Parshas Vayikra 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Honoring a Stepmother and a Stepfather — Whom Should One Serve First?
Q: I was asked by someone whose father had passed away and whose mother later remarried. His mother and her husband now visit his home, and he often wonders whom he should honor first in matters of kibbud—for example, when pouring them a cup to drink and the like. Should he give precedence to his mother or to his mother’s husband?
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 240:21) rules that a person is obligated to honor his father’s wife even though she is not his mother, as long as his father is alive. Likewise, he is obligated to honor his mother’s husband as long as his mother is alive. After the parent’s death he is no longer obligated in their honor; nevertheless, it is proper conduct to continue honoring them even afterward. The Taz (18) explains that this is derived from the Gemara in Kesubos (103a), where the words “es avicha” is understood to include your father’s wife, and “es imecha” is understood to include your mother’s husband. The view of most of the Rishonim is that this obligation is d’oraisa. This appears to be the position of the Rambam (Hilchos Mamrim 6:15), the Ramban in his glosses to Sefer HaMitzvos (shoresh 2), Mordechai (Bava Basra, ch. 3, 527), Shu”t Maharil (81), and the Sefer Chareidim (mitzvos aseh 4:6). A lone dissenting view is found in the Meiri in Kesubos, who writes that the obligation is d’rbanan and that the pasuk is only as an asmachta.
One may further inquire into the nature of this obligation: Is the requirement to honor a father’s wife or a mother’s husband simply an extension of the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents—so that by honoring them one thereby honors the biological parent—or is it an independent obligation of honor in its own right? Several practical differences may depend on this question. For example, is one obligated to honor a father’s wife or a mother’s husband even when the parent is not present? If the entire obligation exists only as a means of honoring the parent, then when the parent is not present there would seemingly be no element of honoring the parent. If, however, it is an independent obligation, the duty would apply even when the parent is not present.
In the Sefer Chofetz Chaim, Mitzvos Asein, Be’er Mayim Chaim (10), he writes that perhaps since the pasuk includes them in all respects similar to a father and mother, the obligation would apply both in their presence and in their absence. On the other hand, it may be that the primary reason they were included in the obligation of honor is that otherwise it would constitute a disgrace to the parent; according to this reasoning, the inclusion would apply only when the parent is present. Yalkut Yosef, Hilchos Kibbud Av Va’em (vol. 2, p. 470) cites the words of the Chofetz Chaim and writes that one who studies his words carefully will see that the Chofetz Chaim sought to suggest that one must honor his father’s wife even when the father himself is not present, similar to the obligation of honoring one’s father even in his absence. However, he did not intend to introduce the idea that one must honor his father’s wife when she herself is not present. According to this, it would seem that the obligation to honor them applies primarily when they are present. See also Shu”t B’tzel HaChochmah (3:95:6), who discusses the related concept of mora, reverence, towards one’s father’s wife.
With regard to our question as to whom one should serve first, his mother or his mother’s husband—see the Minchas Chinuch (33), who writes that if his mother says, “Give me water,” and his mother’s husband also says, “Give me water,” he must certainly give precedence to his mother. Although in the case of a father, one must give precedence to the father because both the son and the mother are obligated in the father’s honor, that principle applies to one’s actual father, whose honor is an independent obligation, and therefore his father and mother stand on equal footing, requiring precedence to be given to the father. In this situation, however, the primary obligation is the honor of the mother, and the obligation to honor the stepfather stems from the honor of the mother; thus, the mother takes precedence.
In Sefer Chut Shani by HaGaon Rav Nissim Karelitz zt”l, in the laws of kibbud av v’eim, it is written that if honoring the mother conflicts with honoring the mother’s husband—for example, if the mother tells him to turn on the light while her husband tells him not to turn it on—then according to the Minchas Chinuch (33) he should listen to his mother, since the entire obligation to honor the mother’s husband derives from the honor of the mother. However, according to the Darchei Moshe the matter remains uncertain. Therefore, one should be careful to preserve the honor of both and avoid offending either of them. Accordingly, if there is discord between the mother and her husband and the son wishes to intervene to make peace between them, he must take care to preserve the honor of both and not cause offense to either one.
Common Questions Regarding the 4 Cups of Wine on the Night of the Seder
Drinking the Arba Kosos with a Straw
Q: I have been asked several times by individuals who find it difficult to drink a large amount, or to drink quickly, when drinking directly from the cup. However, when they drink through a straw it is easier for them. The question therefore arises: does drinking in this manner qualify as “derech cheirus,” in a free manner, required for the fulfillment of the mitzvah of the arba kosos, the arba kosos of wine, or not?
A: This issue has already been discussed by leading halachic authorities of the generation. The prevailing ruling is that one should not drink the wine for the arba kosos through a straw, even though some maintain that it is considered a valid form of drinking. Nevertheless, since when drinking through a straw one cannot consume a revi’is at one time, it should not be done. However, for children who have reached the age of chinuch there is no particular concern.
In the Mishnah Berurah with the annotations B’Yitzchak Yikarei by HaRav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, on Mishnah Berurah Siman 472:34, he writes as follows: “Drinking through a straw, as is common today, requires study as to whether it is considered a normal manner of drinking. Even with regard to Yom Kippur it is questionable whether one would incur the punishment of kareis.” The source of this doubt is a Gemara in Sotah (18a) regarding the mei hamarim (the bitter waters administered to the suspected sotah): “Rava raised the following question: If one caused her to drink through fibers, what is the law? Through a tube, what is the law? Is this considered a normal manner of drinking, or is it not considered a normal manner of drinking?” The Gemara leaves the question unresolved.
