Parshas Bamidbar 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Accepting Tzedaka from Women Without Her Husband’s Knowledge
Q: A very common situation arises when someone collecting charity for a certain institution comes to a home and finds that only the wife is present. Many times, the women themselves do not tell the collector to return later to meet their husbands; rather, they themselves give a sum of money to the collector. The question is whether they are limited in the amount they may give without their husbands’ knowledge. For the Gemara in Bava Kamma (119a) states: “Charity collectors may accept from women only a small amount, but not a large amount.” The Mechaber rules (Yoreh Deah 248:4): “Charity collectors may not accept from women, slaves, or minors anything more than a small amount, but not a large amount.” This applies in the ordinary case, and the Poskim already write that whenever a poor person requests charity, a woman may not give him a substantial sum without receiving permission from her husband. The question is: what exactly qualifies as the amount a woman may give? And is there any distinction if the woman herself earns a considerable income from her own employment?
A: The Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 479) writes that women are likewise obligated in the mitzvah of charity just as men are, since it is not a time-bound mitzvah. Therefore, every adult woman is obligated to give charity according to what is fitting for her. However, the premise of our discussion is the halachah that regarding a married woman, her assets are owned by her husband, and she may not distribute them without his consent. Therefore, one may not accept from her a substantial amount, only a small amount, since it is customary for women to give small sums and their husbands are aware of this practice. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Gezeilah (se’if 5), and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (182:14). Regarding a woman who does have permission from her husband to give a substantial amount, the Mechaber writes there: “Charity collectors may not accept from women, slaves, or minors anything more than a small amount, but not a large amount, since such money is presumed to be stolen or unlawfully taken from others.” The Pischei Teshuvah (se’if katan 3) writes in the name of the Shu”t Noda BiYehudah (first edition, Yoreh Deah 72) that if the woman states that she is giving on behalf of her husband and with his permission, she is believed. However, in Shu”t Teshuvah Me’Ahavah (vol. 3, p. 51a), after citing the words of the Noda BiYehudah, he explains that her credibility applies only when she says that her husband allows her to give charity from his money. But if she says that the money is independently hers, she is not believed. See more in the Badei HaShulchan what he questions on the ruling of the Noda BiYehudah.
Practically speaking, however, the Aruch HaShulchan rules in accordance with the Noda BiYehudah. Therefore, if the woman explicitly states that her husband granted her permission to give a substantial amount, she is believed, and one may accept even a large donation from her. With regard to our case, where the woman works and independently earns money — must she request permission each time she wishes to give a substantial charitable donation, or may one be lenient since she herself earns a considerable income? The Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kamma, 8:29; 10:59), in the name of the Ra’avan, writes that a woman who actively manages financial affairs within the household may give charity even in a substantial amount. This is also cited in Hagahos Yad Avraham and in Aruch HaShulchan (248:12). However, Shu”t Shevet HaLevi (2:118) comments on the Aruch HaShulchan that everything depends on the particular husband and wife. Sometimes a woman’s primary involvement in the home does not make her fully authorized over large sums of money. Even if she serves as an administrator, perhaps the husband authorizes her only for household expenses, or even somewhat beyond that for buying and selling in order to generate profit. But for charitable donations she still requires her husband’s permission — unless she is an “eishes chayil” who supports her husband financially, in which case even for substantial amounts we may presume that her husband approves, since if he were to object, she might cease engaging in business altogether. In the end, everything depends on the circumstances and the particular situation. However, Teshuvos V’Hanhagos (4:219) writes leniently regarding large donations in contemporary times, since today’s women are involved in financial matters and business dealings, including matters relating to family assets, and ordinarily husbands do not object if they give charity. See more in the sefer Ahavas Chesed (Dinei Halvaah, chapter 2, se’if 2).
