Parshas Vaeschanan – 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Ask The Rav
Drinking Coffee During Pesukei D’Zimrah
Q: I was recently asked about a practice that has become increasingly common. Some people come to shul for Shacharis with a cup of coffee, recite the berachah before davening, and then continue sipping from the cup during Pesukei D’Zimrah. Since the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 51) rules that one may not interrupt Pesukei D’Zimrah through speech, does drinking likewise constitute an interruption?
A: First, it is important to note a ruling that Harav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlita once gave me. He ruled that even someone who is very thirsty and wishes to eat or drink during Pesukei D’Zimrah may not recite a berachah at that point in the tefillah.
Similarly, Shu”t Rivvos Ephraim (Vol. VI, §29) writes that one should not recite a berachah over food or drink during Pesukei D’Zimrah unless it is absolutely necessary because of weakness or a medical need that prevents him from continuing to daven properly.
Accordingly, if someone is genuinely ill or extremely weak and requires food or drink in order to continue davening, there is certainly room to be lenient, even to the extent of reciting the appropriate berachah.
Our discussion, however, concerns a healthy individual who simply wishes to continue drinking his coffee during davening. The question, therefore, is whether the act of drinking itself constitutes a hefsek.
Indeed, throughout the halachos of tefillah and berachos we find that performing unrelated actions during a berachah or while davening is treated with great stringency. Drinking coffee in the middle of Pesukei D’Zimrah would seem no different.
The Sdei Chemed, quoting the Pesach HaDevir, writes that even sniffing tobacco during Pesukei D’Zimrah is prohibited because it constitutes an interruption. If that is true, then certainly drinking coffee should be viewed no more leniently.
For this reason, along with several additional considerations that cannot be discussed here at length, the practical ruling is that one should not continue drinking during Pesukei D’Zimrah. This is likewise the ruling I received from several leading Poskim.
Of course, someone who truly requires the drink in order to continue davening has authorities upon whom to rely. However, each individual should honestly assess whether this is genuinely necessary or whether he can simply wait until after davening—particularly considering that he has already had some coffee before beginning the tefillah.
It is also worth noting that some authorities discourage drinking while wearing tefillin, and were careful for that reason as well.
Nevertheless, there is no need to rely on that consideration here, since many Poskim prohibit drinking during Pesukei D’Zimrah even without tefillin, simply because the act of drinking itself constitutes an interruption.
Several Gedolei Yisrael have expressed amazement that people permit themselves such practices during davening without any clear halachic basis.
Accordingly, the practical ruling is that unless a person genuinely needs to drink for health reasons or to enable him to continue davening, one should not drink during Pesukei D’Zimrah. It is appropriate to raise awareness of this issue in order to preserve the dignity of both the tefillah and the beis haknesses.
Removing Mezuzos Before Selling a Home to a Non-Observant Jew
Q: I was asked by someone who sold his home in the United States to a Jew who is not Torah observant and publicly desecrates Shabbos. May he remove the mezuzos before the new owner takes possession of the house?
A: I ruled that he may remove the mezuzos, as we shall explain.
Although there are many details relevant to this topic, we will briefly summarize the practical halachah as it applies when a non-observant Jew moves into one’s home.
The Gemara (Bava Metzia 102a), as codified in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 291:2), rules that one may not remove mezuzos when vacating a home. The Gemara relates the tragic incident of a man who removed his mezuzos upon leaving and subsequently buried his wife and two sons.
The Rishonim offer two explanations for this prohibition.
Tosafos (Bava Metzia 101b, s.v. Lo Yitlenah) explains that removing the mezuzah leaves the home vulnerable to harmful forces. By taking it away, one causes danger to those who will subsequently live there.
The She’iltos (126) offers a different explanation, namely that removing the mezuzah constitutes a bizayon, since a mitzvah object is being discarded from its place of use.
A practical difference between these two approaches may arise in cases of necessity. The Birkei Yosef, cited by the Pischei Teshuvah (291:7), writes that if a person has no mezuzos available for the home into which he is moving and cannot readily obtain them, one may rely upon the opinions of Rav Hai Gaon and Rav Achai Gaon in such a pressing situation. The Aruch HaShulchan (291:3) cites this opinion but leaves the matter unresolved.
The Shulchan Aruch further rules that when a non-Jew is moving into the home, the mezuzos should be removed because there is concern that they will be treated disrespectfully. In such a case, neither the concern of danger nor the prohibition of removing them applies.
