Parshas Devarim – 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
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May a Non-Jewish Housekeeper Work in a Jewish Home on Tishah B’Av?
Q: The following is a common question that arises every year. Some people employ a non-Jewish housekeeper who performs household work during the week, and they are uncertain whether she may continue doing work in a Jewish home on Tishah B’Av.
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 554:22) writes that even in places where the custom is to refrain from work, it is nevertheless permitted to have work performed through a non-Jew, even in one’s own home.
The Beur Halachah (s.v. “al yedei akum”), citing Mateh Yehudah, writes that this applies only if the work was assigned to the non-Jew before Tishah B’Av. He notes, however, that this requires further analysis, since allowing the work to continue does not appear to distract a person from the mourning of the day.
It would therefore seem that those who employ a housekeeper who works every week, and who comes on Tishah B’Av as part of her regular schedule, may allow her to continue working. Since she generally already knows what must be done and does not require instructions for every task, but only occasional direction, such as telling her to clean a particular room, this certainly does not constitute a distraction from the mourning of the day.
This is likewise the ruling recorded in Shiurei Halachah by Rav Shmuel Felder shlit”a.
Although the Mishnah Berurah (554:46) writes that when the matter is publicly noticeable it is prohibited even through a non-Jew, and the Sha’ar HaTziyun (554:50) indicates that any publicly visible work is forbidden even when performed by a non-Jew, it nevertheless appears that when the non-Jew is working as an independent contractor—that is, he was hired to complete a specific job for an agreed-upon fee, rather than employed for a period of time—it is permitted to have the work performed by a non-Jew.
For we find regarding Shabbos, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 244:1) rules that, fundamentally, contracting with a non-Jew to perform work is permitted, and the Sages prohibited it only in situations that could arouse suspicion. Certainly, then, it may be relied upon with regard to Tishah B’Av.
Accordingly, it is permissible for workers to come and mow the lawn or perform similar work, provided they were hired as independent contractors, which is in fact the usual arrangement.
May Women Apply Lipstick or Makeup on Tishah B’Av?
Q: What is the halachah regarding women who wish to apply lipstick or makeup on Tishah B’Av? Does this fall under the prohibition against anointing?
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 554:1) rules that anointing is prohibited on Tishah B’Av. The Mishnah Berurah (554:28) explains that “anointing” refers to substances that are customarily rubbed onto the body, such as oil, fat, soap, and similar items.
The authorities have already written regarding deodorant that, since it is applied merely to prevent unpleasant odor, it is not included in the prohibition on Tishah B’Av.
However, lipstick and face powder require discussion, since they might appear more closely comparable to anointing. Indeed, the poskim point out that the Gemara (Yoma 76b) explains that anointing is prohibited because it is considered like drinking through absorbing. It would therefore seem that the prohibition applies only to substances that are absorbed into the skin.
Accordingly, ointments such as petroleum jelly and similar products are prohibited, whereas substances that merely remain on the surface of the skin would not be included.
For this reason, contemporary halachic authorities rule that there is no concern regarding the prohibition of anointing itself.
Nevertheless, there is another prohibition involved, and that is based on the laws of mourning. The halachah is that during aveilus a woman should neither apply eye cosmetics nor beautify herself.
Likewise, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 381:6) rules that a woman may not apply cosmetics during her period of mourning, since doing so is prohibited in the same manner as bathing.
The Shach (381:4) writes that this restriction is even more stringent than the prohibition against bathing, for it continues even after the seven-day mourning period, except in the case of a married woman, whereas bathing is, by strict law, permitted at that stage.
Accordingly, in our case one should rule stringently because of the laws of mourning, and women should not apply makeup or lipstick on Tishah B’Av. This is the psak halacha for all women. However, regarding a kallah within thirty days of her wedding, there is room to permit her to apply cosmetics on Tishah B’Av, since based on the laws of mourning (ibid.) she would be permitted to apply makeup even during the shiva in order to look nice in front of her chassan.
May One Walk Past an Electronic Sensor on Shabbos in Order to Avoid the Prohibition of Seclusion?
Q: An incident occurred here in Eretz Yisrael. A man came to a senior living facility on Shabbos to spend time with his elderly father. Late Friday night, after the residents had already retired to their rooms and no one was walking through the hallways, he entered a room containing a hot-water urn in order to prepare himself a cup of tea.
To his alarm, he discovered that this room was actually the overnight nurse’s room. The door to the room was operated by an electronic sensor that automatically opened and closed the door.
