Parshas Korach 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
A Promised Wedding Gift After a Broken Shidduch
Q: Regarding someone who wished to make a substantial contribution toward hachnasas kallah for a person marrying off a child who lacked sufficient funds for the wedding. Another individual stated that he intended to contribute a certain sum for this purpose. However, before the wedding date arrived, news arrived that the engagement had been broken and the couple would no longer be marrying. The prospective donor therefore wondered whether his commitment had the status of a charitable vow (neder tzedakah), obligating him to fulfill it, or whether, since he never used the language of a neder and merely expressed a desire to perform a chessed by giving a substantial gift to someone in need, it does not constitute a neder tzedakah and does not obligate him to carry out his promise.
A: At first glance, the question may be divided into at least two separate issues:
1.
Does merely stating one’s intention to give a gift to a needy person constitute a charitable vow? If it does, may the donor redirect the gift to someone else, or must he fulfill his promise specifically to the original recipient?
2.
Even if the commitment was made “bli neder,” does one nevertheless remain obligated to honor his promise?
The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 258:12) cite the Mordechai, based on the Yerushalmi, that if one tells another person that he wishes to give him a substantial gift, he may retract the offer, as discussed in the Gemara in Bava Metzia regarding mechusar amanah (failure to keep one’s word). This, however, applies only when the recipient is not poor. If the recipient is poor, the commitment is treated as Nidrei tzedakah, and one may not retract it.
The Teshuvos Maimoniyos (Mishpatim 64) implies that anyone eligible to receive charity is considered poor for this purpose. The same understanding emerges from the words of the Beis Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 243). Thus, even if one used the language of a gift and never mentioned a vow at all, while a promise to a non-poor person may involve only an issue of keeping one’s word—and regarding a substantial gift perhaps not even that—when the recipient is poor, the promise is treated as though it were made in the language of a vow. This would also be considered a neder with merely his intention. Consequently, telling a poor person, “I will give you a gift,” is considered like making a charitable vow.
Furthermore, the Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 258:13), citing the Kenesses HaGedolah, writes that the same would apply if the recipient is a Torah scholar, since supporting Torah is a mitzvah. However, the Shevus Yaakov (II:159) disputes this extension and argues that the concept of a vow applies only to an actual poor person. Even the Mabit, the source for the Kenesses HaGedolah, referred to a recipient who was both poor and a Torah scholar, and thus added the fact that he was a Torah scholar as additional consideration.
Similarly, Mahari Asad (Orach Chaim 83) implies that even a gift to a Rav does not become a vow unless the Rav is considered poor.
We should also note the ruling of the Shach (Choshen Mishpat 243:1), cited as well by Rav Akiva Eiger, who quotes the Maharik (Shoresh 133). He writes that if one tells a poor person that he will exert himself on the poor person’s behalf, it may not attain the status of a vow, since commitments involving personal effort do not become a neder.
Accordingly, one could argue that if a person promises a poor individual that he will arrange fundraising or gather support for him, that may be considered a commitment of personal effort rather than a financial obligation. In our case, however, the donor pledged to provide the money himself, not merely to solicit contributions from others.
In short, we find numerous sources among the Rishonim and Acharonim indicating that when one promises a gift to a poor person who genuinely needs it, he is obligated to fulfill his word under the laws of vows. Therefore, there is substantial basis to view such a commitment as binding, much like other charitable vows.
The Effect of Saying “Bli Neder”
One must also consider whether a person can avoid creating a vow by explicitly stating bli neder. Indeed, the Rosh (Nedarim 1:8), as well as the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 203), rule that one who wishes to avoid creating a vow must explicitly say bli neder. This is likewise cited by the Prishah, the Shach (4), and the Pischei Teshuvah (1) in the name of the Shelah. The reason is that even if one merely states that he intends to do something, without using formal language of a vow, the commitment may nevertheless become binding unless he expressly says bli neder.
Accordingly, if one tells a poor person, “I will give you this gift,” but adds the words bli neder, the promise does not attain the status of a vow and there is no obligation under the laws of vows to fulfill it.
Although this emerges clearly from the words of the Acharonim, and it is certainly advisable to accustom oneself to saying bli neder, it may nevertheless be proper, ideally, to fulfill the commitment even when it was made bli neder. For the Poskim write—and the Shelah HaKadosh (Parashas Mattos)—that when a person undertakes an obligation toward another and adds the words bli neder, he should still fulfill it. The commitment remains included in the principle of “Whatever proceeds from his mouth he shall do.” The only difference is that if he fails to fulfill it, he does not violate the prohibition of vows, since he explicitly said bli neder—unlike those who say that once someone says bli neder, he bears no responsibility whatsoever to keep his word.
In Shevet HaLevi (10:156), Rav Shmuel Wosner writes to Rav Elachanan Berlin, son-in-law of Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, that many people mistakenly assume that accepting something upon themselves bli neder means they need not carry it out. This is incorrect. It simply means that failure to do so does not constitute a violation of the laws of vows. One should nevertheless fulfill his commitment. See also Teshuvos V’Hanhagos 3:160.
