Parshas Pinchas 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
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Tzitzis with a Zipper That Closes the Entire Side of the Garment
Q: While I was visiting in Los Angeles, I had the privilege of delivering a shiur at Beis Tefillah, under Rav Dovid Edelstein shlita. He brought to my attention about a new style of tzitzis garment that has recently appeared on the market. It contains a zipper along the side that can be closed all the way to the bottom of the garment, effectively joining the four corners together. Rabbanim were uncertain whether this presents a halachic problem, and whether the manufacturers should be advised not to produce tzitzis garments of this design.
A: The lengthy discussion in Hilchos Tzitzis (Orach Chaim 10:7–8) makes it clear that a garment should be entirely open in order to unquestionably qualify as a four-cornered garment obligated in tzitzis. If it is completely closed, there is concern that it is no longer considered a four-cornered garment and would therefore be exempt from tzitzis.
Accordingly, we must determine whether closing a zipper all the way to the bottom of the garment gives it the appearance of a closed garment. Even if it does appear closed, there remains another question: Is there still an issue of mar’is ayin? If so, how much of the garment must remain open to eliminate that concern? After all, the garment itself was unquestionably manufactured as a four-cornered garment; the only question is whether fastening it changes its halachic status.
The Magen Avraham (Orach Chaim 10:12), citing the Levush, writes that one should not place hooks on a tallis katan below the beltline, because this makes it closed. He cites the Terumas HaDeshen, who writes that hooks are generally not considered a permanent connection with respect to the laws of kilayim unless they are bent in such a way that they cannot be separated without a deliberate act. Nevertheless, the Magen Avraham suggests that such hooks may still be prohibited because of mar’is ayin.
Rav Akiva Eiger understands the Magen Avraham to mean that mar’is ayin applies even where most of the garment remains open. According to this approach, our case would likewise be prohibited because of mar’is ayin unless the zipper is opened enough that the concern no longer exists.
However, the Mishnah Berurah and the Biur Halachah cite the Elyah Rabbah and other Acharonim, who question the Magen Avraham’s ruling. They maintain that when hooks can easily be opened, no concern of mar’is ayin exists. They also cite Rav Akiva Eiger, who writes that where a person always wears his tallis katan beneath his outer clothing, even while in a public place, there may be no concern of mar’is ayin at all, since the garment is not visible to others. Whether this reasoning applies depends upon the practical circumstances.
In any event, I found that the Shevet HaKehasi (Vol. II, siman 9) rules leniently regarding fastening the sides of a tallis katan with either a zipper or snaps. He explains that the Levush prohibited hooks because they are hooked into place and require an act to open them up. This is also implied by the comments of Rav Akiva Eiger. By contrast, modern snaps are easily opened with a simple pull, and therefore there is no concern of mar’is ayin.
Furthermore, the Levush’s prohibition applies where numerous hooks extend from below the beltline all the way to the bottom of the garment, making most of the garment appear permanently closed.
In our case, however, there is only a single snap or a zipper designed to be opened and closed with ease. Certainly no one would mistakenly assume that the majority of the garment is permanently joined together. Accordingly, even according to the opinions of the Levush and the Magen Avraham, there is room to permit it.
Therefore, the practical halachah is that one may, even lechatchilah, fasten the lower sides of a tallis katan with a snap or zipper. This remains true even if the two sides are brought very close together, with only the slightest separation remaining, since the entire concern is one of mar’is ayin, and, as explained above, that concern does not apply in this case.
Photographing While Girls Are Singing
Q: I was asked many times an important question regarding a photographer who accepted an assignment to photograph a girls’ choir composed of girls aged sixteen and under, performing before an audience of women and girls. He himself would be present photographing the event. Is there room to justify permitting him to work there during the singing? Furthermore, are the girls permitted to sing while a Jewish man is present, or is there a concern of lifnei iveir?
This question arises frequently in girls’ summer camps, where men are sometimes present in the auditorium as maintenance workers, photographers, or other employees while the girls are singing. Since there is kol ishah involved, may they remain in the hall while the girls are singing?
A: In my humble opinion, lechatchilah it is preferable not to accept such an assignment, or at least not to be present during the singing. Nevertheless, one who is lenient has authorities upon whom to rely, especially if he intends not to listen.
