Parshas Shemos 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Is It Permitted to Lie or Forge Documents in Order to Receive What Is Rightfully His from His Father’s Estate
Q:
An incident occurred in chutz la’aretz involving a Jew who passed away without leaving a will, and who left behind a very large estate. His son and daughter were not in agreement regarding the division of the inheritance. The daughter claims that under the law of the land she is entitled to half of the estate, and she intends to go to civil court to have the inheritance divided equally. The son, however, argues that according to Torah law he is the sole heir, and that she has no right whatsoever to claim any portion of the inheritance. Moreover, if she were to take a share without his consent, it would constitute outright theft on her part. Therefore, the son wishes to forge a will bearing the signatures of two witnesses, stating that his father left the entire inheritance to him, in order to prevent his sister from transgressing the prohibition of theft. More than that, he claims that he wishes to spare her from having to return in a later gilgul to repay the stolen property that she would take under secular law, in contradiction to Torah law! The son therefore asks: is it permitted to forge a will for this purpose?
A:
In this week’s Parshah (Shemos 3:18) it states that Moshe Rabbeinu said to Pharaoh, “And now, let us go, please, a journey of three days into the wilderness, and we shall offer sacrifices to Hashem our G-d.” At first glance this is difficult to understand, for the Jewish people did not intend to go for only three days; rather, their intention was to leave Mitzrayim permanently. Why, then, did Moshe Rabbeinu request only a three-day journey?
An additional difficulty arises from later in the Parshah (ibid. 3:22): “And each woman shall ask of her neighbor and of the lodger in her house silver vessels and gold vessels and garments, and you shall place them upon your sons and upon your daughters, and you shall empty out Egypt.” Rashi explains, based on the Targum, “and you shall empty out Egypt.” Here too it is difficult to understand: they did not intend merely to “borrow” the garments, but rather to take them permanently, as compensation for the labor they had performed in Mitzrayim for two hundred and ten years. If so, why did the Torah describe it as “asking,” implying a temporary loan, when their intention was clearly to keep the items permanently?
The Ohr HaChaim Hakadosh (to Shemos 3:18) explains that Hashem had them act cunningly in order to extract from the Egyptians the wages of a hired laborer for all the years that Klal Yisroel had been enslaved. This is not to say, chas v’shalom, that Hashem was incapable of freeing Bnei Yisroel and taking their wealth openly; rather, Hashem intended to mislead them so that they would pursue the Jewish people, in order to bring greater punishment upon Pharaoh. For without the pretense of borrowing, the Egyptians would not have chased after them.
The Ohr HaChaim further adds (ibid. 3:22) that from the posuk “And each woman shall ask of her neighbor,” we see that it is permitted to save one’s property from an extortionist by any means necessary. From his words it emerges that it is permitted to use deception in order to extract money from one who seeks to wrongfully take it. Seemingly, one might argue that the same applies in our case. However, there is room to analyze this further.
The Mishnah in Shevuos (31a) teaches that even when one is stating a factual truth, but does so in a misleading manner, it is forbidden. For it is taught there: if one is owed one hundred zuz by his fellow, he may not claim two hundred in order that the debtor admit to owing one hundred and thereby obligate himself in an oath, and then have additional claims rolled onto him. This is prohibited, as the posuk states, “Midvar sheker tirchak—Distance yourself from falsehood.” The Shach (Choshen Mishpat 75:1) writes: “I do not know why the Tur and the Mechaber did not mention these laws anywhere.” In other words, the Shach wonders why we do not find these laws codified in the Shulchan Aruch.
Some, however, cite the Teshuvah of the Chavos Yair (§136), who writes explicitly that the entire discussion in Shevuos, and all the examples cited there as being forbidden because of “Midvar sheker tirchak,” are merely extra safeguards and not prohibitions rooted in the strict letter of the law.
Teshuvos Rashba (vol. III, siman 81) was asked: since a person is permitted to take the law into his own hands (avid inish dina lenafshei), and is allowed to strike the defendant even though this involves a violation of “lo yosif,” perhaps one might entertain the possibility that he is likewise permitted to lie for this purpose. The Rashba rules emphatically: “Far be it from the descendants of Avraham to speak falsehood,” even in a case of financial loss, as it is written, “Sheiris Yisroel shall not commit injustice, nor shall they speak falsehood” (Tzefaniah 3:13). He cites the above-mentioned Gemara in Shevuos. According to this, in our case as well, it would be forbidden to lie in order to receive what is rightfully his.
On the other hand, in the Teshuvos Torah Lishmah (siman 371) by the author of the Ben Ish Chai, an incident is recorded that took place in a certain country where the civil courts divide inheritance equally among sons and daughters. In the case presented, there was a daughter who rebelled against Torah law and claimed her share of her father’s estate in the non-Jewish courts, despite the presence of sons who were the rightful heirs. The sons asked whether they were permitted to forge a will or a deed of gift from the father in favor of the sons, since according to Torah law they alone are the heirs, or whether this would be forbidden due to “Midvar sheker tirchak.” The Torah Lishmah ruled that it is certainly permitted, and that there is no concern of “Midvar sheker tirchak,” for Chazal taught (Yevamos 65b) that one may deviate from the truth for the sake of peace—and there is no peace greater than upholding the banner of Torah. Nevertheless, his ruling requires further analysis, for he does not mention at all the words of the Rashba, and therefore it is unclear how he permits lying in such a case.
