Parshas Vayeshev 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Lending a Credit Card and Benefiting from Points Accrued Through
the Borrower’s Purchases
Q: I was asked about a common practice: individuals lending their
credit card to others who then use it for their purchases. This is especial-
ly common in what is known as “lending groups,” in which people who
need lines of credit match together with people who need to spend a
certain amount on their credit cards within a certain amount of time of
opening the credit card. Particularly abroad, most credit cards accumu-
late reward points that can be redeemed for discounts, merchandise, and
the like. The questioner wondered whether this arrangement involves a
prohibition of ribbis: the borrower repays the exact amount he spent, yet
the lender also earns reward points as a result of the borrower’s purchas-
es. Is this considered ribbis?
A: At first glance, one might argue that although the cardholder gains
from the transaction, nevertheless, since these benefits do not constitute
interest paid by the borrower to the lender, the arrangement should be
permissible, as ruled in Yoreh Deah 160:13. However, this reasoning
can be challenged. The Shulchan Aruch there states that the borrower
may not say to the lender, “So-and-so will pay on my behalf,” even if
that third party pays from his own pocket. The Rosh (Bava Metzia 5:47)
explains that this appears as if the third party is acting as the borrower’s
agent in giving interest to the lender, which would constitute a form of
ha’aramas ribbis—circumventing the laws of interest. Nevertheless, in
our case there is room to be lenient. First, we may suggest that the con-
cern of the third party appearing as the borrower’s agent applies only
when the borrower explicitly instructs, “So-and-so will pay for me.”
Here, however, no such statement is made. Moreover, the points earned
are not granted because Reuven borrowed money from Shimon via the
credit card; rather, they are awarded simply because Shimon’s card was
used. Thus, it does not appear as though the company is acting as the
agent of the borrower in giving interest. Additionally, one can distin-
guish between a case where a third party gives actual interest “on my
behalf” and our case, where the third party—the credit card company—
gives points irrespective of whether the transaction constituted a loan.
The primary reason credit card companies issue reward points aren’t
because someone borrowed funds, but to incentivize card usage, from
which the company profits via merchant fees and commissions. There-
fore, the points are not considered a payment of interest. A further basis
for leniency is the ruling of the Taz (Yoreh Deah 172:10), who writes
that there is no prohibition of ribbis when the lender benefits in a way
that causes no loss whatsoever to the borrower. The Taz states similarly
in173:24. See also Bris Yehudah, Ikarei Dinim, Ch. 12, note 25. I have
also heard from Mori V’Rabi, Maran HaRav Avigdor Nebenzahl,
shlit”a, that one may be lenient in this matter. Since the benefit does not
constitute interest from borrower to lender, and because Shimon earns
the points not because he lent money to Reuven, but because of the cred-
it card company’s reward system, there is no halachic concern of ribbis.
Laws of Davar Charif (Sharp foods) in Hilchos Basar BeChalav
Q: There are many halachos regarding basar v’chalav—such as wait-
ing times between them, the rules of cooking inadvertently in a pot of
the opposite type—both when it is ben yomo or not—and the laws of
preparing pareve food in a pot designated for one type when one intends
to serve it with the other. But there is an additional class of questions
that recurs frequently: the laws of davar charif—sharp foods. A case
arose in which someone borrowed from his neighbor a large pareve pot
to prepare a pareve soup for a family gathering scheduled for Motzaei
Shabbos. On Erev Shabbos, while preparing the soup, they inadvertently
chopped onions with a dairy knife and sautéed them in the borrowed pot.
After the soup had already been cooked, the neighbor called to say that
they had just remembered that about two years earlier they once cooked
a meat soup in that very pot. Since the questioner was aware that a davar
charif absorbs taste even from a pot that is eino ben yomo, he wondered
whether the soup was permitted, considering that the onion absorbed
dairy taste from the knife, and the pot used to sauté the onions contained
meat blios (absorptions) from the earlier soup.
