Parshas Vayeitzei 5786 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
A Donor Who Donated a Building on Condition It Bear His Name — and Another Donor Wishes to Renovate It on Condition It Bear His Name
Q: A case occurred in which an individual donated a substantial sum of money to purchase a building for an institution, on the explicit and “tenai kaful” that the building bear his name. When later approached about funding renovations, he responded that all such expenses would be his responsibility. He has since passed away. Over the years, however, the cost of renovation has risen exponentially, and the heirs now argue that his undertaking was never intended to cover something open-ended and unlimited. Meanwhile, a new donor is prepared to fund the renovation—on condition that the building be named after him in some form. How should the matter be resolved?
A: At first glance, if the heirs contribute the amount that renovations would have cost at that earlier time, then the institution must retain the original donor’s name, since the building was purchased with his funds. The heirs’ claim is compelling: although the donor pledged to handle future renovations, the Rambam (Hilchos Mechirah 11:16) rules that one cannot obligate himself in something that has no defined limit. Many dispute this view, and the Shach (60:13) writes that one cannot claim kim li like the Rambam, since he is a lone opinion; this is also the position of the Aruch HaShulchan.
However, further analysis is necessary. The Shach himself notes that one may indeed claim kim li like the Rambam; and although the Shach is a daas yachid, the party in possession (the muchzak) may assert kim li that he is entitled to argue kim li! This requires further clarification.
The Mishneh LaMelech (ibid.) writes that when one obligates himself in an undefined commitment and receives something in return for that commitment, the Rambam agrees that the obligation is binding. This is cited by the Ketzos HaChoshen (60:2). In our case, the donor received something tangible in exchange for his pledge: the building would bear his name. Moreover, the donor never undertook to renovate the building years later under entirely different economic conditions. With regard to nedarim, everything depends on the context of the time and place. This follows the Rambam (Hilchos Nedarim 9:1): “With respect to nedarim, we follow the common usage of language in that place, in that language, and at that time.”
Similarly, the Tur (Yoreh Deah 217) records the Rambam’s rule that nedarim follow the linguistic norms of the place and time.
Responsa Lechem Rav (siman 113) further writes that documents and neder-obligations are analogous: just as in nedarim we follow the speech patterns of ordinary people, so too in documents. All the more so here, where the matter regards a nedder, the donor’s words must be understood according to the ordinary meaning in his context—meaning his stipulation applies also to his heirs, who follow after him.
Accordingly, the conclusion is that the yorshim’s claim is valid, and it is not permissible to accept a new donor whose condition would alter the name of the building.
The Use of Closed-Circuit Cameras on Shabbos
Q: I was asked by individuals who have closed-circuit cameras and wish to leave them operating throughout Shabbos due to concerns of theft and similar issues. Since the cameras continuously record people—and most of those entering their property on Shabbos are Jews—Or would this involve the prohibition of kesivah or other melachos?
A: This practice of using cameras as a security measure requires halachic clarification regarding Shabbos. Contemporary poskim have discussed extensively the permissibility of closed-circuit cameras, and it is difficult to cover all aspects of the debate—ranging from the dispute among the Rishonim to the sugya of p’sik reisha d’lo nicha lei in rabbinic prohibitions, such as whether one may walk on a sidewalk when an electronic sensor triggers a light. Elsewhere, I have written at length on the topic—particularly regarding lights in private courtyards—and have already cited authorities who permit their use. Here, we will note several points recorded in the name of leading halachic authorities.
The Position of Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l Regarding Closed-Circuit Cameras on Shabbos
Maran HaGaon Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l (as cited in Hilchos Shabbos b’Shabbos, vol. III, p. 201) held that when a camera is set to record all those who enter and projects the image onto a screen, one should not walk in front of it. However, in situations of necessity—such as cameras installed for security purposes—and when the person entering derives no benefit from the recording, it is permissible mi’ikar hadin to pass through.
Rav Elayshiv explained that, fundamentally, there is no issur d’oraisa involved. (It should be noted that in Me’or HaShabbos, vol. IV, p. 201, Rav Elyashiv is cited as holding that the very formation of an image upon a screen may constitute a issur d’oraisa of writing; and although the image does not remain—since the person moves away—this is comparable to what the Rambam writes, cited in Mishnah Berurah 340:22, that one who writes on his skin with ink is liable even though the warmth of the body will later cause the writing to fade. One must say that his position cited later is based fundamentally on the fact that the act is not attributed to the person.)