The central question is whether the principle of “ba’avidteih tarid”—that one who is engrossed in his work is not distracted by improper thoughts—would apply over here. Since the photographer is fully occupied trying to capture the best possible photographs, perhaps he is considered preoccupied with his work, leaving no concern that he will come to improper thoughts. On the other hand, one could argue that the principle of ba’avidteih tarid does not apply where the man’s work directly involves the women themselves; this requires further study.
The Gemara in Avodah Zarah (20b) teaches that one may not gaze even at male and female animals mating, lest it lead to improper thoughts. Later, the Gemara states in the name of Rav Yehudah that one may even assist with the breeding itself based on ba’avidteih tarid—he is occupied with his task. Rashi explains that his mind is focused entirely on his work, causing him to forget any improper thoughts. From this, the Gemara derives that a launderer may handle a woman’s attractive garments because he is occupied with his work. The same teaching appears in Bava Metzia 91a, and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 23:3) rules accordingly regarding breeding animals.
We find in several places throughout Chazal and the poskim that matters involving arayos may be permitted where a person is fully occupied with his work, even when the work itself involves women. Similarly, the Rishonim and later authorities permit a physician to treat female patients.
The Gemara later discusses looking at colorful women’s clothing. Rav Chisda distinguishes between old garments (previously worn), which are prohibited to gaze upon, and new garments (never before worn), which are permitted. The Gemara challenges this distinction by asking how launderers could perform their work if merely looking were prohibited. The answer given is once again that they are ba’avidteih tarid.
The Rishonim disagree whether Rav Chisda’s distinction between new and old garments remains accepted after the Gemara’s discussion, or whether it was entirely rejected. Even if his proof was rejected, perhaps the distinction itself remains valid.
Furthermore, the Shach (Yoreh Deah 195:20) writes that it is the accepted practice for Jewish physicians to take the pulse of female patients—even married women or non-Jewish women—despite the availability of non-Jewish physicians. Other poskim likewise rule this way, because the physician is occupied with his professional duties.
Thus, we have several sources establishing that when one is genuinely preoccupied with his work, there is no concern for improper thoughts. The remaining question is how far this reasoning extends, and whether this leniency was universally accepted.
Returning to our case, since the entire reason the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21:1) prohibits hearing a woman’s singing voice is because it may lead to improper thoughts, as explained by the Levush, then perhaps the principle of ba’avidteih tarid applies here as well.
Igros Moshe (Even HaEzer Vol. 4, 62:1) writes that there are considerations of both tirda and mirtas that could permit a male lifeguard to work at a beach where women are swimming. Accordingly, he rules that, strictly speaking, a woman may swim where there is only a male lifeguard, since he is occupied with responsibilities requiring his full attention. Nevertheless, Rav Moshe adds that a yerei Shamayim woman should not rely upon this leniency, because concerns still remain.
Although our case is not identical, we likewise see that lechatchilah one should avoid placing oneself in a situation that could lead to improper thoughts or cause one to focus upon women or girls. Therefore, even according to Rav Moshe’s reasoning, it is proper to avoid accepting such employment.
The Poskim discuss a similar question regarding girls singing on a bus while a male driver is present. In Halichos Shlomo and other works, it is reported that Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt”l, was reluctant to permit this based solely upon the principle of ba’avidteih tarid—he says that “perhaps” there is room for leniency.
There is also reason to be stringent because not every occupation requires complete concentration. Particularly when someone is highly experienced at his work, it is difficult to assume that he is so fully occupied that improper thoughts could never arise.
I similarly saw in Chut Shani (§21, p. 70), regarding a female therapist giving a therapeutic massage to a man. He writes that she could simultaneously perform her work and still entertain improper thoughts. Therefore, the principle of ba’avidteih tarid does not automatically apply.
Although the Beis She’arim (Orach Chaim 33) applies the principle of ba’avidteih tarid leniently even regarding hearing a woman’s singing voice, he nevertheless concludes that such a situation is highly inappropriate. Consequently, it is very difficult to permit it lechatchilah.
At most, one may say that a person who is lenient has authorities upon whom to rely, but it is certainly proper to avoid such situations whenever possible.
I also heard from Harav Avigdor Nebenzahl, shlita, that one should not be lenient unless he specifically intends not to listen to the singing while occupied with his photography or similar work.
