Parshas Vayera 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
How Much Is Owed to a Bochur Who Suggested a Name to the Shadchan
Q: A real-life situation arose, presenting a common question in the laws of shadchanus. Two young men met at an event. Their conversation had nothing to do with shidduchim; however, as they were parting, one of them mentioned that he had a sister in shidduchim and asked the other whether he might know someone in his yeshivah who could be a suitable match for her.
The second young man replied that if he thought of anyone, he would let him know. Then, before they even finished speaking, he suddenly said, “Actually, perhaps a certain fellow in our yeshivah might be the right type for your sister.” He gave him that bochur’s phone number, and they parted ways, not seeing each other again.
In due course, bs”d, the sister became engaged to the very bochur whose name had been mentioned. Her brother had acted as the shadchan throughout the process and successfully brought about the shidduch. The question now arose: must the brother search for the young man who originally mentioned the bochur’s name and pay him a share of the shadchanus money (matchmaking fee)? Or, since all the actual work of shadchanus was done by the brother himself, does that first young man have no monetary claim at all?
A: In brief, the practical ruling in such cases depends on several principles. There is an established rule regarding shadchanus payments: if someone merely suggests a name, without playing any further role in bringing the sides together, the practice is generally that he does not receive a full share, nor even a third, as that is only for someone who suggested the name to both sides. However, some authorities rule that such a person is entitled to a small portion, since he was the one who originated the idea that ultimately led to the match.
In this instance, the young man’s suggestion was made to the shadchan himself, who then carried out all the subsequent work from beginning to end. Therefore, it is proper that the shadchan give him a token share, commensurate with the benefit he derived from the suggestion.
We find a similar concept in the Rema (Choshen Mishpat §264:3): “If a person performs an act or favor for his fellow, the recipient cannot claim, ‘You acted for me without my instruction, and therefore I owe you nothing.’ Rather, he must compensate him for the benefit he received.”
Accordingly, the shadchan should compensate the young man for his contribution.
Although the Nesivos HaMishpat (§12) writes that if one explicitly tells his friend that he is doing him a favor, even if the friend ultimately benefits financially, there is no obligation to pay. However, when one renders such assistance without explicitly stating that he is doing so merely as a favor, the Rema’s ruling applies — he cannot say, “You helped me for free.”
Therefore, in our case, if the young man did not state outright that he was merely doing a favor, the shadchan should pay him a partial amount, according to what the dayan or posek deems appropriate.
My dear friend, the author of Teshuvos Vayishma Moshe, shlita, records that several dayanim ruled that the shadchan is not halachically obligated to pay anything at all, since the young man played no actual role in arranging the shidduch. He did not approach either party directly, nor was he aware that the brother he was speaking with would himself act as the shadchan. It is therefore clear that he had no intention of earning a fee for suggesting the name.
Nevertheless, those same dayanim concluded that lifnim meshuras hadin, it would be proper for the shadchan to offer a small payment in recognition of the suggestion that ultimately led to the shidduch.
A Case of Lost Maaser Money
A certain individual would separate maaser from his monthly income. On one occasion, after setting aside the designated sum, he placed the money into an envelope. Later, he was unable to locate it; the envelope had gone missing. His question was: is he now obligated to replace the lost amount and give it to tzedakah, or is he exempt, since the money had already been set aside?
This question is discussed by the Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh De’ah §249:1) in the name of Teshuvos Arba Turim (§6). The teshuvah reads as follows:
I was asked regarding a man who kept his maaser funds at home until he would encounter worthy aniyim or relatives in need. In the interim, he used the money for his own personal needs. Later, a relative wrote to him requesting assistance toward his daughter’s marriage. Since the man now lacked cash on hand, he sent merchandise instead, via a trustworthy messenger — but the merchandise was stolen en route. Is the sender responsible for the loss?
He replied: If the man had not used the maaser money for his own needs, but rather sent the original funds directly to the ani, and they were then lost, he would certainly not be held responsible for the loss. Even had he purchased merchandise with those funds to increase their value for the ani, he would likewise be exempt, for we do not view that as negligence. However, since he had used the maaser money for personal purposes, and the loss occurred as a consequence of that prior misuse, he is now deemed negligent. For had he sent the funds themselves, it is highly likely they would not have been stolen, as they could easily have been hidden. Therefore, he is liable — at least b’ydei Shamayim — to reimburse the ani with other funds.
From his words it emerges that if one had sent the actual maaser money and it was lost en route, he bears no further responsibility.
At first glance, this is difficult to understand. If the funds never reached the hands of the poor recipient, why should he be exempt? Ordinarily, if one owes money to another and sends it without the creditor’s explicit consent, the sender retains full responsibility should the money be lost, as ruled explicitly in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat §121:1.
It appears, however, that in the cited case, the ani had requested that the money be sent to him, as stated in the question. Once the recipient consents to that arrangement, he implicitly assumes the risk of loss in transit. The donor, having fulfilled the recipient’s request, is thereby absolved of responsibility.
