personal liability. He writes that the Tchebiner Rav zt”l also agreed that one may be lenient, b’tziruf all these considerations. This is similar to the rationale offered earlier in Shoel U’Meishiv.
It seems that even according to the Poskim who were stringent — against the Shoel U’Meishiv, Maharsham, and Cheshav Ha’ephod — and would therefore hold that one who has no other business and borrows a mortgage to purchase a home cannot normally rely on this leniency, nevertheless, we may still permit for the following reason:
Since housing prices generally appreciate, when one buys a home, he is effectively making an investment in an asset that will rise in value. Although sometimes the appreciation of the home may not match the high interest percentage charged by the bank (and thus it would seemingly be considered ribbis), there is an additional point to consider: if he would have to pay the bank rent for its share of the house — as would be the case in any iska partnership — then generally the rental value, together with the property’s appreciation, would cover the “extra money” (dmei hispashrus) owed to the bank.