Parshas Toldos – 5787 – Intriguing Questions & Answers

Rabbi Yaakov Aron Skoczylas   -  

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Is It Permissible to Burn Challah in the Oven While Baking Bread

Q: A common question regarding a woman who was pressed for time on Erev Shabbos and wanted to bake her challahs in the oven while simultaneously burning the portion of dough she had separated for challah. Is there any halachic concern with doing so?

A: Contemporary poskim have discussed whether one may initially burn the separated challah while baking bread in the same oven, or whether there is a concern of reicha (the transfer of taste through aroma) or zei’ah (steam). Some maintain that one should preferably not burn the separated challah while baking bread, while others permit doing so even lechatchilah. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 108:1) discusses whether reicha milsa hi — whether aroma is halachically significant. We have discussed this extensively in my sefer Ohel Yaakov, Hilchos Basar B’Chalav.

Regarding our question, there are two concerns to consider: reicha and zei’ah. First, regarding reicha, many Acharonim disagree whether bread is considered a fatty food (davar shamen) or a lean food (davar kachush), and whether the concern of reicha applies to it at all. The Taz and Shach, at the beginning of siman 108, write that there is no concern of reicha when both foods are lean. Although some are stringent even when both foods are lean, nearly all poskim are lenient regarding two types of bread, since both are completely lean and there is no concern of reicha, even lechatchilah. See Pri Megadim at the beginning of the siman, Shulchan Aruch HaRav (447:9), and Mishnah Berurah (461:22).

Halachah Lemaaseh: It appears that according to the basic halachah, there is no concern with baking bread in the oven at the same time as the dough separated for challah. Nevertheless, in practice, it seems preferable to be stringent lechatchilah, unless the separated dough is wrapped on all sides. If one already baked them together, there is no need for concern, since bedieved we are not concerned about reicha. Regarding zei’ah, we follow the Pri Megadim, cited in Pischei Teshuvah (92:6), that zei’ah does not apply to foods. See also Challah K’Hilchasah (1:16) and the explanations there.

However, I saw in Shu”t Avnei Yashfeh, Vol. V (139:6), that he was asked this question and permitted burning the separated challah in the same oven in which cakes were being baked, even though the cakes were initially moist, provided that the separated challah was placed at the bottom of the oven, in an area where food is not normally baked. The Author of Shu”t Shevet HaKehasi, wrote in the Alim L’Terufah publication that lechatchilah, one should not burn the separated challah while baking bread in the same oven. However, there is room to question this stringency. After all, the Shach and Taz (108:1) write that when both foods are lean, one may be lenient regarding reicha even lechatchilah.

Although some disagree, including the Beis Meir and Aruch HaShulchan, the Yad Yehudah (se’if katan 2) distinguishes between two types of bread and other lean foods, explaining that bread does not present a concern of reicha at all. Nevertheless, there is room to be concerned even when both items are bread, although this is not required according to the basic halachah, which permits it even lechatchilah.

I would also like to point out that although the poskim were not concerned about reicha between two types of bread, perhaps our bread is different, since we add oil, eggs, and similar ingredients to the dough. It may therefore present a concern of reicha. This matter still requires further examination. We therefore see that, in practice, there are poskim who are not concerned about this. Nevertheless, the matter remains subject to disagreement, and since some are stringent lechatchilah, it is preferable to be careful. In the case, where the woman was pressed for time on Erev Shabbos, there is certainly room to be lenient.

Halachah Lemaaseh: One who wishes to burn the separated challah in the oven while baking bread should preferably wrap it completely in aluminum foil, in which case it is permitted.

This applies provided there is no water beneath the foil. However, if one is baking a food containing a large amount of liquid, causing the entire oven to fill with steam and moisture, there is a concern that the oven may become prohibited in that area. It is therefore preferable not to burn the separated challah while such a dish is being cooked.


Someone Who Forgot Mayim Acharonim and Remembered During Birchas Hamazon

Q: A common question arises when someone forgets to wash mayim acharonim before Birchas Hamazon and remembers only in the middle of Birchas Hamazon. Must he wash immediately upon remembering, or is it no longer necessary, since washing afterward would not accomplish anything?

A: The Tur (O.C. 181) cites two primary reasons for the obligation to wash mayim acharonim at the end of a meal, before Birchas Hamazon:

  1. To remove any dirt or residue from the hands before reciting a berachah.
  2. Because melech Sedomis (Sodomite salt) can cause blindness if it comes into contact with the eyes.