This question is relevant only according to the opinion that the time limit of k’dei achilas pras for drinking is the same as for eating. Otherwise, there would be no defined time frame requiring the drinking of a revi’is when drinking through a straw.
In responsa Shu”t Mishnas Yosef, vol. 15 (§53), the author discusses our question, of whether one may drink the arba kosos on the night of the Pesach Seder using a straw. He responds: “The primary requirements are that the kos is full and that the wine not be pagum (disqualified), as ruled in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 182 and 272). Additionally, the drinking must be a cheek-full or the majority of the cup, and it must be consumed in one continuous act without a significant interruption (Rema, O.C. 472:9; Mishnah Berurah 34). However, the precise form of drinking is not explicitly defined. For example, if someone were to take wine from the cup with a spoon and drink it from the spoon, I have not yet found a source that explicitly prohibits it. (This could have practical relevance in the case of a sick person who must be given drink in such a manner.) Accordingly, it would seem that drinking through a straw may also be considered a normal form of drinking, since many people throughout the year drink this way. Nevertheless, it is certainly more proper that one drink directly from the cup in a dignified manner, rather than sucking through a straw, so that it does not appear burdensome to him. This is somewhat analogous to the Gemara in Pesachim 57a, where a Kohen Gadol wrapped his hands in silk while performing the Avodah and was severely punished for doing so. Although there the act constituted a disgrace, whereas here the person merely seeks to make the drinking easier for himself, still, one should ideally drink directly from the cup, unless he is elderly or ill and unable to do so due to some difficulty.
At What Age Does the Obligation of Chinuch Apply to the Arba Kosos?
Q: At what age must children be trained in the mitzvah of drinking the arba kosos?
A: The Shulchan Aruch HaRav (472:25) writes that the age of chinuch for the arba kosos begins from the time that a child understands the sanctity of Yom Tov; at that point it is appropriate to train him in kiddush al hakos. With regard to the approximate age, the Mishnah Berurah in the Hilchos Kiddush (269:1) writes that it is around six or seven years old, depending on the child’s level of understanding.
In the responsa Avnei Yashfeh (4:66), the author was asked about a four-year-old child and whether there is any value in giving him the arba kosos. He writes that the question stems from what the Mishnah Berurah states (343:3), that with regard to positive commandments the age of chinuch depends on the nature of the mitzvah. Thus, a child who knows how to wrap himself properly is trained in the mitzvah of tzitzis and his father obtains a tallis for him, and so forth. If so, one might argue that even a younger child, below the usual age of chinuch, already knows how to drink the arba kosos. However, the Shulchan Aruch (472:8) rules that one must drink the arba kosos in their proper prescribed manner, and if one drank them one after another without maintaining the proper prescribed manner, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Mishnah Berurah there (24) explains that this means that the Haggadah must be recited between the cups. Since a very young child is not capable of reciting the Haggadah, it follows that he is also exempt from the arba kosos, because he cannot fulfill the mitzvah in its required form.
We may also suggest that anyone who does not understand sippur yetzias mitzrayim is not obligated in the mitzvah of the arba kosos or the other mitzvos of the Seder night. This idea appears to be supported by the ruling of the Rema (472:2), who writes that a child who does not understand what is being related about yetzias mitzrayim may be fed matzah on Erev Pesach. The clear implication of this is that the obligation is dependent upon understanding; if he does not comprehend the story, he is likewise exempt from the other mitzvos of the night. The author then notes that the Chok Yaakov (472:27) writes explicitly that the age of chinuch for this mitzvah is five or six years old.
Placing Different Types of Wine on the Table and the Bracha of HaTov VeHaMeitiv
Q: A question that arises for many people each year is the following. At times on the night of the Seder, in the middle of the meal, a person drinks a particularly good wine that he did not have for the first two cups. Similarly, it sometimes happens that after drinking the first cup, he finds that he does not like this wine and wishes to drink a different type of wine for the second cup. One must therefore consider whether he is obligated to recite the blessing of HaTov VeHaMeitiv on such wine.
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 175:2) rules that one recites the blessing of HaTov VeHaMeitiv when there is a change of wine, even if one is not certain that the second wine is superior to the first, so long as it is not known to be inferior. The Mishnah Berurah (2) writes that on the night of Pesach it is preferable not to drink two types of wine so as to avoid the need to recite the blessing of HaTov VeHaMeitiv. In Sha’ar HaTziyun he adds that if the first cup was not pleasing to him, there is no need to recite HaTov VeHaMeitiv on a wine that had not been on the table. See also what is discussed in Shu”t Minchas Shlomo, vol. 1 (18, note 6), where this ruling of the Sha’ar HaTziyun is questioned. In practice, the Mishnah Berurah (4) writes that if the bottles were already in his home and he had in mind to drink additional wine, even though they were not placed before him on the table, the blessing of HaTov VeHaMeitiv is not recited. See further Kaf HaChaim there (se’if katan 10), Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak, vol. 9 (14), and Ma’adanei Yom Tov, vol. 4 (116).