A: The Gemara in Chullin (111b) states that if one slices a radish with
a meat knife, the radish may not be eaten with dairy, because a davar
charif, even when cold, absorbs flavor through the pressure of the blade
(duchka d’sakina). The Rishonim dispute which foods fall under the
definition of davar charif. As for the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch
(Yoreh De’ah 96:1), some understand that all sharp foods are included;
however, in pressing circumstances or financial loss, one may rely on
the opinion that only “chiltis” qualifies as a classic davar charif (see Kaf
HaChaim 96:11). The Rema, however, rules that any sharp food cut with
a meat knife, even if the knife is eino ben yomo, may not be eaten with
milk.
A Knife That Is Eino Ben Yomo: The Shulchan Aruch (96:1) cites
two views regarding duchka d’sakina: According to the first, the prohi-
bition of eating with milk applies only if the meat knife was ben yomo,
or eino ben yomo when it was not properly cleaned. According to the
second view, even if the knife is eino ben
yomo and perfectly clean, the sharpness of the
food improves the otherwise pungent taste and
renders it a positive flavor. The Pleisi (96:5) and the Pri
Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav 96:10) explain that the Shul-
chan Aruch rules stringently according to the second opinion
only when the sharp food was cut or cooked directly in a vessel
of tarfus. But if it was cut or cooked only in a meat or dairy uten-
sil, one must be concerned only when the knife or utensil is ben
yomo, following the first view. This is evident in Shulchan Aruch
96:3, which explicitly rules stringently only for ben yomo in the con-
text of meat/dairy utensils, omitting the second view. However, the
Kaf HaChaim (96:10–11, 7) maintains that the Shulchan Aruch is strin-
gent even for eino ben yomo, except in cases of great financial loss or
pressing need. On the other hand, the Rema (96:3) explicitly rules that if
a davar charif was cut with a meat knife that is eino ben yomo, it may
not be eaten with dairy. The Shach (96:6) concurs and notes that this is
the opinion of all the Acharonim.
What Defines a Dairy Knife? It is common for cutlery to be treated
with the status of “milk” or “meat.” Indeed, one must be careful not to
mix their usage. However, strictly speaking, a knife becomes dairy or
meat only if it absorbed taste from a hot food at the level of yad soledes
bo in a kli rishon. The Aruch HaShulchan (94:35) writes: “You should
know that often what people call a ‘dairy knife’ is not really dairy.
When a question arises, the Rav must inquire how the knife was used,
for most do not cut truly hot dairy foods with the knife in a kli rishon;
they use it only for butter or cheese. Such a knife has no true dairy
status. The Rav must investigate so as not to cause needless finan-
cial loss, for those asking are often unfamiliar with these distinc-
tions, as is well known.”
An Onion Was Cut with a Meat Knife, Then Cooked It in a
Dairy Dish—Sixty Times What?
If one cuts an onion with a meat knife and cooks it in dairy food,
the Shulchan Aruch (96:1) rules that there must be a sixty-to-
one ratio. The Shach (96:8) and Taz (96:4) disagree about what
the sixty must be measured against. The Shach maintains that
if one remembers the exact part of the knife that cut the on-
ion, it suffices to have sixty against that portion; if not, sixty
against the entire blade (excluding the handle). The Taz
argues that since a person rarely pays attention to the ex-
act point of contact, we always require sixty against the
entire blade. In any case, sixty is needed only against
the absorbed taste of the blade—not against the entire
onion—because the onion remained permissible at the
time it fell into the mixture (Taz 96:5).
Onions were Cut with a Dairy Knife Used Mostly
with Cold, and Then Fried in a Meat Pan
1) Majority Cold Usage; Minority Usage with a
Kli Rishon
A dairy knife that is eino ben yomo and whose
primary use is cold (for butter, cheese, etc.) but is
occasionally used to cut hot dairy food in a kli
rishon: many poskim suggest that if onions cut
with such a knife were fried in a meat pan, nei-
ther the food nor utensils become forbidden—
even if meat is subsequently added (Beis Meir
96:3; Mishmeres Shalom 96 on Sifsei Daas 2;
Teshuvos Maharsham 1:70). Still, others (Beis
Shlomo O.C. 55; Y.D. 168) argue that with a
davar charif we do not follow majority usage.