The Shulchan Aruch (181:10) writes that some have the custom not to wash mayim acharonim, since melach Sedomis is no longer commonly found among us. Nevertheless, the poskim write that one should wash even nowadays. The Beis Yosef cites the Rambam, who explains that there may be other types of salt with properties similar to melach Sedomis. Similarly, the Magen Avraham writes in the name of the Mekubalim that every person should be careful to wash mayim acharonim.

Accordingly, if one remembers in the middle of Birchas Hamazon that he did not wash, he certainly must still wash his hands. After all, he still needs to continue reciting Birchas Hamazon, and his hands should not be dirty. The other reasons for washing also remain applicable. If he remembers only after completing Birchas Hamazon, it is true that the reason of removing dirt before reciting a berachah no longer applies, since he has already finished. Nevertheless, the concern of melach Sedomis still applies. Accordingly, whenever one remembers that he did not wash mayim acharonim, even a considerable time after Birchas Hamazon, he should wash his hands. See also Mekor Chaim, by the Chavos Yair, who mentions a custom among Ashkenazim to wash their hands even after Birchas Hamazon. Therefore, washing afterward is certainly appropriate in such a case.

Halachah Lemaaseh: One who forgot to wash mayim acharonim before Birchas Hamazon and remembers during Birchas Hamazon or afterward should wash his hands when he remembers.


Removing Flakes of Skin (Dandruff) from Clothing on Shabbos

Q: It is common for some people on Shabbos to remove flakes of skin, commonly known as dandruff, from their shirts, jackets, or other clothing. It is well known that removing dust from a black garment can involve the prohibition of melaben (laundering), since cleaning dust from clothing resembles washing it and is prohibited on Shabbos. Does the same prohibition apply to removing dandruff, or is it different from dust?

A: The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 302:1) rules that one may remove feathers from a garment.

The Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 7) explains that this is not comparable to laundering, since feathers are not embedded in the garment like water or dirt, but merely rest on its surface. Therefore, they may be removed even from a new black garment whose owner is particular about its cleanliness. We learn an important principle from this halachah.

There are two types of dirt found on clothing. One type actually soils the garment itself, such as dust, dirt, or water. The other consists of foreign substances resting on the garment, such as feathers or mud.

In the second case, the garment itself is not considered dirty; rather, it is a garment with something dirty resting upon it. Therefore, such substances may be removed, since doing so does not constitute laundering the garment. They are merely foreign objects that have settled on its surface, unlike dust and dirt. This explains the distinction between dust, water, and dirt, where several conditions must be met before shaking them off is permitted, and feathers or mud, which may be removed without those conditions.

Accordingly, in the case under discussion, one may remove the flakes of skin from the garment. Similarly, if a garment falls on the floor and foreign substances such as hair or similar items become attached to it, they may be removed.

The Concern of Muktzeh:

However, we must still consider why removing feathers and other permitted substances does not involve the prohibition of moving muktzeh. From the explanation given by the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (302:3), it would appear that only feathers that were previously inside a pillow or cushion are not considered muktzeh. Accordingly, other substances, such as flakes of skin, hair, threads, and similar items, should seemingly be prohibited to remove by hand because of muktzeh. However, the Minchas Yitzchak (Vol. V, siman 38) cites the Chazon Ish (47:15), who permits their removal because they are considered subordinate to the permitted object.

Furthermore, when the permitted object is the primary item, removing a small unwanted substance is considered an act of improving the permitted object, and therefore does not involve the prohibition of muktzeh. This can be explained further: As long as the unwanted substance remains on the garment, it is not considered muktzeh, since it is subordinate to the garment.

Therefore, when one takes hold of it to remove it, he is handling it in a permitted manner. Once it has been removed, he may also discard it. This is also the practical ruling of the Sefer Meir Nesivos (page 7).

There is no room here to elaborate on the separate prohibition mentioned in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah regarding scratching one’s head in order to remove flakes of skin or dandruff. See there for further discussion.


Practical Corner: By Rabbi Nesanel Odzer from the Rabbanim of Beis Horaah KLY:

What Bracha Does One Make on Sushi When There Is No Majority Ingredient?

Q: What bracha should one make on sushi consisting of 40% rice, 30% salmon, and 30% cucumber?

