Parshas Vayeira – 5787 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Ask The Rav
May Someone Suffering from Heartburn Take Tums on Shabbos?
Q: It is common for people to experience heartburn after eating certain foods on Shabbos, while others suffer from heartburn regularly. Is it permissible to take Tums, a medication that relieves heartburn, on Shabbos, or is it prohibited because of the concern of shechikas samemanim (grinding medicinal ingredients), just as taking medication is generally prohibited on Shabbos?
A: We will briefly explain the practical halachah. A person suffering from severe heartburn that causes his entire body to become weak, or causes him considerable discomfort, has the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah (a person who is ill but not dangerously so). Such a person may take medication on Shabbos, including chewable tablets and a baking soda solution, as explained in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 328), that a choleh she’ein bo sakanah may take medication on Shabbos. However, regarding someone who suffers from heartburn but does not experience weakness throughout his body, we must consider whether he is prohibited from taking medication or drinking a baking soda solution to relieve the heartburn, or whether these are considered ordinary foods consumed by healthy people, as discussed in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 328:37).
At first glance, it is difficult to permit taking Tums on the grounds that it is considered an ordinary food מאכל בריאים. After all, people do not generally purchase Tums unless they need relief from heartburn. Nobody buys it simply because it tastes sweet; for that purpose, people purchase other candies. It is therefore clear that one takes Tums specifically for medicinal purposes. However, if a person is not yet experiencing any heartburn but anticipates that it may develop because he ate a particular food, he may take medication to prevent the discomfort. This is because taking preventative measures is not included in the prohibition against taking medication on Shabbos. Similarly, even if he has already begun experiencing heartburn, he may eat certain foods that naturally relieve the discomfort, such as almonds and the like, since these are ordinary foods eaten by healthy people.
If, however, a person suffers from chronic heartburn, he is considered ill, particularly if the condition causes him to become weak throughout his body. In such a case, he may take the aforementioned remedies. This is what my rebbi, Maran HaGaon Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, ruled for me: If a person has difficulty functioning because of his heartburn, or if his entire body becomes weak, he may take something on Shabbos to relieve the discomfort. This is also stated in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah. However, in the ordinary case where someone suddenly experiences heartburn during Shabbos, it is considered a מיחוש (minor discomfort), and he may not take medication for it. Nevertheless, he may eat or drink foods that healthy people normally consume, such as cucumbers or soda water, as explained in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 328:37).
Regarding drinking a baking soda solution, the poskim disagree. Shu”t Az Nidberu, Vol. I (siman 31), and Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah are stringent, since it is not considered something normally consumed by healthy people. However, the Ketzos HaShulchan is lenient. There are also poskim who permit taking medication even when heartburn strikes suddenly. Their reasoning is that heartburn is not considered an illness at all, but rather discomfort caused by eating too much, which is not classified as an illness, as explained in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 328:39).
Nevertheless, one should not rely on this opinion alone unless the case involves a pregnant woman or for one who suffers from this chronically. For an ordinary person who wishes to relieve his heartburn, it is preferable to mix the tablet into food.
Halachah Lemaaseh: A person who suffers from chronic heartburn that causes general bodily weakness or makes it difficult for him to function may take Tums on Shabbos. However, if he does not suffer from chronic heartburn but experiences it only occasionally, lechatchilah he should be stringent and eat only ordinary foods that help relieve the heartburn. If the discomfort is particularly difficult, he may mix the tablet into food and rely on the poskim who are lenient in this regard.
Someone Who Ate Cholent and Wants to Drink Milk an Hour Later Because of Severe Heartburn:
In a case where someone ate cholent on Shabbos and subsequently developed painful heartburn, we must consider whether he may drink milk after only one hour to relieve the discomfort, or whether he must still wait the full six hours after eating meat. At first glance, we can argue that either way, the halachah is clear. If he is considered sufficiently ill that the ordinary restriction against taking medication does not apply, then his illness would also permit him to drink milk after only one hour. If he is a choleh she’ein bo sakanah whose entire body has become weak, he may take either milk or medication. However, if he is not particularly ill and is merely experiencing the ordinary discomfort of heartburn, there is certainly no basis to permit drinking milk within six hours of eating meat, since he is not considered ill.
This was also the ruling of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Rav Yisroel Yaakov Fisher zt”l.
Two People Who Accidentally Exchanged Their Tallisim After Using the Restroom
I was asked about a common situation in which two people leave shul during davening to use the restroom. Upon returning, each mistakenly takes the other person’s tallis. At the end of davening, they realize their mistake and exchange the tallisim back. Must each recite another berachah when putting on his own tallis, perhaps because there was a hesech hadaas?
Removing a Tallis and Putting It on Again — When Is Another Berachah Required?
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 8:14) rules that if one removes his tallis, even intending to put it back on immediately, he must recite another berachah. The Rema, however, rules that if he intended to put it back on, no additional berachah is required. He also cites an opinion that this applies only if he continued wearing a tallis katan. See Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 38).
The Kaf HaChaim (O.C. 8:52) and others write that even Sephardim follow the Rema’s ruling in this matter and do not recite another berachah, because of safek berachos lehakel.
The Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 37) explains that since he intended to put the tallis back on immediately and did so, removing it is not considered an interruption. This remains true even if he changed locations, such as removing it before entering the restroom, provided he subsequently puts on the same tallis.
This differs from tefillin, where the poskim agree (O.C. 25:12) that removing them to enter the restroom constitutes an interruption. Since one may not enter a restroom wearing tefillin, it is considered a complete interruption. With a tallis, however, there is technically no prohibition against entering a restroom while wearing it, although it is improper to do so. Therefore, removing it does not constitute an interruption.
