Parshas Mishpatim 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Is it Permitted to Find Out the Baby’s Gender via Ultrasound?
Q: I am frequently asked by pregnant women who wish to know whether it is permitted for them—or whether there is any reason to refrain—from discovering the gender of the baby during a doctor’s visit. Nowadays, it is possible to determine through ultrasound whether the baby is male or female. Is there any reason to avoid doing so?
A: First and foremost, I always instruct that each woman should consult her own Rav regarding his practice in these matters, since we do not find any ruling in the Shulchan Aruch prohibiting the determination of a baby’s gender. Those who are particular in this regard do so more as an “inyan” than as a matter of strict halachah. Those who maintain that it is proper to refrain base themselves upon what is stated in the Midrash (Bereishis Rabbah, Parashas Toldos 65:12): “Seven matters are concealed from man: the day of death, the day of consolation, the depth of judgment, a person does not know through what he will earn his livelihood, a person does not know what is in his fellow’s heart, a person does not know what is in the stomach of a woman, and when the wicked kingdom will fall… A person does not know what is in the stomach of a woman, as it is written (Koheles 11:5), ‘Just as you do not know the way of the wind, nor the nature of the embryo in a pregnant stomach, so can you never know the work of G-d Who makes everything..’ ” The Metzudas Dovid explains: “Just as you do not know by which path the wind travels, though you hear its sound, and just as regarding the fetus enclosed in the stomach of the pregnant woman—you do not know whether it is male or female, even though you see the protrusion of the stomach—so too you do not know the work of G-d… ‘Everything’ meaning: you do not know any aspect of Hashem’s works. This connects to the earlier verse to say that you should not delay your sowing because of the wind nor fear the rain, for you cannot know when they will come.” The meforshim write that these matters are intentionally concealed, not by chance, and that there is a reason why human beings are not meant to know them. According to this, it would seem inappropriate to discover the gender of the baby. In the sefer Toras HaYoledes (chapter 57, note 2), HaGaon Rabbi Yitzchak Zilberstein, shlit”a, asks that nowadays, it is possible to determine the baby’s gender through medical technology—contrary to what the Midrash seems to say? He answers that according to the Chasam Sofer (Even HaEzer II, siman 82), there is a distinction between the term me’uberes (pregnant woman) and ishah (woman). The term me’uberes applies once the pregnancy is visibly recognizable after three months, whereas ishah may refer to a woman within the first three months of pregnancy. According to this, the words of Chazal are precise, as they state “what is in the womb of a woman”—that is, within the first three months, and certainly within the first forty days, when it is not yet possible to determine the fetus’s gender. Accordingly, after three months it would be permitted to determine whether the child is male or female. In any event, where there is a need, certainly there is no obligation to refrain from determining the gender. We may also add that there is no issue here of “Tamim tihyeh”—“You shall be wholehearted with Hashem your G-d” (Devarim 18:13). The primary meaning of that pasuk is not to investigate the future through divination or similar means. Here, however, this is not an inquiry into the future; rather, it is clarification of a present reality that is merely hidden from view. It is comparable to an X-ray or similar imaging, which is not lacking in tamim tihyeh.
In Conclusion: It is permitted to discover the gender of the fetus during pregnancy. There are those who refrain from doing so due to certain concerns, and they have a basis upon which to be stringent. One who wishes to be stringent—tavo alav brachah.
Holding a Baby During Tefillah – May One Interrupt Shemoneh Esrei to Calm a Baby Who is Disturbing Them?
Q: I have frequently been asked by young mothers who, Baruch Hashem, spend much of their time caring for their babies, and as a result encounter common questions in Hilchos Tefillah. For example: Is it permitted to hold a baby while davening? And if a baby begins to cry while a woman is in the middle of Shemoneh Esrei, may she quiet the child who is disturbing her?