A: The Mishnah teaches us the fundamental principle of ikkur and tafel: When two foods are eaten together, one makes a bracha on the ikkur (primary food), thereby exempting the tafel (secondary food) from requiring its own bracha (Mishnah Berachos 44a; Shulchan Aruch O.C. 212:1). The classic case is where one food is eaten merely to enhance the other. For example, when spreading a thin layer of cream cheese on a rice cake, the cream cheese is considered tafel, as its purpose is to enhance the rice cake.

However, there is another category of ikkur and tafel, where both foods are significant in their own right. When they form a single dish, the halacha generally follows the majority ingredient (Rosh, Berachos 6:8; Shulchan Aruch O.C. 208:7; Mishnah Berurah 212:1). Thus, when eating sushi containing rice and salmon, if both are considered significant, the bracha generally follows whichever constitutes the majority. However, if one ingredient is clearly considered secondary to the other, the bracha follows the ikkur, even when it is the minority. An important exception is the rule of kol sheyesh bo, whereby even a minority of the five grains can determine the bracha of a mixture. However, rice is not one of the five grains, and therefore does not enjoy this special status (Shulchan Aruch O.C. 208:2, 7).

Our question, however, presents an interesting complication: What happens when no ingredient constitutes a majority?

One might suggest that since the rice makes up 40% of the sushi, more than either of the other ingredients, it should determine the bracha. However, this would seem to be a mistake. The Shaar HaTziyon (208:34) explicitly explains that the principle of following the majority is based on rubo kekulo, meaning that a majority is halachically treated as though it represents the entire entity. Accordingly, when rice constitutes the majority, it is considered as though the dish consists entirely of rice. However, this reasoning seemingly requires an actual majority, not merely the largest of several minorities. Thus, when rice constitutes only 40% of the dish, the principle of rubo kekulo would not apply.

This leaves us with two possible approaches.

The first approach is to make three separate brachos: Mezonos on the rice, Haadama on the cucumber, and Shehakol on the salmon. After all, each ingredient is significant, and none constitutes a majority that would exempt the others.

Indeed, the Chayei Adam maintains that when different foods remain individually recognizable, each requires its own bracha (Chayei Adam 51:13; 54:9). However, the Biur Halacha (212:1, s.v. Im Ha’ikkur Me’urav) discusses this opinion and concludes that, in a mixture with a majority ingredient, we do not follow it in practice, because of safek brachos lehakel. Nevertheless, where there is no majority at all, there may be greater room to consider this approach.

The second approach is to recite a single bracha that can exempt all three ingredients, at least bedieved (after the fact). The Mishnah explicitly teaches that Shehakol exempts all foods bedieved, a ruling codified by the Shulchan Aruch (Berachos 40a; Shulchan Aruch O.C. 206:1). Interestingly, the Chayei Adam suggests that Mezonos also exempts virtually all foods bedieved, since everything nourishing is called mazon, apart from water and salt (Chayei Adam 58:3; Biur Halacha 167:10, s.v. Bimkom Birchas Hamotzi).

Accordingly, both Mezonos and Shehakol might serve as inclusive brachos. However, there is an important distinction: The effectiveness of Shehakol is an explicit ruling of the Mishnah, whereas the broader effectiveness of Mezonos is a later, disputed ruling (see Aruch HaShulchan O.C. 167:19). Therefore, according to this approach, Shehakol would appear preferable.

Summary: Since there is no straightforward hachra’ah regarding this unusual mixture, the preferable solution is to make Mezonos, Haadama, and Shehakol on three separate foods, explicitly intending to exempt the corresponding ingredients of the sushi. However, if this is not possible, the Libun HaBracha (p. 262) rules that one should separate the three ingredients of the sushi and make the appropriate bracha on each one individually before eating them together. Although deliberately separating a tafel from its ikkur in order to make an additional bracha is generally considered a bracha she’eina tzricha (an unnecessary bracha), in our case, the separation is being done specifically to avoid a genuine safek regarding the appropriate bracha. We may therefore rely on the poskim who maintain that an additional bracha made for the purpose of resolving a halachic doubt is not considered a bracha she’eina tzricha. This is especially justified in light of the Chayei Adam’s opinion that each recognizable ingredient requires its own bracha even when eaten together as one dish. According to his opinion, all three brachos are genuinely required, further strengthening our grounds for relying on the lenient opinions regarding bracha she’eina tzricha.