Parshas Matos–Maasei 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
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Swimming Lifeguard Course During the Nine Days
Q: A man paid in advance to enroll in a swimming course that trains participants to become certified lifeguards, intending to use the certification for future employment and parnassah. Due to scheduling changes, however, the course was postponed until after Rosh Chodesh Av. Is he permitted to participate in the swimming course during the Nine Days?
A: We have previously cited several times the ruling of the Maharam Schick (Yoreh Deah §368), who is inclined to permit studying music during the year of mourning when it is for the sake of earning a livelihood. The basis for this leniency is the Pri Megadim (Orach Chaim 551, Mishbetzos Zahav 10), who permits musicians to perform for non-Jews as a means of livelihood, since this is their source of income. The Maharam Schick understands that the Pri Megadim extends this leniency even after Rosh Chodesh Av until Tishah B’Av, unlike the Derech HaChaim, whose understanding is cited by the Biur Halachah at the beginning of סימן תקנ.
Our case is somewhat more lenient than playing musical instruments, since music is prohibited from the time Av begins because of the Gemara’s injunction that “Mi’shenichnas Av mema’atin b’simchah,” whereas refraining from bathing until Tishah B’Av is only a minhag. However, this leniency applies only where the course is genuinely necessary for one’s livelihood. That is, if he realistically expects to obtain employment as a lifeguard during the current summer, there is room to consider permitting it.
In practice, however, by the middle of the summer most camps and pools have already hired their lifeguards. If the certification is intended only for next year’s employment, there is no reason he cannot postpone the course until after Tishah B’Av. Accordingly, the practical ruling is to be stringent.
Although some have suggested that perhaps it should be permitted because his intention is not recreational enjoyment but merely instruction or exercise, this argument is difficult to accept. It is well established that swimming is prohibited from Rosh Chodesh Av even when done solely for exercise rather than for pleasure. This is evident from the Mishnah Berurah (551:95), who discusses tevilah in the mikvah on Erev Shabbos. One who customarily goes to the mikveh every Friday is permitted to continue doing so, whereas one who occasionally skips because of business obligations or cold weather may not tovel during this period. Clearly, the tevilah is not intended for enjoyment or cleanliness, yet it is nevertheless restricted.
The Sha’ar HaTziyun (98) further writes that even where immersion is permitted, this applies only in cold water, since hot water constitutes pleasurable bathing. It is therefore apparent that even when entering the water is not for enjoyment or cleanliness, the restriction still applies.
Accordingly, swimming for instructional purposes is likewise prohibited. Since we have already explained that there is insufficient basis to permit it because of potential financial loss, the practical halachah is to rule stringently.
A Child Who Missed Kiddush on Friday Night—Does He Need to Repeat It?
Q: During the summer months, it is very common for young children to fall asleep before Kiddush on Friday night. Parents often put them to bed before Kiddush, and they therefore do not hear Kiddush at all. If the child has reached the age of chinuch—approximately six years old until bar mitzvah—must he hear or recite Kiddush on Shabbos morning to make up what he missed?
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 271:8) rules that an adult who failed to recite or hear Kiddush on Friday night must make it up during the daytime.
Our question depends upon a well-known discussion among the Acharonim regarding the nature of this daytime Kiddush. Is it a form of tashlumin—a make-up for the missed nighttime obligation—or does the obligation of Kiddush fundamentally continue throughout Shabbos? See the Bach there.
According to those who maintain that the daytime Kiddush is part of the original obligation, it would seem that a child should certainly be trained to fulfill it. Even so, this is not entirely clear, since one could argue that the mitzvah of chinuch applies only to obligations that are fulfilled lechatchilah, and not to those performed only b’di’eved. See Shu”t Kinyan Torah (Vol. V, §21) and Shu”t Shevet HaKehasi (Vol. VI, §152).
According to those who understand the daytime Kiddush as tashlumin, the question depends upon another dispute among the Acharonim: Does the obligation of chinuch extend to tashlumin, or only to the primary performance of the mitzvah?
A similar discussion appears regarding a child who forgot to daven. Shu”t B’tzel HaChochmah (Vol. V, §169) writes that a child need not be educated to recite a compensatory tefillah, since chinuch applies only to the original mitzvah and not to tashlumin. He seeks to prove this from the Mishnah at the end of Maseches Challah, which indicates that there is no obligation of chinuch regarding Pesach Sheini. This would suggest that Chazal instituted chinuch only for the primary mitzvah and not for its replacement.
Others, however, dispute this proof, and Harav Shmuel Kamenetsky, shlita, likewise writes in Kovetz Halachos (Vol. I) that there is indeed a concept of tashlumin for both tefillah and Kiddush even with respect to chinuch.