The question is whether the same ruling applies to a Jew who publicly desecrates Shabbos.
On the one hand, in many areas of halachah such a person is treated similarly to a non-Jew. On the other hand, perhaps we need not assume that he will treat the mezuzah with the same level of disrespect.
In truth, there are many different categories of non-observant Jews. Someone who desecrates Shabbos privately but still maintains some connection to Judaism is not generally suspected of disrespecting a mezuzah. On the contrary, one should leave the mezuzah in place, allowing him to benefit from the mitzvah and perhaps inspiring him and his family to return to Torah observance through its merit.
A Jew who publicly desecrates Shabbos occupies a different halachic status. As stated explicitly in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 385:2), he is treated like a non-Jew with respect to certain halachos: he may not be counted toward a minyan and is disqualified from testimony. Nevertheless, he remains fully Jewish, and if he betroths a woman, the kiddushin is valid.
The Acharonim discuss this status at length in other contexts as well. Even so, if such a person desecrates Shabbos for personal enjoyment rather than מתוך להכעיס, he is not necessarily suspected of treating a mezuzah disrespectfully. He still possesses a Jewish identity, and one should not remove from him one of the few remaining mitzvos available to him.
A different situation exists regarding someone who qualifies as a tinok shenishbah—a person raised without any meaningful knowledge of Judaism. Although we judge him favorably and recognize that his conduct is the result of the environment in which he was raised, he may nevertheless handle a mezuzah as someone with no appreciation for its sanctity. Should he decide to repaint his doorframe or renovate his home, he may simply remove the mezuzah and discard it.
The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 13:28) famously classified many secular Jews as tinokos shenishbu. However, this refers primarily to those who truly lack any exposure to Torah life. Today, many secular Jews encounter observant Jews regularly, yet still view Torah observance as belonging to a separate community with which they do not identify.
Accordingly, Shu”t Shevet HaLevi (Vol. VIII, §165 and Vol. IX, §198) writes that it is difficult to classify all such individuals as tinokos shenishbu. Rather, they are considered inadvertent sinners whose conduct stems from the secular education they received.
This approach is supported by the Rambam (Hilchos Mamrim 3:3), who writes that children raised by parents who have abandoned Judaism are considered coerced, even if they later become aware of Torah-observant Jews, since they continue following the mistaken path in which they were raised. The Rambam therefore emphasizes that they should be drawn close with kindness and encouraged to return to Torah.
Nevertheless, in the case of someone raised in a manner openly hostile to Torah observance, there remains a genuine concern that he may eventually treat the mezuzah disrespectfully. If he removes it while renovating his home, it may simply be discarded. In such a situation, the departing homeowner may remove the mezuzos before leaving.
An even more severe case is that of a Jew who is married to a non-Jewish woman. The Rambam (Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 12:7) describes this as one of the gravest spiritual breaches, since it severs the continuity of the Jewish people and creates a profound attachment to the nations of the world.
In our case, there is an additional concern that the non-Jewish wife or her children may remove and disgrace the mezuzah. They may also intentionally remove it in order to conceal any outward sign of Jewish identity.
Furthermore, Chazal imposed a number of sanctions upon such an individual. For example, a Kohen in this situation may not duchan, and after his passing he is not buried in a cemetery reserved for Torah-observant Jews.
Certainly, then, there is reason not to leave a mezuzah in such a home once the Jewish owner departs.
Accordingly, although there is room to argue for stringency, I have seen this ruling in Mezuzos Melachim, and it also emerges from Shu”t Igros Moshe (Yoreh Deah I, §184), that where a publicly non-observant Jew is moving into the home and there is legitimate concern that the mezuzos will not be treated with proper respect, they may be removed before he takes possession of the property.
Tashlumin of Havdalah for a Katan
Q: If a child went to sleep before hearing Havdalah, must he recite Havdalah on Sunday, or not? Alternatively, would it be preferable for him to recite Havdalah before going to sleep, after Plag HaMinchah on Shabbos afternoon?
A: Regarding Havdalah, several leading halachic authorities have already ruled that if a child did not hear Havdalah at its proper time, he should recite it himself on Sunday. See Lehoros Nasan (Vol. 10, §33) and Teshuvos V’Hanhagos (Vol. 3, §112).
