Parshas Beshalach 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
May One Daven That a Missile Fall in an Open Area?
Q: I was previously asked whether, at the time of a siren, is it permitted to pray that the missile fall in a place where it will cause no damage, or whether this constitutes a tefillas shav (a prayer in vain), since the missile already has a trajectory, and according to the natural order it is not possible for its course to change after it has been launched. Now, it is certainly permitted to daven that it not hit a Jew, for this can occur within the natural order—whether through interception of the missile, or through people leaving the place where the missile is destined to fall. However, to daven that it falls in a place where it will cause no damage—is this considered a tefillas shav?
A: The root of the doubt is whether one may pray that a miracle occurs, or whether such a prayer is considered a tefillas shav. On the one hand, we have the Gemara in Berachos (60a), where it asks: do we not find that Leah davened that the baby in her womb be female, and her prayer was accepted, and it was transformed from male to female? The Gemara answers that “we do not invoke miraculous events.” In the sefer Imrei Noam from the Vilna Gaon (ad loc., p. 54), he explains as follows: “Hakadosh Baruch Hu is certainly capable of performing a miracle against the natural order, as He did for Leah; however, one may not request that Hakadosh Baruch Hu perform a miracle for himself against the natural order. This is the meaning behind the term tefillas shav—meaning that only the prayer is futile, but the matter itself is not futile.”
On the other hand, we find a situation in which it is permitted to pray that a miracle occur, and such a prayer is not considered a tefillas shav. For it is taught in a barisa (Ta’anis 8b), and cited in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 230:2): “One who enters to measure his grain says: ‘May it be Your will, Hashem Elokai, that You send blessing into this pile’, etc. If he measured and afterward blessed, this is a tefillas shav, for blessing is not found [in something that is measured], only in that which is hidden from the eye.”
The words of Rabbeinu Bechaye in the beginning of Parashas Ki Sisa are well-known, where he writes: “There is no individual Jew to whom hidden miracles do not occur every single day, and he does not know it… And in order to teach that hidden miracles accompany a person every day, Chazal explained this teaching: One who enters to measure his grain says: May it be Your will, etc. Chazal are teaching us that hidden miracles occur every day, and that they only apply to something that is not counted or measured. For if the blessing were to rest upon something counted, it would not be a hidden miracle but a revealed one, and not every person merits a revealed miracle. For this reason, they said: if he measured and afterward blessed, this is a tefillas shav, since once it has been measured, a hidden miracle is no longer possible.”
Thus, we see that it is not a tefillas shav to request and pray for a hidden miracle. If so, it requires clarification why, in the case of one’s wife being pregnant, it is considered a tefillas shav to pray that the fetus be transformed from female to male—after all, that too is hidden from the eye and would be a hidden miracle.
My dear friend, Rav Avraham Zanger, shlit”a, wrote that HaRav Chaim Kanievsky, zt”l, once said regarding a pregnant woman about whom doctors, based on tests, stated that the fetus had Down syndrome, and the question was asked whether one may daven that it not be so, or whether that would be a tefillas shav. He responded that one may daven, for it is a hidden miracle [and what the doctors say based on their tests need not be taken into account at all, for they err frequently, and it is still considered within the category of a hidden miracle].
Now, as is known, a fetus with Down syndrome is formed that way from the very beginning of its formation, and according to the natural order it cannot change, except through an outright miracle. If so, it requires clarification why this differs from praying that a female fetus be transformed into a male, which is deemed a tefillas shav.
In truth, the Acharonim explain that the reason for the halachah that one who davens that his wife give birth to a male is considered to be a tefillas shav is because one may not daven for a miracle, as we cited above from the Vilna Gaon. This is also implied by the language of the Gemara there: “we do not invoke miraculous events.” They explain that one who prays for something that is not within the natural order but only through a miracle is engaged in a tefillas shav, unless he is a great and righteous individual like Leah.
This is also cited in Sefer Chassidim (siman 95): “A person should never request from Hakadosh Baruch Hu something that is improper, such as that his wife give birth at eight months and the child live, or that he be in distant islands—even though Hakadosh Baruch Hu has the ability to do so, as this is a tefillas shav.” And further (siman 794): “Even though Hakadosh Baruch Hu has the ability, one should not request something that does not occur [according to the natural order], such as if his wife miscarried at eight months, where it is clear that the fetus is not viable—one does not pray that it live. It is forbidden to request something that is improper to say, such as ‘may it be Your will that my wife give birth at eight months and the child live,’ and it is forbidden to pray Hakadosh Baruch Hu perform a miracle involving a change in the world, such as if one has a tree that should produce fruit before its time,” etc.
Similarly, in Igros Moshe (Orach Chaim II, siman 111), he writes that a person is obligated to engage in effort for his livelihood and it is forbidden to rely on a miracle and say that even if he does nothing, Hashem will provide his livelihood in some manner. See there for several reasons, one of which is that it is forbidden even to pray that Hashem perform a miracle for him, such as davening that his wife give birth to a male. Thus, he derives from this that the general principle is that it is forbidden to pray for a miracle, even a hidden miracle.