Accordingly, there is room to argue that even when a person promised a gift bli neder, he should ideally honor his commitment. Therefore, in the present case, one could suggest that the promise should still be fulfilled. Although the wedding itself is no longer taking place, perhaps the funds could be used for another legitimate need of the same family, or the donor could wait until a future family celebration arises and assist with those expenses.
However, it seems that there is also room to argue that even ideally, he may not be obligated to fulfill the promise in this case. This is based on the ruling of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Minchas Shlomo (1:91:20). He discusses the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 203:4) regarding charitable pledges and explains that where people customarily make a declaration before Rosh Hashanah annulling future vows, such a declaration may prevent ordinary commitments from acquiring the status of vows.
Rav Shlomo Zalman establishes that in situations where a commitment becomes a vow only because Halachah said so without specifying, a prior declaration that one does not wish future statements to become vows can be effective. Since the individual himself never intended to create a vow, and the Torah merely treats the statement as one, his earlier declaration may prevent the vow from taking effect. Accordingly, whenever he makes an ordinary commitment without specifying otherwise, it is considered as though he had said bli neder. Nevertheless, Rav Shlomo Zalman himself would emphasize that one should ideally not rely on this general declaration alone. Rather, whenever possible, one should explicitly state bli neder.
In practice:
If one promises a gift to a poor and needy individual, he should always say bli neder explicitly. If he does not, the commitment may attain the status of a charitable vow and must be fulfilled.
However, if he made the customary declaration before Rosh Hashanah annulling future vows, and later pledged charity without explicitly saying bli neder, he may rely upon that declaration and need not be concerned that his commitment acquired the status of a vow.
Candy That Got Stuck in a Shul Chandelier on Shabbos
Q: In many shuls, the women’s section is located on the second floor, and on occasions such as an aufruf or bar mitzvah it is customary to throw candy bags (“pekelech”) and other treats. It sometimes happens that the candy becomes lodged in a hanging chandelier or other ceiling-mounted light fixture. May one remove the candy on Shabbos, even though doing so will likely cause the fixture to move? Is there a concern of muktzah?
A: The halachah would depend on whether he could remove the candy without touching the chandelier, or if it is certain that the chandelier will move in the process.
A chandelier is generally considered muktzah machmas gufo (and not muktzah machmas chisaron kis, and certainly not kli shemelachto l’issur), since it may not be touched at all, since touching alone will cause it to move. However, with a stick, since it is for the sake of something permitted, then according to the Taz (308:18) it would be permitted (according to the understanding of the Pri Megadim there, and not like the understanding of Shulchan Aruch Harav [9]). Similarly, if it is moved k’lacher yad, backhandedly, it would also be permitted according to the Rema, as well as the fact that it is “derech hilucho,” according to the Chazon Ish (47:12-13), it would also be permitted.
Accordingly, one should avoid directly touching the chandelier with his hand. If, however, he reaches for the candy and there is only a possibility that his hand may brush against the fixture, this is considered a davar she’eino miskavein (an unintended result) and is permitted so long as the movement is not inevitable (pesik reisha).
Once the candy is in his hand, removing it is permitted even if the candy itself brushes against the chandelier on its way out. This is considered indirect movement of the muktzah item for the sake of retrieving a permitted object, which is allowed even in cases of muktzah machmas gufo.
One could argue that, with respect to moving the chandelier, this would be classified as misasek (an inadvertent act). Some, however, question this, since the person is aware that he may touch the chandelier, and therefore it may not qualify as misasek, based on the discussion in Kovetz Shiurim (Vol. II, siman 23:3).
Nevertheless, perhaps this case is no worse than the Gemara’s example (Pesachim 33a) of one who intended to lift detached grass but instead cut attached attached. The Gemara classifies that case as misasek, even though it does not state that he was unaware there was attached produce present. See also Tosafos there (s.v. Niskaven). The main point is that the act he intended to perform is fundamentally different from the act that was actually accomplished.
My son-in-law, however, argues that according to Rav Akiva Eiger (1:8), even a misasek requires atonement, and would therefore not be permitted lechatchilah. According to this approach, however, misasek would appear to be more severe than a case of davar she’eino miskavein, whereas the Gemara would seem to imply the opposite (see Rashi there, s.v. Rav Nachman).
The Magen Avos (40a), however, writes that according to R’Shimon, whose opinion we follow that davar she’eino miskavein is permitted—misasek is actually more severe than davar she’eino miskavein. The basis of this distinction requires further clarification.
The opinion of Kovetz Shiurim is based on the view of Rav Akiva Eiger (Yoreh Deah, beginning of the laws of basar b’chalav) that a safek pesik reisha (a doubtful inevitable result) is prohibited. In practice, however, we do not follow that view; rather, we follow the ruling of the Taz (Orach Chaim 316:3). See also Shu”t VaYa’an David, Vol. 3, siman 33.
Furthermore, once the candy bag is in his hand and is being removed, even if it is impossible to take it out without the bag brushing against the chandelier, this is considered moving the chandelier indirectly through another object for the sake of retrieving a permitted item. Such indirect movement is permitted even in the case of muktzah machmas gufo, as we find regarding stones discussed in siman 309. Therefore, it is permitted.