Practically, since the recording occurs in an unusual manner (kil’achar yad), and it is a case of p’sik reisha d’lo nicha lei, and the person is not engaging in an act of writing at all—but rather he is merely walking, without interacting with the system in any intentional way—the melachah cannot be attributed or traced to him. Therefore, he ruled that in areas where one benefits from the recording, one should be stringent; but in instances where one has no interest in the camera’s operation—such as when walking in the street—although he knows a camera is operating, there is no prohibition mi’ikar hadin in walking there, even when the cameras are used expressly for security purposes.
(Me’or HaShabbos, ibid., further records that Rav Elyashiv suggested configuring the system so that the computer operates for forty seconds and then pauses for five seconds, repeating this cycle throughout Shabbos. In such a case, the image certainly does not endure, thus avoiding any biblical concern of “writing that lasts,” defined as writing that remains throughout Shabbos, as explained in Sha’ar HaTziyun 303:68. Although technically one can program it to run for two hours at a time and then shut it off for five seconds, nonetheless, any reduction in the duration of the image is preferable.)
Rav Elyashiv zt”l further stated that cameras which operate without any active display screen—and simply store the footage on a device accessed only after Shabbos—present no halachic concern whatsoever. There is no screen-based writing, and as for the digital recording, there is no need for concern: the data is not visible, is created automatically, and is generated without intent or significance. Accordingly, it does not constitute even rabbinic writing. Therefore, Rav Elyashiv ruled that in places where cameras are needed for security and people pass by them on Shabbos, they may be activated as long as the monitor remains off.
This is very common for those who monitor their property through a cellphone; when the phone’s display is turned off for the duration of Shabbos, there is certainly no prohibition.
It is well known that the poskim discussed extensively regarding walking to the Kosel on Shabbos after cameras were installed there. A practical solution was developed: the connection between the cameras and the monitoring screens is active only for designated intervals on Shabbos and Yom Tov, and after a short interruption the system resets. (See She’eilos u’Teshuvos Shaarei Tzion, vol. I, by Rav Shmuel Ben Tzion Rabinowitz shlit”a, §12, for a detailed discussion.) It is also well known that mori v’rabi, Maran HaGaon Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a, Rav of the Old City, permitted leaving the cameras operating throughout Shabbos.
The Position of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l Regarding Closed-Circuit Cameras on Shabbos
Maran HaGaon Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l likewise adopted a lenient position on this matter (see Shulchan Shlomo on Hilchos Shabbos 340:12, os 2; Me’or HaShabbos, vol. IV, §14, section 129; Teshuvos Rivevos Ephraim, vol. III, §247; and Me’orei Eish, vol. II, shaar teshii, §2, p. 737). He explained that although one who writes with mei milin—a certain type of ink—on Shabbos is nevertheless liable, even though the writing immediately vanishes and is not visible at all (see Gittin 19b), this is because the writing was momentarily discernible. Since it was visible, it is halachically classified as writing. Thus, even if the writing then disappears, it is still considered potentially enduring, as it can be made visible again through application of heat.
In contrast, in our case, the recorded image is never visible at all—not even initially—and therefore lacks the halachic significance of writing. Although it would seem reasonable that a rabbinic prohibition should apply, nevertheless in a case such as this, where it is a p’sik reisha d’lo nicha lei, and in addition is performed kil’achar yad, there is room for leniency, as Rav Shlomo Zalman concluded.
From his words, it would appear that he refers to a situation where the screen is not on when one walks past the camera. However, Me’or HaShabbos (ibid.) records testimonies that Rav Shlomo Zalman was lenient even when the screen was on. Therefore, in practice, one may be lenient when the monitor is turned off throughout Shabbos. Furthermore, one need not inform a non-Jew that the screen is off on Shabbos; on the contrary, it is advisable to show him the functioning monitor during the week so that he sees that all activity in the home is recorded, and thus he will be careful not to violate the family’s expectations and may continue working there.