When he entered, the door happened to be open because a nurse, who was not observant of Torah and mitzvos, had just walked through. However, he now found himself unable to leave the room without passing in front of the electronic sensor and thereby causing the door to open electrically.
As matters stood, he was violating the prohibition of yichud by remaining alone with the nurse, yet he could not escape that prohibition without committing another prohibition.
Is one permitted to violate a less severe prohibition in order to avoid a more serious one, or is it preferable to remain passive and stay where he is?
On the one hand, if he remains in the room, the situation of seclusion may soon come to an end—for example, another person may happen to enter the room, or the nurse herself may need to leave for some reason.
On the other hand, for every moment that he remains there he is violating the Torah prohibition of yichud, since the nurse is Jewish and is a married woman. (Seclusion with a non-Jewish woman, by contrast, is only Rabbinically prohibited.) Perhaps, then, one should desecrate Shabbos in order to save himself from this transgression.
A: This question was already presented to Harav Yitzchak Zilberstein in the past, and he ruled that the man may not leave the room by intentionally causing the door to open.
Although, according to most halachic authorities, opening such a door through an electronic mechanism involves only a Rabbinic prohibition, one may not actively violate even a Rabbinic prohibition in order to avoid a Torah prohibition that is being transgressed passively.
Furthermore, there is considerable reason to question whether such permission should be granted at all. Even if there would otherwise be a Torah prohibition of yichud, it would appear that since this is a public facility where people are generally free to enter and leave, the situation may not be considered actual yichud, even if it is uncommon for anyone to enter at that particular hour. If so, it would certainly not justify actively violating even a Rabbinic prohibition.
Nevertheless, where there is unquestionably a full-fledged prohibition of yichud—for example, where the door cannot be opened from the outside but only from within—there is room to permit violating a Rabbinic prohibition in order to escape the prohibition of seclusion, in accordance with the opinion of the halachic authorities that will be discussed below.
However, it seems to me—and this is likewise the ruling of other contemporary halachic authorities—that there is room to permit it, particularly if the man causes the door to open in an unusual manner, thereby ensuring that the act constitutes only a Rabbinic prohibition.
The reasoning is that the prohibition of seclusion is being violated continuously, every moment that he remains there. By performing a single Rabbinically prohibited act, he saves himself from repeatedly transgressing a much more severe prohibition.
Most halachic authorities therefore agree that one may violate the Rabbinic prohibition involved in opening the door in order to escape the Torah prohibition of yichud.
Since the prohibition of yichud is committed every moment he remains in the room, whereas the prohibition of Shabbos is violated only once, the prohibition of seclusion is considered more severe in this circumstance, and he should leave the room immediately.
Accordingly, one should take care to open the door in an unusual manner so that, according to all opinions, the act remains only Rabbinically prohibited.
For example, instead of walking normally through the sensor’s detection area—which is the ordinary way the door is opened—he should extend his fist in front of the electronic sensor, causing the door to open in an unusual fashion.
Once the door has opened, he may then walk through the doorway and leave the room.
Although the door itself opens in its normal manner, since the action that triggered its opening was performed abnormally, it is considered to have been done in an unusual manner.
Clarification: Swimming Lifeguarding Course During the Nine Days
A: Last week we addressed the question of taking a lifeguard certification course during the Nine Days.
I would like to clarify the matter, as many people pointed out that in the United States, some rabbanim are generally lenient regarding instructional swimming.
In our discussion, however, we suggested a possible reason to be stringent, since it is not particularly likely that a person would obtain a lifeguarding job in the middle of the summer. We therefore considered the case as one that might not constitute a significant financial loss.
After discussing the shailah with mori v’rabi, Harav Avigdor Nebenzahl, shlit”a, he ruled that not receiving the certification is indeed considered a loss.
Accordingly, he ruled that one may be lenient and take the lifeguard certification course.
If the course is being taught by a Jew, however, the participant should be careful that his involvement is limited to the instructional aspect of the course and not for the enjoyment of swimming. In other words, it is not an opportunity to swim recreationally.
It was also brought to my attention that the proof I cited from the Mishnah Berurah regarding his stringency about immersion in a mikvah is not conclusive.
There is room to distinguish between the two cases, since the mikvah discussed there is hot, whereas a swimming pool is generally not.
In conclusion, one who needs to teach or attend a lifeguard certification course that can only be held during the Nine Days has halachic authorities upon whom to rely. As always, one should consult his own Rav to determine whether this leniency applies to his particular situation.