Parshas Ekev – 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
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May a Business Partner Deduct a Financial Concession from Ma’aser Funds in Order to Preserve Peace?
Q: A recent case arose involving two successful business partners engaged in large investment ventures. Baruch Hashem, both have been very prosperous. Following a misunderstanding that developed into a serious dispute, Reuven felt he deserved a larger share of the profits from a particular transaction. After giving the matter considerable thought, however, he decided that preserving such a valuable friendship and partnership was worth more than the additional income. He therefore wished to forgo his share in favor of Shimon. Since he is making this financial concession solely for the sake of peace, may he deduct the amount he relinquishes from his ma’aser funds, considering that promoting peace between people is itself a great mitzvah?
A: Ma’aser funds may not be used for one’s own personal expenses. However, benefiting indirectly from ma’aser money is permitted.
The Taz (Yoreh Deah 249) writes that just as one may designate agricultural tithes in a manner that provides him with some indirect benefit, so too one may derive incidental benefit from charitable funds. Certainly, when the purpose is to fulfill a mitzvah, this is permitted.
Although one who is repaying a personal loan may not use ma’aser funds for that purpose—even though repaying one’s debts is itself a mitzvah—that is because the debt is an established personal obligation and cannot be transferred to charity.
Creating peace between individuals, however, is among the greatest mitzvos. Chazal teach that Achitofel derived from a kal vachomer that even the Name of Hashem may be erased in order to restore harmony between husband and wife. Surely, then, using ma’aser funds to preserve peace between business partners falls within this category.
Accordingly, one may use ma’aser funds to cover the amount he voluntarily relinquishes in order to restore peace. This is the practical ruling I heard from my rebbe, Harav Avigdor Nebenzahl, shlita.
The sefer Mar Midali (p. 348), quoting the Gaavad of Karlsberg, adds an important qualification. This ruling applies only when it is genuinely unclear which party is correct. If one knows that his fellow is clearly in the right, he may not manipulate the situation by using charitable funds to satisfy his own obligation.
Therefore, it is advisable that when using ma’aser money in such a case, one stipulate—either mentally or explicitly—that should it later become clear who was actually entitled to the money, the amount taken from ma’aser should be regarded merely as a loan, to be repaid in full to the charity fund.
Investing in Stocks of Companies That Sell Non-Kosher Food
Q: I was asked by a businessman who wishes to invest in publicly traded stocks. Naturally, he has no involvement whatsoever with the food sold by the company; he merely purchases shares as an investment.
Does owning stock in a company such as McDonald’s, which sells non-kosher food, violate the prohibition against engaging in commerce with forbidden foods? The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 117) prohibits trading in non-kosher food lest one come to eat it. Since the investor never handles the food itself, and his ownership consists only of shares in the company, perhaps this concern does not apply.
A: The practical guidance I have received is that lechatchilah, one who can invest in companies that do not sell prohibited foods should certainly do so. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of strict halachah, there is substantial basis to be lenient, as we shall explain.
This discussion touches upon several broader halachic issues, including the status of stock ownership with respect to Shabbos and Pesach. For example, if a person owns shares in a company that operates on Shabbos or possesses chametz on Pesach, is he considered an owner of the business itself?
The fundamental question is whether a shareholder is regarded as an actual owner of the company’s assets, or whether his ownership merely entitles him to receive a share of its profits.
In practice, shareholders generally bear no personal responsibility for the company’s liabilities and have little or no authority over its day-to-day operations. A critical distinction must therefore be made between minority shareholders and those who acquire a controlling interest.
Most investors purchase only a small percentage of a company’s stock with no practical influence over its management. Someone who acquires a controlling share, however, presents a very different halachic question.
Many leading Poskim have addressed this issue.
Shu”t Mahari A. HaLevi (Vol. II, §124) writes that an ordinary shareholder does not possess ownership rights over the company’s assets. The management alone controls the business, and shareholders have neither the authority to dispose of its property nor to determine how it is operated.
The Minchas Yitzchak (Vol. III, §1) discusses this issue at length in connection with chametz ownership on Pesach. Although the subject is complex, it is noteworthy that many mechiras chametz documents include shares in corporations out of stringency.
Similarly, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim IV, §54) discusses the case of one who acquires a controlling interest in a company that operates on Shabbos. Such a person is certainly regarded as having significant ownership, since he can appoint management and influence company policy. Even there, however, Rav Moshe offers grounds for leniency when the actual operation of the business is carried out entirely by non-Jews.
