Parshas Chukas 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
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May the Brachah for Pidyon Haben be Recited for the Bechor of a Ba’alas Teshuvah?
Q: A ba’alas teshuvah gave birth to a firstborn son and does not know whether her father was a Kohen, a Levi, or a Yisrael. May the pidyon haben be performed with the brachah?
A: The Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh De’ah 305:32), citing the Tzemach Tzedek, writes that in the case of a woman who does not know whether her father was a Kohen, Levi, or Yisrael, the child is exempt from redemption. The reason is that although the majority of people are Yisraelim and not Kohanim or Levi’im, monetary matters are not determined based on rov, majority. As stated in Yoreh De’ah 305, when there is uncertainty whether a firstborn son is obligated in redemption, we apply the principle that of hamotzi michaveiro alav harayah, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. The same reasoning would apply even in a case where there is a majority.
However, many Acharonim disagreed with this ruling for several reasons.
First, the Binyan Tzion (1:104) cites sources indicating that in cases of a particularly strong rov, money may indeed be extracted on the basis of that rov.
Second, the Hafla’ah (Kesubos 15b) writes that when the rov has already been established and relied upon in areas of issur, we follow the rov even in monetary matters. Many Acharonim concur with this approach.
The Kol Aryeh and Levushei Mordechai (Yoreh De’ah 204) rule that when there is an actual doubt that her father may have been a Kohen, that is when we say that we do not follow the rov. However, when no genuine basis for doubt exists, then even in monetary matters we follow the majority. In such a case, the minority possibility is not treated as a meaningful concern, and one need not regard the matter as a safek at all. Accordingly, one may rely upon the rov even to make a brachah.
The Poskim add another consideration, particularly in the case of ba’alei teshuvah. There is often a significant concern that individuals claiming Kohanic lineage may in fact have the status of a chalal. We rule in Yoreh De’ah 305:18 that the son of a chalal has the same status as a Yisrael regarding the redemption of the firstborn. See also Even HaEzer 7:12. This also appears from the ruling of Shevet HaLevi (Vol. 10, 32:3), who likewise treats them as Yisraelim regarding this law.
Therefore, the practical ruling in our case is that a ba’alas teshuvah who does not know whether she is the daughter of a Kohen, Levi, or Yisrael, we follow the rov, which would say that she is a Yisraelis. Accordingly, the pidyon haben should be performed, and the brachah may be recited.
Selling a Chandelier to a Church
Q: A common question that arises is regarding the sale of various items to churches, or performing work inside such buildings. Recently, the following case was raised: A person owns a lighting business and sells chandeliers and similar fixtures. A church wishes to purchase a chandelier from him for use in the church building. May he sell it to them? Furthermore, may he or his employees install it inside the church?
A: In practice, I would rule that one may sell the chandelier to the church, since the lighting fixture is not used directly for avodah zarah itself. However, installing or hanging it inside the church is prohibited, because one may not enter a house of avodah zarah. Some authorities are lenient to permit sending non-Jewish workers to perform the installation in cases of substantial financial loss.
The basis for permitting the sale is found in Yoreh De’ah 143:2, where it is ruled that one may not assist idolaters in constructing a dome intended to house their idols, since this constitutes benefiting idolatry. The Shach (1) explains that even if the building itself is not worshipped, the construction remains prohibited because it serves the idol. He disagrees with the Bach, who maintains that the prohibition applies only when the building itself is worshipped.
Nevertheless, it is clear from the discussion that only items which directly serve the idol are prohibited. An indirect accessory (tashmish d’tashmish) to such service is permitted. For this reason, it is permissible to construct a hall that will later contain a dome used for idol worship. Accordingly, a chandelier would appear comparable to such a hall. Its purpose is to beautify the room rather than to serve the idol itself. It is therefore considered an indirect accessory and would not be prohibited.