A: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 96:1) writes that when one is davening, he should not hold tefillin in his hand, nor kisvei kodesh, nor a full bowl, nor a knife, nor money, nor a loaf of bread—because he is concerned that they will fall, and he will become distracted and his concentration will be decreased. The Mishnah Berurah (96:1), citing the Pri Megadim, writes that this applies as well during Krias Shema and Pesukei DeZimrah. Further, the Mishnah Berurah (96:4), quoting the Birkei Yosef, adds that it is likewise forbidden to place a baby before oneself during Tefillah. From this it would appear that certainly holding a baby in one’s hands while davening is prohibited, since one’s attention is focused on the child so that they do not fall, and in addition, a baby will generally distract the person and prevent proper concentration. The chiddush mentioned by the Poskim here is that even seating a baby in front of oneself is forbidden. However, where without holding the baby one would be unable to daven at all, it is certainly preferable to pray in this manner—even with diminished concentration—than not to daven altogether. Regarding someone whose baby is crying and wishes to quiet the child during Shemoneh Esrei: The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 104:1) rules that one may not interrupt his prayer. The Mishnah Berurah (104:1) writes that even a mere gesture is forbidden. However, in the case of a crying baby, one may gesture with his hands to quiet the child so that he does not disturb him from his tefillah. If this is ineffective, he should distance himself from the child, but he may not speak. This ruling is based on the Shaarei Teshuvah. The reason it is permitted to gesture is explained there, that since the baby’s crying disturbs him and prevents proper concentration, this is considered a tzorech tefillah—a function of the tefillah itself. The Kaf HaChaim (104:3), citing the Machazik Berachah, writes that if a baby is disturbing him, he may even make a soft sound to quiet the child. The Kaf HaChaim explains that it is preferable to quiet the child with a slight sound than to remain distracted during tefillah or be forced to move away. However, the Aruch HaShulchan (104:4) disagrees with this leniency, questioning how they permitted even gesturing or moving away. He writes that even if it is for the sake of tefillah, it is difficult to permit; rather, if a baby cries and disturbs him, he should strengthen himself in tefillah, and he will have siyata d’shmaya. Therefore, one should not rush to be lenient in this matter. On the other hand, the sefer Leket HaKemach HeChadash (104) writes like the Mishnah Berurah, that if a baby cries in Shul during Shemoneh Esrei, some mistakenly leave the child there, thinking it is forbidden to interrupt. In truth, one must interrupt and remove the child from the Shul so that his voice is no longer heard by those praying. He further cites that the Chazon Ish ztz”l ruled in a case where a child refused to go to the restroom on his own, that the father should interrupt his davening and accompany him. In Halichos Shlomo (8:5) it is written that if gesturing is ineffective and it is impossible to distance oneself, one may approach the child and quiet him without speaking. Presumably, this refers to quieting the child by giving him a toy or some sweets or the like. We see from this that not only walking is permitted, but even engaging in another act (which would appear to be a greater interruption than merely walking) is not considered a hefsek. This is similar to what the Mishnah Berurah (104:2), in the name of the Chayei Adam (25:9), writes: If one is in middle of Shemoneh Esrei and becomes uncertain about a law relevant to his tefillah—for example, he forgot a certain insertion—he may walk from his place to look up the halachah in a sefer. Whether one may ask someone verbally is uncertain, though it would seem permissible. See there in Nishmas Adam for his reasoning. We see that one may interrupt even with walking in order to ensure proper prayer. Accordingly, if a woman is davening at home and, in the middle of Shemoneh Esrei, a child begins to cry and disturb her—or children begin fighting and the like—then certainly, if she is able to strengthen herself and maintain concentration, that is preferable. However, if she cannot concentrate, she may gesture with her hands (gesturing is preferable to making a sound). If gesturing is ineffective, she may make a soft sound to quiet them. If this too is ineffective, she may move to another place where she will not be disturbed. In all cases, however, she may not speak. If she knows that even by moving elsewhere, she will not be able to concentrate because she is aware that the baby is crying, then it is preferable that she hold the baby in her arms while davening.
Interrupting One’s Davening to Signal to His Son to Daven Properly
Q: There are those who raise the following question: If one is standing in the middle of Shemoneh Esrei and notices that his older son is making a mistake in his prayer—for example, reciting the Shabbos Shemoneh Esrei on Yom Tov or the like—is it permitted to signal to him so that he correct himself and pray properly?
A: In Igros Moshe (Orach Chaim 4:16), Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses at length a case where an incorrect announcement was made, which would cause the tzibbur to say brachos in vain. He concludes that in a pressing situation such as this, it is permitted to make a corrective announcement even in middle of Shemoneh Esrei between one berachah and the next. Accordingly, in our case as well, it would seem permitted to signal to one’s son in order to save him from reciting a brachah in vain. Indeed, it is even better in our case, since he is not interrupting with speech but merely gesturing. Moreover, if this matter is disturbing his own concentration in tefillah, there would be further room to permit it. However, there remains room to analyze a different scenario—where the son is not praying incorrectly, but simply is not praying at all, in which case there is no concern of a brachah in vain. Would it then be permitted to signal to him to begin davening? In the sefer Chanokh LaNa’ar (chapter 11, note 10), this question is left unresolved, and he suggests that if the matter is disturbing the father’s concentration, then perhaps he may signal to him. Nevertheless, this is not a simple leniency, as we saw that the Aruch HaShulchan maintains that even gesturing constitutes a hefsek, and accordingly one should not be quick to permit such a thing. Indeed, it may be argued that as the child matures he will accustom himself to daven properly, and there is no need to remind him each time while he is in the middle of his own davening. Therefore, it is worthwhile to be stringent for what is written in Ishei Yisrael (chapter 32, note 45) in the name of HaGaon Rabbi Yehoshua Neuwirth, zt”l, author of Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, that presumably such signaling would be permitted only between one berachah and the next. We may suggest, however, that the advantage of waiting between brachos applies specifically where the concern is that of a hefsek of speech, so as not to ruin his tefillah. Here, however, the primary issue is not a hefsek of speech but rather a lack of concentration. In such a case, there may be no distinction; on the contrary, it would seem preferable not to wait until the conclusion of the berachah, but rather to remove the distraction immediately so that he may concentrate properly throughout the remainder of the berachah as well.