Parshas Shoftim – 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Ask The Rav
May Someone Transfer His Place in Line to Another Person by Giving Over a Numbered Ticket?
Q: A common situation arises when someone takes a numbered ticket at a bank or post office and waits for his turn. If he later realizes that the wait is too long and decides to leave, may someone else use his ticket?
This question arises in two forms:
- If the original holder simply leaves the ticket behind on the counter, may another person who finds it use it?
- If he intentionally gives or even sells the ticket to a friend, may the friend use it?
A: I want to present some opinions from Gedolei Haposkim, and since they have different opinions, it is preferable to ask your Rav beforehand.
Some poskim wanted to distinguish between these two cases. If the person simply abandoned the ticket and left, another individual may not use it. Once the original holder relinquished his place, everyone else already waiting in line immediately acquired the benefit of moving one place closer to the front. That benefit now belongs collectively to those waiting, and no newcomer may appropriate it.
If, however, the original holder intentionally gives the ticket to a friend before relinquishing it, the situation is different. Since he never abandoned his place, the others in line never acquired that benefit, and his friend may use the ticket. Harav Yitzchak Zilberstein shlit”a concurred with this distinction.
Rav Zilberstein further noted that many modern queue systems require customers to enter their identification number when obtaining a ticket, so that the clerk already has their account information available when their turn arrives. In such cases, transferring the ticket is improper, as it delays everyone else while the clerk must retrieve the new customer’s information. Since this inconveniences the public, the ticket should not be transferred.
My dear friend Rav Moshe Fried discussed this with some prominent poskim in Eretz Yisroel, as is recorded in his sefer Vayishma Moshe.
Harav Yaakov Meir Stern shlit”a agreed that the distinction is halachically correct. Nevertheless, he felt that even where transferring the ticket is technically permitted, it is preferable not to do so and instead wait one’s turn like everyone else. Certainly, in the computerized system described above, the ticket should not be transferred.
Harav Shamai Gross shlit”a, however, maintained that even someone who merely finds an abandoned ticket may use it.
Although others explain that the issue depends on how the numbered ticket is viewed. If the ticket itself establishes one’s place in line, it may be transferred or even sold. If, however, the ticket merely records the order in which people arrived, then someone who arrived later cannot use another person’s ticket to bypass those who came before him.
Practically speaking, they leaned toward permitting one person to transfer his ticket to another, except in systems where the ticket is personalized with the original holder’s identifying information.
Finally, Harav Naftali Nussbaum shlit”a emphasized that the determining factor is the policy of the institution itself. Since the bank or post office establishes the rules governing its queue system, one should follow its regulations. If the institution does not permit transferring tickets, then doing so is prohibited.
When in doubt, it is preferable to refrain. Therefore one should ask their Rav what is the accepted way to behave in such a situation.
Should a Yoledes Stay Close to the Hospital for Shabbos?
Q: Many young couples ask me, particularly before their first child, whether, since there is always a possibility that the baby will be born on Shabbos, a woman who is nearing the end of her ninth month is required to spend Shabbos in a location closer to the hospital so that she will not need to be mechalel Shabbos by traveling there, or whether there is no need to be particular about this.
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Siman 330:1) states that a yoledes is considered a choleh sheyesh bo sakanah, and Shabbos may be violated for anything she requires.
The Mishnah Berurah (s.k. 1) writes that it is therefore proper for a woman who has reached her ninth month to prepare everything she will need before each Erev Shabbos, in case she gives birth on Shabbos and will then not need to be mechalel Shabbos. This is based on the Magen Avraham (s.k. 1), who cites the Sefer Chassidim (Siman 1105).
Nevertheless, it is clear from his words that she is not obligated to spend Shabbos in a location close to the hospital in order to avoid having to travel there on Shabbos, since doing so can involve difficulty and inconvenience.
This is also brought in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa (Perek 36, se’if 7) in the name of the Chazon Ish and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach.
The Kovetz Teshuvos of Rav Elyashiv (Vol. 1, Siman 43) likewise writes that, according to halachah, she is not required to stay near the hospital on Shabbos.
She is also permitted to spend Shabbos elsewhere, such as at her parents’ home, even if that location is farther from the hospital and would require a longer drive or traveling outside the techum.
The reason for all of the above is that, according to the strict halachah, she is not required to make special efforts to prevent a potential chillul Shabbos. This is a situation that may arise naturally, and she is not bringing herself into that situation through her own actions. Furthermore, it is only a possibility that she will come to need to be mechalel Shabbos, since it is entirely possible that the birth will not take place on Shabbos at all.
The Sefer Chassidim’s recommendation is therefore not a halachic obligation, but rather something that is proper to do.
Furthermore, it is discussing a situation where she can prepare everything before Shabbos without incurring any loss or difficulty. Where doing so involves significant inconvenience or detracts from her oneg Shabbos, she is not required to do so, particularly if she is planning to travel to the hospital with the assistance of a non-Jew.
It should be noted, however, that if she has already begun experiencing labor pains before Shabbos and it is very likely that she will give birth on Shabbos, it is certainly very advisable to travel to the hospital before Shabbos in order to avoid chillul Shabbos, since she knows that within a few hours she will likely be in active labor.