In conclusion:
The halachic conclusion appears to be as follows: it is forbidden to lie or to forge documents in a beis din, even in a case of financial loss. There are poskim who maintain that where the lie does not distort the psak din, it is permitted to speak falsely in court (see Chut HaMeshulash of Rav Chaim of Volozhin, §15, in the name of the Kedushas Yom Tov, siman 11). However, outside of beis din, it is permitted to deviate from the truth in order to save oneself—or even others—from financial loss. Even so, it remains questionable whether forging a document is permitted even outside of court. In any case where there is a concern of chilul Hashem, it is certainly forbidden. If one already forged a will and extracted the entire inheritance through the civil courts, there is room to argue that the money is not considered stolen in his possession; this view is cited in the sefer Maadanei Yom Tov.
May One Recite Baruch Shepatrani in the Absence of His Son
Q:
Someone inquired regarding his son who is becoming Bar Mitzvah. The father, however, is compelled to remain abroad and cannot return to Eretz Yisrael before Shabbos, and thus will not be present when his son receives his aliyah to the Torah. May the father recite the blessing of Baruch Shepatrani not in the presence of his son?
A:
The source for this blessing is derived from Parashas Toldos, where it states, “And the youths grew up, and Eisav became a man skilled in hunting” (Bereishis 25:27). Chazal expound in Bereishis Rabbah (Parashas Toldos, ch. 63:10): Rabbi Elazar said, a person is obligated to tend to his son until the age of thirteen; from that point onward, he should say, “Baruch Shepatrani Mi’onsho Shel Zeh—Blessed is He Who has exempted me from the punishment of this one.”
The Darkei Moshe (Orach Chaim 225:1) writes as follows: It is recorded in the name of the Mordechai by the Maharil that when a son becomes bar mitzvah, his father is obligated to recite the blessing, “Baruch Shepatrani,” and such was the practice of the Maharil. He continues: I did not find this blessing mentioned explicitly in the Gemara, and it is difficult for me that a blessing be recited which is not mentioned in the Gemara or in the Poskim. However, in Bereishis Rabbah (ibid., §14) this ruling is cited in the name of Rabbi Eliezer; therefore, it is preferable to recite the blessing without Sheim U’Malchus.
The Rema cites both opinions in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 225:2). The Mishnah Berurah records that the Vilna Gaon ruled that the blessing should be recited with Sheim U’Malchus, and that this was also the practice of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, ztz”l. Nevertheless, he would instruct others not to recite it with Sheim U’Malchus. Indeed, the widespread minhag among the majority of Klal Yisrael is to recite the blessing without Sheim U’Malchus.
With regard to our case, the poskim offer several reasons why the father may not recite the blessing in the absence of his bar mitzvah son:
(1) Since the prevailing custom is to recite the blessing when the son is called to the Torah, at which time it becomes publicly known that he has reached bar mitzvah, the father cannot recite the brachah without his son’s presence. At the time the brachah would be recited, it is not evident to the public that the son has indeed become bar mitzvah.
(2) In Teshuvos Minchas Yitzchak (vol. III, siman 303, s.v. VeMah), it is noted that from the wording of the blessing—“from the punishment of this one”—it is implied that it must be recited in the presence of the son, in order to impress upon him that from this point onward he must be vigilant to follow the proper path, as the father’s responsibility has now been removed.
Based on this, Responsa B’Tzel HaChochmah (vol. V, siman 132:2) questions how one could recite such a formulation when the son is not present at all. This is further supported by what is stated in Shulchan Aruch regarding the laws of Krias HaTorah (Orach Chaim 134:2), that during hagbahah one must show the Sefer Torah to the people standing on his right and on his left, at which point they recite “Vezos haTorah.” The poskim write (see Be’er Heitev se’if katan 4) that one may not say “Vezos” until he actually sees the writing before his eyes. The Da’as Torah of the Maharsham cites additional proofs to this effect.
Seemingly, the same principle applies here: when one says, “Who has exempted me from the punishment of this one,” the son must be present. It is difficult to say that this is only lechatchilah—where possible—but that when it is impossible, such as in our case where the father is in a different country and cannot be present for his son’s Aliyah, the father would nevertheless be permitted to recite the blessing in his current location. Accordingly, the father should not recite the brachah when not in the presence of his son.
Erasing Printed Letters on Eggshells on Shabbos
Q:
At times, letters are printed on the eggshells and are not erased during cooking (as is known, there are certain types of ink stamps that do not always wash off when the eggs are cooked). Is there a concern of mechikah (erasing) when one breaks the shell?
A:
The Kaf HaChaim (Orach Chaim 340:34), citing Responsa Lev Chaim (vol. II, siman 178), writes that it is forbidden to break the shell of a roasted egg upon which letters are written on the outside. Although one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for this, there is nevertheless a rabbinic prohibition involved. This is likewise stated in Ketzos HaShulchan (end of siman 144, Badei HaShulchan §6).
However, there is room to comment on this ruling. Erasing when it is not done for the purpose of writing is not a Torah prohibition when the erasure accomplishes no constructive purpose (see Biur Halachah to siman 340:3, s.v. ha’mochek). Furthermore, it is possible that this does not constitute the normal manner of the melachah of erasing at all, and would thus be considered erasing in an unusual manner. One cannot object from the opinions that forbid opening a book when letters are written along the edges of the pages, for the Mishnah Berurah (ibid. §17) writes that the custom is to rely on the lenient opinions in that matter. Additionally, this is a case of an unintended consequence (davar she’eino miskaven) and is not an inevitable result (eino psik reisha). Even if it were considered a psik reisha, it would be one that is undesirable (lo nicha lei). It is well established (see Sha’ar HaTziyun to siman 316:18 and siman 337:2) that a psik reisha d’lo nicha lei involving two rabbinic prohibitions is permitted on Shabbos. One who examines the above-cited Responsa Lev Chaim will see that he himself adds additional grounds for leniency, and indeed inclines more toward permitting the practice than forbidding it. Therefore, it would appear that there is no real concern in this regard.