Practically, it is very difficult to rely on lenien-
cy here (see the Sefer Davar Charif 7:34).
2) Majority Cold Usage; Minority Usage of Cutting a Davar Gush in a Kli
Sheni
If onions were cut with a meat knife that was mostly used for a davar gush (a
hot solid food) in a kli sheni, and the onions were later mixed into dairy
food, there is strong basis to be lenient: some permit whenever majority use
is cold; others maintain that cutting a davar gush in a keli sheni does not give
the knife a meat status at all.
3) When it is Uncertain Whether the Knife Was Ever Used for Hot Foods
Likewise, if one has a meat knife used mostly cold and is unsure whether it
was ever used on hot food, one should ideally avoid cutting sharp items for
dairy use; however, bedi’eved—if onions were cut and then mixed into dairy
food—there is significant basis for leniency.
Summary of Practical Ruling
In our case, several factors combine to permit the soup:
- The dairy knife had absorbed taste only from a davar gush, not from a kli
rishon; the poskim dispute whether one must be stringent for a davar gush. - It is uncertain whether that particular knife was ever used for hot dairy at
all, since several similar knives were present in the drawer. - The knife is used mainly for cold items, and some poskim rule that we
follow the majority usage. - Any absorbed dairy taste is limited to the blade area, and there is almost
certainly sixty in the soup against that. - Some maintain that if twelve months have passed since any absorption,
leniency is even more justified—especially since here the absorption would
have involved permissible dairy food as opposed to actual tarfus. - Some hold that only chiltis qualifies as a true davar charif.
Accordingly, there is solid halachic basis to permit the soup.
Printing Advertisements in Weekly Torah Publications
Intended for Reading on Shabbos
Q: I was asked regarding our weekly Torah pamphlet, which bs”d we dis-
tribute each week. Is it permitted to include advertisements for businesses or
companies that wish to sponsor it and, in return, receive publicity? Or per-
haps such ads should be omitted, since one must consider whether it is per-
missible altogether for people to look at such advertisements on Shabbos.
A: Let us briefly outline several relevant points. We see from the Gemara
in Shabbos (148a; 116b) that there is a prohibition of shṭarei hedyotos—
reading ordinary documents—such as financial statements or correspond-
ence that fall under the category of mimtzo cheftzecha (personal pursuits).
This is codified in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 307:12): If one invited
guests and prepared delicacies for them, and he wrote a note listing the num-
ber of guests and the foods prepared, it is forbidden to read that note on Shab-
bos so that they do not come to read ordinary documents. The Shulchan
Aruch HaRav (307:22) explains that this refers to debt documents, records of
sales and purchases, collaterals, accounts, and all similar things connected to
mimtzo chafetzacha,
personal pursuits that are prohibited on Shabbos.
Based on this, reading prices or business advertisements would indeed raise
a concern of shṭarei hedyotos. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to avoid
placing such advertisements in a Shabbos weekly publication, as doing so
may cause the public to inadvertently read them on Shabbos. However, if
advertisements were already included, this does not prohibit reading the
divrei Torah contained in the bulletin. This applies specifically to a publica-
tion whose primary purpose is Torah content. I have seen this ruling in Shu”t
Avnei Yashfeh (vol. I, siman 76) in the name of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auer-
bach, zt”l; similarly, it is explained in Shu”t Minchas Asher (vol. I, siman
19; vol. II, siman 21). In the Sefer Piha Pascha b’Chochmah by the author of
Machazeh Eliyahu, zt”l he writes that if a person knows that they are likely
to read the advertisements, they should refrain from reading the pamphlet
altogether.