As a practical ruling, several guidelines emerge from the Poskim regarding when one may accept a substantial charitable donation from a woman. First, it is explicit in Even HaEzer (85:11) that if a woman possesses property received as a personal gift — for example, someone gave her money on condition that her husband would have no rights to it — she may certainly give from those funds to charity, even in a large amount. Likewise, a woman who maintains her own separate bank account apart from her husband may give from it without requesting permission from him. In the sefer Shaarei Tzedek, the author cites Rav Wosner, zt”l, regarding restitution money received from Germany, that the accepted practice was that such funds belonged to the woman who received them. However, Shu”t Igros Moshe (Even HaEzer vol. 1, siman 103) held that German restitution payments have the status of nichsei melug, whose profits belong to the husband. Similarly, if the substantial amount that the woman gives to the charity collector comes from pushkahs kept in her home, it is permitted to accept from her. And finally, if the woman is the primary financial supporter of her husband, one may accept from her even a substantial charitable donation.
A Non-Jewish Worker Wearing a Cross in One’s Home
Q: A very common question arises regarding non-Jews who wear a cross around their necks. There are also non-Jews (such as foreign workers from India) who bow to a small idol that they bring with them. Is one obligated to prevent them from bringing such items into his home?
A: The basis of the question is the Mishnah in Avodah Zarah (21a), codified in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 151:10), that it is forbidden to rent a house to a non-Jew — even outside Eretz Yisrael — because he will permanently bring idols into it. However, the Rema adds that nowadays the custom is to rent homes to non-Jews even for residence, since they generally do not bring objects of idol worship into their homes. The Shach (17) challenges the Rema, for we clearly see that they do in fact bring idols into their homes permanently. He answers that perhaps in the time of the Rema they were not accustomed to doing so, as the Rosh writes in Avodah Zarah (1:22). Nevertheless, the Shach writes that the more convincing explanation is the second answer of the Rosh: although according to halachah renting does not constitute ownership, nevertheless, since the non-Jewish governments are powerful and under their legal systems a rental is considered akin to a sale, it is viewed as though the non-Jew is bringing the idol into his own home. He notes that this understanding is found in additional Rishonim as well.
Accordingly, in Eretz Yisrael there is certainly no allowance for a non-Jew employed as a caregiver in a Jewish home to bring idols into the Jew’s house. Even outside Eretz Yisrael, if the non-Jew lives together with the elderly person in the home and does not have the status of a renter at all, it would likewise be forbidden. Therefore, one must prevent a foreign worker from bringing into the Jewish home anything that is considered idol worship.
However, one must still analyze the status of a non-Jew who wears a cross around his neck. The Rema (Yoreh Deah 141:1) writes that a cross which is worshipped has the status of an idol-image and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. But a cross worn around the neck merely as a symbol or remembrance is not considered an idol-image and is permitted. The Shach (6) adds that this leniency applies only when we know that the wearer did not bow to it. But if we do not know this, it is no better than utensils found bearing images associated with idol worship, which are forbidden, since whenever that form is commonly worshipped we suspect that the objects themselves may have been worshipped, as explained in the Shulchan Aruch there (se’if 3). Although the Chasam Sofer cites the Ritva in Avodah Zarah that nowadays people do not bow to such forms appearing on utensils, nevertheless, people certainly do bow to the cross itself.
However, the Darchei Teshuvah (ibid., 7) cites the Shu”t Sho’el U’Meishiv (first edition, vol. 3, siman 71), who discusses an incident during Succos of the year 5612, when the king passed through Lvov and sent medals to individuals he wished to honor, including a Jew. The medal bore a cross, and the Jew asked whether he was permitted to wear it. The Sho’el U’Meishiv wrote that since the Rema rules that something worn around the neck merely as a commemorative symbol is not considered an idol-image, perhaps one need not be concerned here either, since the king intended it solely as an honorary token and sign of affection toward those who found favor in his eyes. Furthermore, it involved royal honor. Nevertheless, he concludes without a definitive ruling.