One could argue, however, that this is true only when adequate lighting already exists and the chandelier serves merely as decoration. If the fixture is being installed to provide the room’s essential lighting, the case may be similar to that discussed by the Taz (2), who prohibits making windows for a church because the windows are necessary for the functioning of the building itself. On the other hand, one could distinguish between the two cases. Windows become an integral part of the structure itself, whereas a lighting fixture is simply attached to the building and may still be considered only an indirect accessory. Nevertheless, since lighting is normally installed as part of the building’s functional design and becomes part of the room’s completion, there is reason to be stringent; see Darkei Teshuvah (5).
However, all of the above discussion concerns building or installing items for a church. Regarding the mere sale of items needed by a church, the Rema (Yoreh De’ah 151:1) rules that when the church can obtain the item elsewhere, the common practice is to be lenient, although baal nefesh yachmir. The Shach explains that the religion that they practice today is considered shituf, and therefore lifnei iveir would not apply. Although many authorities dispute this leniency, Teshuros Shai writes that one need only be stringent not to actually build it for them, but to sell an indirect accessory would certainly be permitted.
As for performing the installation inside the church, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 149:1) rules that one may not even enter a fair associated with idolatry. Accordingly, where there is no danger involved, there is generally no basis to permit entering a church building. Regarding sending a non-Jewish employee in one’s place, the Darkei Teshuvah cites authorities who rule stringently, although others are lenient. In practice, one should not rely upon the lenient view unless declining the job would result in substantial financial loss.
Practical Conclusion: A chandelier may be sold to a church, since it is not used directly for idol worship. However, a Jew should not enter the church to install it. In cases of significant financial loss, there may be room to rely on the lenient opinion and have a non-Jewish employee perform the installation.
Does “Borei Pri HaGafen” on Grape Juice During Kiddush Exempt Other Beverages?
Q: Each Shabbos, people sit in shul for Kiddush, which is often made on grape juice. There are several common practical halachic questions that arise. If someone recites Kiddush on grape juice on behalf of the tzibbur, may everyone then drink soda or other beverages based on the rule that wine exempts other beverages from their brachah? Or must each person drink a melo lugmo, a cheekful, of grape juice, or at the very least taste some of it? And even if wine can exempt other beverages from their brachah, does grape juice have the same status as wine for this purpose?
A: The source for the well-known rule that wine exempts other beverages is found in Berachos 41b, where Rav Pappa ruled that wine exempts all other beverages. We find a dispute among the Rishonim as to whether this ruling is accepted in practice. The Rambam does not mention this halachah, whereas the Rosh and the students of Rabbeinu Yonah maintain that wine does exempt other beverages. This is the ruling codified by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 174:2). See also Aruch HaShulchan (174:3).
One must further examine whether this halachah applies only when the other beverages are already before him. For example, at a shul Kiddush, people may wish to leave the soda in the refrigerator so that it remains cold. Does the Kiddush over wine or grape juice exempt the brachah on those beverages, or is only when they are already on the table before him?
The Shulchan Aruch (174:2) writes that wine exempts all other beverages. Tosafos (Berachos 42b) explains that this is because wine is the most significant of all beverages, and therefore the other drinks are considered subordinate to it. The Rashba (ibid. s.v. yayin), however, writes that this halachah applies specifically when a person has established himself for wine-drinking and, in the midst of that established drinking session, wishes to drink other beverages as well.
The Sha’ar HaTziyun (174:5) was uncertain how to understand the Rashba. Perhaps the Rashba means that:
- The requirement of establishing oneself for wine applies only in a case where, at the time he recited the brachah over the wine, the other beverages were not before him and he did not have them in mind. In such a situation, were it not for his established wine-drinking session, the other beverages would not be included in the brachah over the wine. However, once he has established himself to drink wine, it is as though he has established a wine meal, and therefore the brachah can extend even to beverages that were not in his mind at the time of the brachah, since it is common during a meal for additional drinks to be brought out. However, if the other beverages were in front of him, then even if he did not establish himself, his brachah still covers them.