Regarding our case—whether one may pray for a change in the missile’s trajectory—this would seemingly fall under the category of a hidden miracle, since it is something hidden from the eye. Therefore, it appears that one may not pray for a hidden miracle, and only regarding an increase in one’s produce before measurement may one daven, since we were promised this, and it is therefore considered part of the natural order. I have heard that some nevertheless say that even in such a case, it is explained in Michtav Me’Eliyahu that one may indeed daven, and that there are sources for this—and that everything can always change. Therefore, each person should act in accordance with his own Rebbeim. However, certainly one must always pray that no Jew anywhere in the world be harmed, and that Hashem save us from all our enemies!
A Chosson Who Pressured His Father-in-Law to Increase His Financial Commitment
Q: A story occurred involving a chosson and kallah who met, and whose parents agreed between themselves how much money each side would give to the young couple. In the shtar tena’im it was written that the commitment was “as discussed.” In actuality, the chosson was not aware of the amount the parents had agreed upon. After the engagement, however, it became known to him that the agreed-upon sum was far less than the minimum he would need in order to purchase an apartment, even after taking upon himself a mortgage. One day, when he was sitting alone with his father-in-law, he explained to him that he had no ability whatsoever to purchase an apartment, and he pressured him very strongly until the father-in-law agreed to add a significant sum. After they purchased the apartment, his friends remarked to him that he had violated the prohibition of Lo Sachmod, and consequently it is possible that he must return the additional amount that his father-in-law gave him.
A: The Chafetz Chaim, zt”l, writes in Sefer HaMitzvos HaKatzar (Lo Saaseh 40) as follows: “That one should not be jealous of the property of his fellow… and this is commonly found with a chosson who burdens his father-in-law before the wedding, demanding that he give him such-and-such an item that was not stipulated at the time of writing the tena’im. Even though the father-in-law fulfills his request, nevertheless the chosson transgresses this prohibition of Lo Sachmod.” The Chafetz Chaim, zt”l, writes likewise again in Shemiras HaLashon (at the end of the sefer).
Accordingly, we must ask: when the chosson does teshuvah for this, is he required to return to his father-in-law what was added as a result of the pressure? The poskim dispute as to whether the prohibition of Lo Sachmod is comparable to the prohibition of theft, and therefore entails an obligation of restitution, or whether, once the prohibition has been violated, the act is done and there is no rectification. The Tumim (Choshen Mishpat 34, end of se’if katan 13) writes that on a Torah level one is not required to return that which he coveted, but the Rabanan treated it as full-fledged theft in all respects, and therefore he is obligated in restitution. According to this, in our case the chosson would be required to return the money to his father-in-law.
However, the Chiddushei HaRim (ad loc., p. 42, s.v. VeHinei baTumim) disagrees with the Tumim and writes that in any event, where the other party consented and sold willingly and said “I want,” certainly there is no obligation to return, even rabbinically; the prohibition that he violated was already violated. For we rule that talyuhu vezavin, z’vinei z’vini—if one is coerced and sells, the sale is valid. Nowhere do we find that there is an obligation to return even m’drabanan, and likewise in the Shulchan Aruch and all the poskim it is clear that the transaction is completely valid.
And if the intent of the Tumim is to a case where he did not say “I want,” then it would seem that he certainly must return it on a Torah level, since he did not consent and did not acquire the object at all, for it is impossible to acquire it against his will. Therefore, even if one were to say that the aseh of “and he shall return” does not apply to rectify the negative prohibition, nevertheless, since he never acquired it, why should he not be obligated to return something that belongs to the seller and is not his?
Accordingly, in our case, since the poskim are divided on the matter, it is impossible for a Beis Din to extract the additional sum that the chosson received. Nevertheless, there remains room for discussion whether it is proper for him to return what he received to his father-in-law.
In Shu”t Teshuvos VeHanhagos (Vol. II, siman 617), Rav Moshe Shternbuch shlit”a comments on the words of the Chafetz Chaim, zt”l, and writes that there is room to be melamed zechus on the common practice. For we may suggest that the entire prohibition of urging another to give him or sell him something applies only when it is done solely for one’s own benefit, i.e. to obtain an object from his fellow. But when it is also for the benefit of the giver—such as here, where the chosson’s demand is for the sake of the giver’s daughter, so that she will receive more—then it is for the giver’s own benefit as well. In such a case, there is room to consider that perhaps he does not transgress Lo Sachmod, and this requires further analysis.
In Practice: In our case, several considerations may be combined to explain why the chosson did not transgress Lo Sachmod: 1) There are those who maintain that the prohibition of Lo Sachmod applies only when one covets a specific object—and this is implied by the precise wording of the Chafetz Chaim in Sefer HaMitzvos HaKatzar, “that he give him such-and-such an item” and not when one covets another’s money. 2) There are those who maintain that there is no prohibition when the giver also benefits from what he gives, and here the father certainly benefits if his daughter has an apartment. Accordingly, it is difficult to say that the chosson must return the money that his father-in-law added, especially in light of the dispute among the poskim as to whether there is an obligation of “v’heishiv” even when one transgressed Lo Sachmod.