In situations where genuine security concerns require that the monitor remain on during Shabbos, it is preferable to configure the system so that the computer operates for forty seconds and then pauses for five seconds, and this cycle repeats throughout the day. In that case, the image does not endure, thereby avoiding any concern of lasting writing.
May a Bochur Lie and Say That He Is Not Dating?
Q: I am frequently asked whether a young man or woman in shidduchim may lie and say that they are not currently dating, or that they have not yet begun going out—even if in reality they have already started. The concern, they explain, is fear of ayin hara or of people who talk too much, which could cause harm. Under such circumstances, is one permitted to lie?
A: We have already written in several previous issues about similar questions regarding the permissibility of deviating from the truth. We cited the well-known Gemara in Bava Metzia 23a, which discusses when one may alter the facts, especially when doing so serves a constructive purpose. We also quoted the Sefer Chassidim, who likewise permits lying when there is a purpose. We must now consider how these principles apply in our case.
It would seem that even in situations where it is technically permitted to lie, one should still minimize falsehood as much as possible, finding alternative wording so as not to utter an outright lie. This is explicitly written by the Chofetz Chaim (Hilchos Rechilus 1:8):
“If one is asked: ‘What did so-and-so say about me?’—if he can respond in a way that is neither an outright lie nor rechilus, he should answer in that manner and not speak sheker. But if he sees that his friend will not accept such an answer, he may state a full untruth for the sake of peace.”
Similarly, Maran Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l writes in Ashrei HaIsh (Orach Chaim I, ch. 30, §17):
“One who wishes to avoid embarrassment or distress—either for himself or for another—should endeavor not to speak an outright lie. Instead, he should phrase his words in a way that can be interpreted in more than one manner, or otherwise deflect the question.”
Maran Rav Chaim Kanievsky zt”l likewise writes in Orchos Yosher (Shaar Emes) that even in cases where Chazal permit deviating from the truth—such as for the sake of peace (Yevamos 65b), or in the three areas listed in Bava Metzia 23b (regarding masechtos, relations, and hospitality)—one should still avoid an outright lie, and instead use language that can be understood in two ways, allowing the other party to draw an incorrect conclusion. He cites Rabbeinu Bachya on Parashas Vayishlach, based on Bereishis Rabbah (78:14) regarding Yaakov’s words, “Until I come to my master, to Se’ir.” Rabbi Avahu notes that Yaakov never actually went to Har Se’ir. Would Yaakov Avinu, the embodiment of truth, speak falsely? Rather, his words were fulfilled in the future—as it says, “And saviors shall ascend Mount Zion to judge the mountain of Esav.” Although halachically it would have been permissible for Yaakov to answer broadly (as we find in Avodah Zarah 25b regarding answering a gentile who asks one’s destination), Yaakov Avinu—being the epitome of truth—did not utter an outright falsehood; he intended a distant future event which Esav did not understand.
Nevertheless, it appears that in our case it is permitted to say that one is not dating. The reason is that it is comparable to the category of relations, regarding which Chazal allowed one to deviate from the truth. The source of these three categories is the Gemara in Bava Metzia 23b, in the name of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel: “In three matters the Sages would deviate from the truth: concerning tractates, concerning matters of purity, and concerning hospitality.”
I found that in Titen Emes LeYaakov (ch. 5, §17), the author records that he asked Maran Rav Elyashiv zt”l about precisely this scenario: A bochur went on a date, and the next day his friend asked him, “Where were you last night—were you on a date?” Rav Elyashiv ruled that the bochur may deviate from the truth if he is embarrassed to reveal the facts. Similarly, in a case where a woman unfortunately miscarried and later gave birth to a boy, and her friend asks, “When will the pidyon haben be?” —she may answer that she is a bas Kohen or bas Levi (and therefore exempt), if she is embarrassed to tell the truth. He adds that this is supported by the explanations of the category of purya, understood by some Rishonim as relating to matters of keri, and likewise by the case of masekhta, where one may deviate due to embarrassment when asked about a tractate he has not mastered.
Along similar lines, I found in my Ohel Yaakov, Hilchos Sheva Berachos, p. 95, where I asked mori v’rabi, Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a:
Q: When a shidduch is suggested to someone who is not interested, may he say that he is “busy with something else,” even when he actually is not?
A: Yes.
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Reb Abraham Ben Moshe Asher Anshil Z”L
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