But in our case — where the poor person made no such request, and the donor himself separated the maaser funds voluntarily, placing them into an envelope which was later lost — it would seem even the Arba Turim would agree that he remains liable. The reason is clear: the money never reached the hands of the poor, and the mitzvah of giving tzedakah is not fulfilled until it is actually delivered. Merely designating or setting aside funds in a particular place does not discharge the obligation.
This is analogous to any other monetary debt: so long as the creditor has not instructed that the payment be left in a specific location, the borrower bears full responsibility until it is received. Likewise, here, unless the ani requested that the funds be placed in a given spot, the donor remains responsible — and the mitzvah of giving tzedakah has not yet been completed.
This is also the ruling of Teshuvos Avnei Yashfeh (Vol. 9), who concludes that in such a case, the donor must replace the lost funds and give it to tzedakah.
Placing Food on a Hot Plate That Is Turned Off but Set to Turn On via a Shabbos Timer
Q: I have been asked numerous times the following question: May one place, before Shabbos, fully cooked foods on a hot plate that is currently off, but connected to a Shabbos timer which will turn on in the middle of Shabbos, thereby warming the food only then?
A: To briefly outline the matter, and in honor of the upcoming yahrtzeit of the Chazon Ish, zt”l, we begin with his well-known position on this issue. In Chazon Ish (Orach Chaim 38:2), he writes:
“If one has an oven powered by electricity, and before Shabbos he prepares a timer to activate the current at a set hour, it is forbidden to place a pot upon the oven before the electricity is turned on… Likewise, if the pot was placed on the stove before Shabbos in a prohibited manner — for instance, it was partially cooked but not yet reached ma’achal ben Derusai, he must remove it.
Further, even if one placed the pot before Shabbos in a location where the heat of the electricity would later reach it on Shabbos, it is forbidden — for the heat of electricity is considered as an uncovered fire (eina gerufa). However, before Shabbos it is permitted to place food in a closed oven, since it is fully sealed.”
Similarly, in Chazon Ish (37:31), he writes:
“If the fire will later enter the oven — such as with an electric mechanism set before Shabbos to activate at a certain time — it is forbidden to place food into the oven on Shabbos itself, even if it is fully cooked and even if it is still warm, for it is like shehiyah on Shabbos.”
From his words it appears that the prohibition applies only if one places the food on Shabbos itself; but if it is placed before Shabbos, there is room to permit, at least where the food is fully cooked.
The Shevet HaLevi (Vol. 9 §51:2) likewise cites the words of the Chazon Ish and rules that if the food is fully cooked and placed there from before Shabbos, there is no prohibition.
He concludes: “It is obvious that in such a case, where there remains only a concern of mechzi k’mevashel (appearing to cook), this does not apply when no action is performed on Shabbos and the pot was placed from before Shabbos upon the stove — this is so obvious that it doesn’t even need to be written.”
The Minchas Yitzchak (Vol. 4 §26:10), after quoting the above words of the Chazon Ish, writes:
“It would seem from his words that if the food was placed before Shabbos in a closed device, where no concern of stoking the coals (chitui) applies, it is permitted.”
However, the Minchas Yitzchak (4:26:10) argues on the Chazon Ish and takes a stricter approach. Among his proofs to prohibit, he cites the dispute among the Rishonim brought by the Rema (O.C. 253:2), that according to some opinions, if one places a pot near sunset — at such a time that were the food to cool down it could not be reheated before nightfall — it is considered as though he placed it on Shabbos itself and thereby forbidden. Although there are those who are lenient, the Rema concludes that while the custom is to be lenient, it is praiseworthy to be stringent when possible.
However, his proof is difficult to understand. Aside from the Rema himself ruling that the custom is to be lenient, even according to the stringent view, their concern applies specifically to a stove that is not garuf or katum, as the Mishnah Berurah (ibid. §73) explains. And even if we follow the T’hillah L’David who extends this stringency even to a fire that is garuf or katum in all cases — at the very least, there is at least a fire presently lit.
In our case, however — where the hot plate is entirely off before Shabbos — it is clear that according to all opinions there is no prohibition whatsoever. When the pot is placed there before Shabbos, there is no “stove” present at all; a stove without heat is not halachically regarded as a stove.
Indeed, according to the widely accepted custom that a plata is considered as garuf v’katum, since its temperature cannot be adjusted during Shabbos — there is even greater room for leniency. In such a case, even if the food is not fully cooked, there are grounds to permit, for the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 253:1) rules that anything placed on a covered fire is permitted in all circumstances.
Furthermore, the additional proofs of the Minchas Yitzchak are not entirely compelling. Therefore, in my humble opinion, the primary ruling follows the Chazon Ish and the Shevet HaLevi, zt”l: when the food is fully cooked and placed before Shabbos, it is certainly permitted for a Shabbos timer to later activate the heat — since he is not performing any action on Shabbos.
And according to our accepted practice that a plata is deemed garuf v’katum, the matter is certainly permitted.