However, this requires careful consideration. Since we find that the later authorities disagree as to whether one should make up Havdalah on Sunday, perhaps it would be preferable to instruct the child, after Plag HaMinchah on Shabbos, to recite Havdalah himself at that time.
I found that Rav Noach Isaac Oelbaum shlit”a, in Minchas Chen (Vol. 3), discusses this question and writes as follows:
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 293:3) rules:
“One who is prevented by circumstances—for example, because he must travel beyond the techum for the sake of a mitzvah—may recite the Ma’ariv prayer of Motzaei Shabbos from Plag HaMinchah onward, and may immediately recite Havdalah… Nevertheless, he remains forbidden to perform labor until nightfall.”
However, the Mishnah Berurah (293:9) cites the later authorities as ruling that one should not conduct himself in this manner, because it appears very unusual to the public and may lead people to become lenient with regard to performing labor.
Moreover, in our times, since the accepted practice is to follow the view of the Sages and recite Minchah until evening, it is certainly forbidden, according to the strict halachah, to recite Ma’ariv early on Motzaei Shabbos.
Although some are lenient to pray early on Friday afternoon, that is because there is a mitzvah to extend the sanctity of Shabbos into the weekday, which does not apply at the conclusion of Shabbos.
The Sha’ar HaTziyun there cites this ruling in the name of the Maharshal, the Bach, the Magen Avraham, and other authorities. They give two reasons why one should not recite Havdalah on Shabbos after Plag HaMinchah:
- First, because it appears highly unusual to the public.
- Second, because it may lead people to become lenient regarding prohibited labor.
Thus, it is clear from the halachic authorities that although, according to the strict ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, one is permitted to do so, the accepted custom is not to recite Havdalah while it is still Shabbos, because it appears unusual to the public and may lead people to become lenient regarding prohibited labor.
The extent to which the authorities discouraged reciting Havdalah before the conclusion of Shabbos, whenever it can be avoided, is evident from the ruling of the Mishnah Berurah (299:20). He writes that even in a case where, if one does not recite Havdalah while it is still Shabbos, he will only be able to recite it on Tuesday, it is nevertheless preferable to wait until Tuesday rather than recite Havdalah on Shabbos before nightfall.
He writes:
“This applies only where, after three days, the opportunity to fulfill the mitzvah of Havdalah will have passed entirely. In such a case, one may recite Havdalah while it is still Shabbos. However, if only two days will pass and the opportunity will not yet be lost, it is preferable to wait and recite Havdalah at the end of those two days than to recite it before nightfall on Shabbos.”
See also what Rav Shmuel Wosner writes in Shevet HaLevi (Vol. 10, Orach Chaim, §54). He was asked about elderly individuals who regularly go to sleep at seven o’clock in the evening, while during the summer Shabbos is still in full force.
How should they fulfill Havdalah on Motzaei Shabbos?
May one rely from the outset on the ruling found in the Gemara (Berachos 27b) and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 293:3) permitting one to recite both the Motzaei Shabbos Ma’ariv prayer and Havdalah over a cup of wine while it is still Shabbos?
The author of Shevet HaLevi responded emphatically:
“It is obvious to me that one should not rule this way in practice. The Sages permitted this only on an occasional basis, when circumstances unexpectedly created a pressing need, and only for an individual—not as a regular practice or for the public. Furthermore, the leading halachic authorities have written that this could lead to the desecration of Shabbos, since people may conclude that the weekday has already begun. It therefore appears that the only practical solution is for them to recite Havdalah on Sunday, in accordance with the ruling found in Orach Chaim 299.”
To conclude, let us cite the responsum of Shraga HaMeir (Vol. 6, §64). He was asked about reciting Havdalah while it is still Shabbos, and wrote that he did not understand the question at all.
The entire basis for the leniency cited by the Shulchan Aruch—allowing Havdalah from Plag HaMinchah onward—applies only when there is no other option, such as one who must travel beyond the techum and will afterward have no wine available for Havdalah, or one who will begin a three-day fast immediately after Shabbos.
However, when it is possible to recite Havdalah on Sunday,
“Why should one specifically recite Havdalah on Shabbos? In such a case, everyone agrees that one should not recite Havdalah while it is still Shabbos, since it can be recited on Sunday. Therefore, if one cannot remain awake on Motzaei Shabbos because nightfall is so late, he should simply recite Havdalah on Sunday, and not on Shabbos after Plag HaMinchah.”