Amirah L’Akum to Prevent Basar B’Chalav
Q: I was asked about an incident that occurred here in Eretz Yisrael. A family sent an expensive cake on Erev Shabbos for a group of yeshivah bachurim who were spending Shabbos together. After Kabbalas Shabbos, they suddenly remembered that the expensive cake they had sent was actually milchigs, but that there is an identical version of the cake that is pareve. It is possible that the cake had not been marked as milchigs, and the bachurim could, chas v’shalom, mistakenly serve it as dessert after their fleishig Shabbos meal.
They therefore asked whether it would be permissible to ask a non-Jew to telephone another non-Jew, who would then notify the bachurim that the cake was dairy.
A: There is room to permit this.
The Rema (Orach Chaim 276:2) writes:
“Some authorities maintain that it is permissible to tell a non-Jew to light a candle for the Shabbos meal, because they hold that amirah l’nochri is permitted even for a complete melachah when performed for the sake of a mitzvah. [Ran in the name of the Baal Ha’Itur.] One should be stringent where there is no great need, since the majority of the poskim disagree with this opinion.”
Although the Mishnah Berurah (ibid. 24) cites the Shelah as ruling stringently even in cases of great need, he immediately adds (ibid. 25) that if the eiruv tears on Shabbos, it is permissible to tell a non-Jew to repair it so that the public is not nichshal. In such a case, one may rely upon the opinion of the Baal Ha’Itur to permit amirah l’nochri, even where the melachah involved is a Torah prohibition, because it is a mitzvah affecting the public.
Accordingly, in our case as well, since this involves preventing an aveirah and avoiding a michshol, it is permissible to ask a non-Jew to notify the bachurim. Even though our situation involves only a possible michshol, it would still appear to be permitted.
Making a telephone call is itself only a Rabbinic prohibition, and in situations involving a mitzvah, distress, or financial loss, Chazal permitted amirah l’nochri where the underlying melachah is itself only Rabbinically prohibited.
As for the possibility that the non-Jew may choose to drive a car in order to deliver the message, thereby violating a Torah prohibition, that is not our concern, since we did not instruct him how to notify the bachurim.
Furthermore, according to the Chavos Yair (§53), the prohibition of amirah l’nochri applies only when the non-Jew who is instructed personally performs the prohibited act, not when one tells a non-Jew to ask another non-Jew to perform it. This view is cited by the Mishnah Berurah (307:24).
Although the Mishnah Berurah brings the dissenting opinion of the Avodas HaGershuni and appears to incline toward that view, he nevertheless concludes in the name of the Sefer HaChaim that where there is substantial financial loss one may be lenient.
Surely there is no greater distress than the anguish of a family fearing that they inadvertently caused bachurim to violate the prohibition of basar b’chalav.
It should be emphasized that, based on the above, it would appear permissible in any situation involving concern for a possible michshol. Such cases are not uncommon. For example, someone may send a meat salad—such as one containing cold cuts—but mistakenly used a milchig salad dressing, and wishes to prevent the guests from eating it by having a non-Jew notify them. Incidents of this nature have unfortunately occurred, Hashem yishmor.
If it is possible to arrange that one non-Jew ask another non-Jew to convey the message, this is certainly preferable. Nevertheless, even if such an arrangement is not feasible, there is still room to be lenient. Several other leading Poskim agreed with this ruling.
Although some poskim wished to rule more stringently, arguing that there is only a possibility that the cake would be eaten after at least one hour had elapsed since the meat meal, if it is a long meal—and according to the Rema (Yoreh Deah 89:1), after one hour the remaining prohibition of eating dairy before six hours is only a minhag—they therefore did not wish to permit amirah l’nochri merely to prevent a violation of a minhag.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is still permitted, as well as the other poskim, because this case involves many bachurim and guests, creating the possibility of causing numerous people to stumble in prohibition. Such rationales cannot be used to be strict when it comes to the public.
Therefore, since the cake was sent for many people and there is a genuine concern that one of them might eat it together with meat or otherwise violate the prohibition of basar b’chalav, it is permissible based upon the reasoning of the Baal Ha’Itur cited above. Ideally, if it can be arranged without difficulty, one should have one non-Jew ask another non-Jew to deliver the message.