Intending to Put the Tallis Back On:
If, when removing his tallis, he did not intend to put it back on immediately but only after some time, all opinions agree that he must recite another berachah, even if he subsequently puts it back on immediately and even if he continued wearing a tallis katan. This is because the mitzvah ended when he removed it. Similarly, if he intended to put it back on immediately but subsequently delayed and had a hesech hadaas, he must recite another berachah, even if he continued wearing a tallis katan. See Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 38). However, when one removes his tallis during davening, even without any specific intention, it is assumed that he intends to put it back on. If he folds it and places it in its bag, this is considered as though he explicitly intended not to put it back on.
An Unintentional Hesech Hadaas:
Based on the above, we must consider whether our case constitutes a hesech hadaas, since the apparent interruption occurred only because of a mistake.
The Maharsham, in Daas Torah (O.C. 8:14), discusses a person who mistakenly removed his tallis and then remembered that he still needed to daven Mussaf. He cites the Magen Avraham (O.C. 190:3), who rules that if someone mistakenly recited a berachah acharonah over the cup of Birchas Hamazon while intending to continue drinking, he does not need another berachah rishonah before drinking again. However, the Maharsham distinguishes between the two cases. Regarding a tallis, one must specifically intend to put it back on, and in this case, he did not have that intention. Therefore, another berachah would be required. Regarding eating and drinking, however, as long as one did not intend to stop, no new berachah is necessary. A similar distinction appears in the Taz (Yoreh Deah 19:8). Nevertheless, the Aruch HaShulchan (O.C. 179:6) cites differing opinions regarding whether a mistaken hesech hadaas is considered a genuine interruption. According to the opinion that an unintentional hesech hadaas is not considered an interruption, one would not need another berachah when putting on his own tallis.
I also heard from my rebbi, Maran Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, that this is not considered a hesech hadaas at all, even one resulting from a mistake, since the person intended throughout to continue wearing his tallis for the remainder of davening. As explained earlier, when one intends to continue davening with his tallis, there is no hesech hadaas and no additional berachah is required.
Halachah Lemaaseh: When two people leave shul to use the restroom and mistakenly exchange their tallisim, each wearing the other’s tallis, it appears that when they subsequently put on their own tallisim, this is not considered a hesech hadaas. Therefore, neither needs to recite another berachah.
Practical Corner: By Rabbi Nesanel Odzer from the Rabbanim of Beis Horaah KLY:
Are Prediction Markets (Such as Polymarket and Similar Platforms) Permitted According to Halacha, and How Do They Differ from Stocks?
Before addressing the actual halachic question, it is important to note that the Rivash (432) sharply condemns gambling as repulsive and destructive, even according to those who maintain that it is technically permitted. The purpose of this discussion is solely to examine the halachic permissibility of gambling, not to encourage or endorse it in any way. With that in mind, we can now discuss the halachic aspects of the question.
The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 24b) disqualifies one who gambles for money from giving testimony. The Gemara offers two approaches to explaining this disqualification. According to the first, gambling involves asmachta, which refers to a conditional financial commitment that lacks the firm intention (gemirus da’as) necessary to make it halachically binding. In the case of gambling, each participant agrees to risk his money in anticipation of winning, but does not necessarily have a wholehearted intention to relinquish it if he loses. Consequently, the winner’s acquisition of the money may not be halachically valid, making it considered a form of rabbinic theft. According to the second approach, the concern is that the gambler is not engaged in yishuvo shel olam, meaning, he is not viewed as being a productive person within society. The Gemara clarifies that this second concern does not apply to someone who has another occupation.
The Rambam (Gezeilah 6:10) and Shulchan Aruch (CM 370:2) rule that gambling is prohibited as gezel derabbanan.
The Rema (CM 370:3), however, follows the more lenient approach, according to which me’ikar hadin, gambling is permitted even between Jews, provided the individual has another genuine occupation. The Rema (CM 207:13) further requires that the money be placed on the table beforehand, rather than merely promised afterward. Since prediction markets such as Polymarket require the money to be committed upfront, there are grounds to consider this condition fulfilled, assuming the transaction constitutes a halachically valid acquisition. (See Mishnah Berurah 322:22, who seems to be choshesh for the position of the Shulchan Aruch.)
However, there is an additional consideration that provides grounds for leniency even according to the Shulchan Aruch. The Rambam (Gezeilah 6:11) and Shulchan Aruch (CM 370:3) explicitly rule that gambling with a non-Jew does not involve gezel derabbanan. Since most participants in international prediction markets such as Polymarket are presumably non-Jewish, there are substantial grounds to permit such transactions even according to the Shulchan Aruch.
Stocks, by contrast, are fundamentally different. Although purchasing stocks can be highly speculative, the investor is acquiring an actual ownership interest in a business. This is no different in principle from purchasing real estate or undertaking another business venture that carries the risk of financial loss. In contrast, purchasing a prediction about the outcome of an election is essentially wagering on an uncertain event. The fact that the position can subsequently be sold for a profit does not, by itself, transform the wager into a conventional investment.
In summary, purchasing stocks is permitted as an ordinary business investment, notwithstanding the financial risks involved. Prediction markets, on the other hand, raise the halachic concerns associated with gambling. Nevertheless, for Ashkenazim there are substantial grounds for leniency even when gambling against Jews, provided the money is already given upfront, although there is room to be stringent based on the words of the Mishnah Berurah. Moreover, given the presumably predominantly non-Jewish participation in platforms such as Polymarket, this would permit such transactions even according to the Shulchan Aruch, provided the individual has another genuine occupation.