Therefore, although one who does not require a child to make Kiddush on Shabbos morning has authorities upon whom to rely, lechatchilah every child who did not fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush on Friday night should be trained to recite Kiddush on Shabbos day. This is the position adopted by several leading poskim.
Some add that even according to those who generally do not require chinuch for tashlumin, our case is different, since many authorities maintain that the daytime Kiddush is not merely compensatory but part of the original obligation itself.
Nevertheless, one who does not have the child make up Kiddush may rely upon the lenient opinions.
Regarding a child who falls asleep before Havdalah—whether he should recite Havdalah on Sunday, or perhaps it is preferable to make Havdalah on Shabbos at Plag HaMinchah—be’ezras Hashem we will discuss that common question next week.
Kashering a Dairy Oven for Meat Use at a Vacation Rental
Q: Every summer I am asked about a common situation. Families rent vacation homes that contain a kosher oven designated exclusively for dairy use. The guests would like to kasher the oven so that they can use it for meat.
Since the Magen Avraham famously writes that one should not kasher utensils from dairy to meat because one may later forget which status they have and mistakenly use them for the opposite type of food, is it nevertheless permissible in such a case?
A: In my humble opinion, in circumstances such as these one may be lenient and kasher the oven for meat use. There is no concern that one will later forget its status and mistakenly use it for dairy.
Since this question arises frequently, it is worthwhile to review the sources together with several practical halachic rulings.
The Magen Avraham (Orach Chaim 509:11) writes that although technically it would appear permissible during the year to kasher dairy utensils for meat use, or vice versa, the accepted custom is to refrain from doing so. He cites Harav Binyamin of Posen בשם מהר”ם יפה, who explains that otherwise a person might own only one set of utensils and continually kasher them back and forth between meat and dairy. This creates a concern that he may eventually forget to kasher them before switching their use, leading to error.
This stringency is accepted by many Poskim, including the Pri Megadim, Chasam Sofer, Mishnah Berurah, Igros Moshe, and others.
Nevertheless, the Chasam Sofer (Yoreh Deah §110), cited by the Mishnah Berurah (451:109), rules that when kashering utensils before Pesach, one may change them from meat to dairy or vice versa, since the kashering is being done primarily to remove chametz, and the above concern does not apply.
The Aruch HaShulchan (509:17), however, disagrees, writing:
“There are those who wish to prohibit kashering meat utensils for dairy use or vice versa because perhaps a person will own only one utensil and continually switch it back and forth, eventually making a mistake. This is an unnecessary stringency, and we should not create new gezeiros on our own.”
The Maharsham (Vol. II, §241) further notes that even according to those who accept the Magen Avraham’s stringency, if someone already kashered a utensil from meat to dairy or vice versa, the food cooked in it is certainly permitted, since the restriction is only a matter of accepted custom.
Another suggestion found in the Poskim is to kasher the utensil first for pareve use, and only afterwards designate it for meat. See Shu”t Maharsham (Vol. II, §240). Shu”t Even Yekarah (Yoreh Deah §35) was reluctant to permit this except in cases of need, whereas Shu”t Levushei Mordechai (Vol. III, §212) rules leniently.
Similarly, Shu”t Shevet HaLevi (Vol. IX, §168) discusses a factory that repeatedly kashered equipment from dairy to pareve and then back again. He concludes that since the intermediate designation is pareve, there is no basis to introduce a new stringency, because even if someone were to err, no prohibition would result. Therefore, where there is a need, one may be lenient.
It should also be noted that the Pri Megadim (452:13) permits such changes in cases of pressing need. Accordingly, when someone is staying in a vacation home and has no other oven available for preparing meals, this qualifies as a sha’as hadechak, providing additional grounds for leniency.
I would add another reason to be lenient. It appears that the decree of the Magen Avraham applies specifically to hag’alah, but not to libbun—heating the oven to its highest temperature. This also appears from the Machatzis HaShekel.
Likewise, the Darchei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 121), citing Shu”t Arugas HaBosem and others, distinguishes between hag’alah and libbun, concluding that one may lechatchilah change a utensil from meat to dairy through libbun.
On the other hand, the Pri Megadim (Orach Chaim 451:31) explicitly prohibits doing so, and this is also the view of Mishmeres Shalom.
Nevertheless, the practical ruling is to be lenient, as this also appears to emerge from the Mishnah Berurah (451:19), whose wording indicates that the concern applies specifically to hag’alah and not to libbun.
Therefore, the practical halachah is that one who arrives at a vacation home, or receives a meat or dairy utensil as a gift and wishes to change its designation through proper kashering, may rely upon the combination of these considerations and perform the kashering.