Based on this, some Poskim rule in our case that not only must one certainly prevent a foreign worker from India from bringing an actual idol into the home, but even a cross necklace worn around the neck would be forbidden according to the Shach, unless one knows that it was never worshipped. In the sefer Minchas Asher (Shemos, 20:6), Rav Asher Weiss shlit”a discusses this question at length, as he was frequently asked whether one must require a non-Jew to remove such a necklace. He cites the Teshuvos HaRashba (vol. 1, §177), who writes that if a non-Jew enters a Jew’s home carrying an idol, the Jew is not obligated to expel him based of the prohibition of “Do not bring an abomination into your home.” However, the Knesses HaGedolah, cited in Darchei Teshuvah (se’if katan 24), writes that the Rashba permitted this only on an occasional basis, not as a permanent arrangement. He further cites another opinion suggesting that perhaps the Rashba only allowed it when the non-Jew brought it in without the Jew’s consent, whereas with the Jew’s approval it would be forbidden.
However, in our case, we are not dealing with an actual idol that is worshipped, but merely with a symbol of idol worship. Moreover, the non-Jew wears it of his own accord and not at the instruction of the Jew. Therefore, we are not obligated to protest. This is especially true where there is concern for hostility or ill will, something Chazal themselves took into account in various contexts. This is the general accepted practical ruling: since this is only a symbol associated with idol worship, there is no concern of “Do not bring an abomination into your home,” and one may be lenient, particularly where issues of hostility may arise.
However, in a future issue, b’ezras Hashem, we will further elaborate on the prohibition and discuss how one should conduct himself when a foreign woman from India or the like comes to work in the home, is given a private room. Od chazon la’moed.
A Mistaken Correction During Sefirah Within “Toch Kedei Dibbur”
Q: It sometimes occurs during the days of Sefiras HaOmer that a person counts correctly, for example: “Today is four days to the Omer.” Immediately afterward, however, he begins to think that he made a mistake and that in truth it is already the fifth day. He therefore corrects himself within toch kedei dibbur and says: “Today is five days of the Omer.” Later it becomes clear that his original counting was correct and the second counting was mistaken. Does the “correction” ruin the counting, or has he fulfilled his obligation through the original counting?
A: There is a fundamental principle that anything said within toch kedei dibbur can only rectify but cannot ruin something that was already valid. My dear friend, HaGaon Rav Amrom Fried, shlit”a (cited in Shu”t Vayishma Moshe, vol. 7), noted that this principle is already explicit in the words of the Ramban in Milchamos Hashem on Berachos (7a, Dafei HaRif). The Ramban explains the Gemara’s discussion regarding someone who was holding a cup of beer and began the blessing properly with “Shehakol Nihyeh Bidvaro,” but then mistakenly concluded with “Borei Pri HaGafen.” The Gemara discusses whether the improper conclusion invalidates the proper opening. The Gemara concludes that if he began appropriately for beer, then even though he concluded as though it were wine, he nevertheless fulfilled his obligation, because the blessing had already been properly completed. Whatever he added afterward is considered insignificant speech, and even though he erred in those additional words, we are unconcerned. Similarly, the Mishnah Berurah (46:20) writes the same rule.
One may ask, however, how this differs from the well-known ruling of the Devar Avraham (1:34), who writes that a person uncertain which day of the Omer it is may not recite a blessing and count both possible days out of doubt, because such a count lacks the status of “counting” altogether. It is only considered counting when one is certain; if one is uncertain which day it is, it is not considered counting at all. He brings proof from the laws of ma’aser behemah, where we say: “the definite tenth animal, not the doubtful tenth.” If so, why should we not say here as well that the counting is invalid because he was uncertain which day it actually was?
The Poskim explain that the two cases are fundamentally different. In the case discussed by the Devar Avraham, already at the moment of counting the person was unsure whether his count was correct. But in our case, at the time of the original counting he was completely confident that he was counting properly. Only afterward did doubt enter his mind, leading him to “correct” himself. Therefore, the second counting does not possess the power to invalidate or undo the original count.
The practical conclusion, then, is that even though he subsequently stated the incorrect day within toch kedei dibbur, he nevertheless fulfilled his obligation through the original counting, since the attempted correction cannot invalidate what was already properly done.