- The entire law that wine exempts other beverages applies only when one has established himself for wine-drinking. In such a case, the wine attains special significance and the other beverages become subordinate to it. But if he merely drank a single cup of wine, it is not sufficiently significant to exempt other beverages, even if he had them in mind at the time of the brachah.
In practice, the Acharonim disagree on this matter. The Nishmas Adam rules that wine exempts other beverages only when one has established himself for wine-drinking. The Mishnah Berurah (174:3), however, rules in accordance with most Acharonim that wine exempts other beverages both when one has established himself for drinking and when the other beverages were before him at the time of the brachah. The Mishnah Berurah further adds that some Acharonim maintain that it is not even necessary for the other beverages to be physically present at the time of the brachah; it is sufficient if, when reciting the brachah over the wine, he intended to drink those other beverages as well.
Regarding someone who drinks only a small amount of wine—as is common at a shul Kiddush, where each person takes a cup and drinks only a little wine—does this also exempt the brachah on other beverages?
The Beur Halachah (174) cites the Chayei Adam, who rules that wine exempts other beverages only when he establishes himself for drinking wine. The Beur Halachah writes that although in Mishnah Berurah (174:3) he ruled in accordance with the Acharonim who maintain that even without an established drinking session the other beverages are exempt if they were present at the time of the brachah, nevertheless one should not be lenient unless he drank at least a melo lugmav. Although the Derech HaChaim rules that even a mere taste is sufficient, the Beur Halachah concludes that, ideally, anyone who wishes to exempt other beverages should drink at least a melo lugmav. It emerges from his words that, ideally, one should drink a melo lugmav. If one merely tasted the wine, however, there are poskim upon whom he may rely not to recite an additional brachah over other beverages. See also Piskei Teshuvos, who cites those who are lenient even when no wine was tasted at all.
With regard to our specific discussion of grape juice, let us begin with the Gemara (Bava Basra 97a) which states that one who squeezes grapes and drinks the juice recites the brachah of “Borei Pri Hagafen.” This is codified in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 272:2). Based on this, many poskim maintain that Kiddush may be recited over grape juice and that it has the same halachic status as wine.
Some Poskim, however, note that we only see from the Gemara that grape juice is acceptable for Kiddush, but not necessarily that it shares every halachah of wine. This distinction can already be found in the Rishonim.
Accordingly, Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv ztz”l ruled that one who drinks grape juice may not drink other beverages without first reciting their brachah, because grape juice does not possess the status of wine for this particular halachah.
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ztz”l (Halichos Shlomo, Moadim, Vol. 2, 9:11; see footnotes there), however, maintained that grape juice has the status of wine in all respects. Therefore, it exempts other beverages from brachos, is considered kidush b’makom seudah, and even fulfills the requirements of simchas yom tov, since we do not find that this requires specifically intoxicating wine. After all, one fulfills simchas yom tov through eating meat, despite the fact that this form of joy has nothing to do with intoxication. Nevertheless, he concluded that whenever possible, it is certainly preferable to fulfill the mitzvos of Kiddush, daled kosos, and simchas yom tov with actual wine.
Rav Chaim Kanievsky likewise ruled in accordance with this view. Similarly, in Teshuvos V’Hanhagos (Vol. 7, §27), Rav Moshe Sternbuch shlit”a ruled that grape juice exempts other beverages. He explains that nowadays people do not drink wine as commonly as in the times of Chazal, and many find wine difficult to drink. As a result, many people use grape juice whenever a cup of brachah requires wine. For such people, grape juice effectively serves as their wine. Therefore, nowadays, grape juice is considered wine and possesses the halachic status of wine for all purposes.
It should also be noted that if someone relies on the lenient opinion permitting the daytime Kiddush to be recited over whiskey, whose brachah is shehakol, he should ideally have the other beverages in mind, or at least have them placed on the table, so that they will be included in that brachah and not require an additional brachah.