As always, any such question should be brought to a Rav, since the halachah can depend on the specific circumstances of each individual case.
May a Garment Containing Shaatnez Be Returned to the Store for a Refund?
Q: A man purchased a garment from a store whose owners are not Torah observant. Before wearing it, he submitted it for a shaatnez inspection, which revealed that the garment contained prohibited wool and linen and may not be worn.
Rather than investing in having the shaatnez removed, he preferred to return the garment to the store in exchange for a refund or store credit toward another purchase.
However, before returning it, he wondered whether doing so would constitute lifnei iver (placing a stumbling block before another), since the store owners might simply resell the garment to another customer who would be unaware of the problem and unknowingly transgress the severe prohibition of wearing shaatnez.
Is one permitted to return such a garment?
A: Before addressing the specific question, it is important to first consider whether a Jew may engage in the sale of garments known to contain shaatnez.
I presented this question to my rebbe, Harav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, who ruled that such garments may be sold to a non-Jew, provided there is no concern that they will later be sold to a Jew.
In my sefer Mitzion Tetzei Torah (Vol. I, p. 243), I cited the ruling of Harav Shmuel Wosner zt”l, who expressed concern that selling such garments may involve the prohibition of lifnei iver.
His reasoning is based on the ruling of the Rema (Yoreh Deah 151) regarding the sale of items associated with idolatry, where differing opinions exist, and although common practice follows the lenient view, the Rema concludes that a ba’al nefesh should nevertheless be stringent.
Similarly, the Igros Moshe (Yoreh Deah I:72) discusses selling garments that may contain shaatnez to Jews who are unlikely to have them tested.
He distinguishes between cases where shaatnez is reasonably common in that type of garment—where selling to someone who will not check is prohibited—and cases where the concern is only remote, in which case the garment may be sold.
Additional practical guidance is found in the sefer Shaatnez L’Halachah, which rules that merchants selling clothing to Torah-observant customers are generally not required to inspect every garment themselves, as the responsibility for testing rests with the purchaser.
It is nevertheless advisable for stores to post a notice informing customers that garments requiring inspection should be checked for shaatnez.
However, if the merchant knows that many of his customers are not observant and certainly will not have the garments tested, he should not sell garments that halachically require inspection due to a significant likelihood of containing shaatnez.
Returning to our case, although there is a possibility that the store will resell the garment without correcting it, there is no certainty that this will occur. The owners may choose to remove the shaatnez before reselling it, or the garment may ultimately be purchased by someone who will have it properly inspected.
Since the prohibited outcome is only speculative, returning the garment does not constitute lifnei iver.
There is an additional basis for leniency.
Even if the garment is eventually sold, the prohibition would at most be one of indirect causation (lifnei d’lifnei), which is considerably less severe than directly enabling another person’s transgression.
Accordingly, one may return the garment to the store in exchange for a refund or credit, particularly in light of the authorities who permit dealing commercially with garments containing shaatnez under these circumstances.
Does an Old Aron Kodesh Require Genizah When It Is Replaced?
Q: A Rav of a shul recently asked the following question. After many years, the congregation decided to replace its Aron Kodesh with a new one. Does the old Aron Kodesh require genizah in its entirety?
A: If, at the time the Aron Kodesh was commissioned, it was stipulated that its sanctity would cease once it was no longer in use, then it does not require genizah.
According to Sephardic custom, there is generally room to be lenient even without such a stipulation.
For Ashkenazim, however, if no such condition was made, the Aron Kodesh retains the status of a tashmish kedushah and requires genizah. It may be dismantled into smaller pieces before being buried.
In cases where this would be extremely difficult, Rav Shmuel Wosner zt”l ruled that, in a situation of genuine necessity, one may redeem its sanctity by donating its value to tzedakah.
This leniency, however, should be relied upon only in a pressing circumstance.
The basis for this ruling is found in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 152), which permits demolishing a shul—or any of its furnishings, such as the bimah or Aron Kodesh—when doing so enhances the honor or functionality of the beis haknesses.
With regard to the kedusha of the item being replaced, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 154:3) rules that articles which directly serve sacred objects, such as Sefer Torah cases, mezuzah cases, tefillin straps, an Aron Kodesh that houses a Sefer Torah, or a stand upon which a Sefer Torah is placed, possess inherent sanctity and therefore require genizah.
The Rema adds that this applies to any object that either directly contains a sacred item or was specifically made in its honor.
The Mishnah Berurah (154:9) explains that even when the parchment itself does not directly touch the Aron, if it was constructed to honor the Torah it is still classified as a tashmish kedushah.
Accordingly, according to Ashkenazic practice, an Aron Kodesh built to honor the Torah requires genizah, even if it also serves a protective function.
The Acharonim add, however, that if it was originally made with the explicit condition that its sanctity would end when it was retired, genizah is unnecessary.
For Sephardim, Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yabia Omer VIII, §19) rules that contemporary Aronos generally do not require genizah for several reasons.
Since Sifrei Torah today are permanently enclosed within their own protective cases, the Aron does not directly serve the Torah itself, as noted by the Kaf HaChaim (154:11) and supported by the Chasam Sofer.
Furthermore, several Acharonim maintain that an Aron constructed primarily for storage and protection, rather than as a direct sacred accessory, does not attain the status of a tashmish kedushah.