Shu”t Shulchan HaLevi elaborates further, explaining that an investor purchases stock merely as a financial instrument. He has no ownership of the company’s physical assets, cannot remove or sell them, and has no involvement in managing the business. His intent is simply to invest capital in the hope that its value will appreciate.
Indeed, were such an investor to enter one of the company’s stores and take merchandise for himself, he would be considered a thief, despite owning stock in the corporation. This demonstrates that stock ownership does not constitute direct ownership of the company’s inventory.
Based on these considerations, together with the discussions found in Teshuvos V’Hanhagos (Vol. I, §429), many Poskim conclude that minority shareholders are not regarded as owners of the company’s merchandise.
Accordingly, there is no prohibition against purchasing shares in companies that sell non-kosher foods, even according to opinions that prohibit commercial dealings in forbidden foods. Since the shareholder owns only a small percentage of the corporation and acquires no ownership over the food itself, this is not considered commerce in prohibited foods.
This is likewise the ruling I received from several leading Poskim.
It should be noted, however, that some authorities disagree. They maintain that ownership of shares necessarily constitutes some degree of ownership in the company itself, arguing that it is difficult to claim the corporation has no owners at all.
Furthermore, the Chasam Sofer (Yoreh Deah §104) rules that the prohibition against trading in forbidden foods is not merely a safeguard lest one come to eat them. Rather, it is a Scriptural decree. According to this approach, any Jewish ownership in prohibited foods could potentially fall within the prohibition, even if the owner never personally handles the food.
It should also be emphasized that this discussion applies only to foods that are prohibited for consumption but from which benefit may be derived. Products that are prohibited even for benefit—such as meat cooked together with milk (basar b’chalav)—may not be traded at all, as ruled by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 87:1–3).
By contrast, rabbinically prohibited foods are not included in the prohibition against commercial trade, as stated in Yoreh Deah 117.
Accordingly, the practical halachah is that one may invest in shares of companies that sell non-kosher food, such as McDonald’s. Nevertheless, one who has the opportunity to invest elsewhere should preferably do so.
May an Event Planner Work at a Wedding Featuring Mixed Dancing?
Q: A G-d-fearing woman who earns her livelihood as an event planner and decorator was approached by non-observant clients wishing to hire her for a wedding that would include mixed dancing. Since Chazal speak so strongly against mixed dancing (see Succah 52a), and the Chafetz Chaim likewise emphasizes its severity (Biur Halachah 339, s.v. L’hakel B’chol), may she accept the job, or would doing so constitute assisting those who violate the Torah?
A: As we have explained on several previous occasions, there is no concern here of lifnei iveir, since the event would take place regardless of whether she accepted the job, as established by the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (6b).
The remaining question is whether accepting the work violates the prohibition of mesayei’a lidei ovrei aveirah—assisting others in committing a transgression.
It would appear that in this situation she may accept the job, particularly since it concerns her livelihood.
Shu”t Binyan Tzion (Vol. I, §15) rules that the prohibition of mesayei’a applies only when one’s assistance is given at the actual time the aveirah is being committed. At that moment one is obligated to prevent the sin, not facilitate it. Assistance provided beforehand, however, is not included in this prohibition.
Furthermore, her role in designing and organizing the event bears no direct connection to the prohibited dancing itself. Decorating the hall and coordinating the event are independent services.
Even if one were to argue that organizing the entire event facilitates the prohibited conduct, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah I, §72) discusses the rental of a hall for a wedding that will include mixed dancing.
He explains that renting a hall is fundamentally a permissible activity. Weddings, banquets, and celebrations are all legitimate uses of such a facility. The fact that the guests may choose to engage in prohibited conduct does not transform the rental itself into an act of assisting sin.
Otherwise, it would likewise be forbidden to sell pots and dishes to individuals who might later use them for cooking on Shabbos or preparing non-kosher food—a conclusion no Posek accepts.
The same reasoning applies here. The planner’s work is directed toward arranging the wedding itself, which is entirely permissible. The mixed dancing is a separate wrongful act, unrelated to the essential service she provides.
Accordingly, where her livelihood is involved, she may accept the job. This conclusion is further supported by the opinion of the Shach (Yoreh Deah 151:6), whose approach has been relied upon by a number of later Poskim in situations of genuine need.