Parshas Bereishis 5786- Intriguing Questions & Answers
May a man review his Torah learning with his wife?
Q:
I’m in kollel studying for smichah in hilchos Shabbos and kashrus. We’re expected to know the halachah as presented in the Shulchan Aruch and its sources in the Gemara. In preparation for my tests, may I review the material with my wife in the evenings? I know this is generally discouraged, but would her helping me to clarify and memorize the material be problematic?
A:
In Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 246:6) we find that women who learn Torah receive Heavenly reward, yet not in the same way that men do, given that they are not commanded in the mitzvah of talmud Torah. Despite this, however, Chazal discourage a person from teaching his daughter Torah, declaring that most women are “light headed” and apt to take what they learn out of context and contrive incorrect interpretations.
This is based on the Gemara’s statement:
“כל המלמד את בתו תורה, כאילו מלמדה תיפלות” — “Anyone who teaches his daughter Torah, it’s as if he has taught her obscenity” (Sotah 21b).
The Rishonim and Acharonim interpret the Gemara’s strong condemnation to apply to teaching one’s daughter Torah Sheba’al Peh. Not so, however, Torah Shebichsav, which only lechatchilah shouldn’t be taught to one’s daughter.
The Rema (ibid.), however, writes that a woman is obligated to learn the relevant halachos that pertain to her life and, additionally, that while she is not obligated to teach her son Torah, she may assist her husband or son and enable them to learn.
Poskim do note that Tanach should indeed be taught to women, yet not with the same depth with which men are taught.
In his Likutei Halachos (Sotah 21), the Chofetz Chaim famously writes that though Chazal were much more stringent regarding this halachah, in our times it’s certainly a mitzvah to teach girls Tanach, mussar, and all the necessary halachos that they must know.
Based on the above, it would seem that in our case, a wife would be permitted to help her husband study for his smichah exam, yet he should limit her participation to testing him on the halachic conclusions rather than involving her in the intricacies of the sugya.
More than this, however, I do believe that in light of the above-mentioned Rema’s opinion that a woman may assist her son or husband in their learning, she may even become somewhat more involved in the material if a deeper understanding will better facilitate her assistance.
Hoping to receive a loan from a certain individual, may an institution show favor to that individual’s son?
Q:
Our yeshiva hopes to receive a substantial loan from a certain wealthy, well-connected individual whose son is actually one of our bachurim. I’d imagine that the management will make sure this boy is well cared for (such as invitations to rabbei’im’s homes for Shabbos meals, his choice of seat in the beis midrash, his choice of room and roommates, etc.). But in relation to the anticipated loan, would such preferential treatment be in any way problematic?
A:
Among the laws of ribbis, there is an issur d’rabbanan termed ribbis mukdemes (early interest). Sourced in the Mishnah (Bava Metzia, end of perek 5), this prohibition involves the potential borrower sending a gift to the potential lender with the express intent of gaining the lender’s favor and rendering him more inclined to give the loan. This gesture on the borrower’s part is done “early,” before he actually receives the loan, and results in the lender ultimately receiving more than he lent, i.e., a certain degree of “interest.”
The Rambam and other Rishonim maintain that the issur of ribbis mukdemes applies even when the potential borrower does not communicate his intentions to the potential lender (unlike the Mishnah’s example, where the borrower openly conveys his motives).
Gedolei HaPoskim therefore view the management’s preferential treatment of the bachur as problematic due to ribbis mukdemes.
May one wear undergarments of the opposite gender if their own are unavailable?
Q:
While on a recent vacation, my husband and I got to our hotel in the middle of the night, very much in need of a shower and sleep. But when I stepped out of the bathroom, I realized that I had a problem. The airline had lost my suitcase, and I had no clothes, not even underwear! I couldn’t buy anything at that hour to tide me over until the airline forwarded my luggage, so my husband gave me a T-shirt and a pair of his boxershorts to wear to bed. Awkward, but adequate. I later wondered, however, if it was appropriate. Aren’t women forbidden from wearing men’s clothing, and vice versa?
A:
The Sefer Hachinuch (mitzvos 542 and 543) states:
“לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה” (Devarim 22:5)
to discourage wide-spread immorality (inevitably born of men and women dressing alike and, consequently, intermingling) and distance us from avodah zarah.
And Rambam, notes the Chinuch, states these two reasons as well.
Beis Yosef (Yoreh Deah 182:5) writes that unseen clothing (such as underwear) is not included in the issur. This requires further understanding, however, in light of the fact that transgressing the issur entails the simple, physical act of wearing the garment, and if so, why should its undetectability negate one’s wrongdoing?
Indeed, the Responsa Minchas Yitzchak (6:108) writes that one transgresses this issur even while alone at home, when nobody can see. As such, borrowing one’s husband’s boxershorts for the night would be forbidden.
The pressing need in our case, however, warrants investigation into possible avenues of permissibility. The Taz (182:4), for example, presents Acharonim who maintain that one transgresses the issur only when intending to beautify oneself. When intending to merely keep warm, however, one needn’t worry. Though many argue against this position, we could rely upon it in cases of pressing need.
Others do in fact note that when the garment is undetectable to others, the two above-mentioned reasons underlying the issur would be essentially inapplicable. This has been the opinion of many Gedolei HaPoskim, so in our case of such pressing need, we could be lenient and allow her to wear her husband’s garments.
Must people who have had an engagement broken off reveal this past misfortune to those whom they subsequently date?
Q:
Recently, I was engaged, and just a few weeks before the wedding, everything fell through. That was a tough one. I’ve put it behind me, though, and have started dating again. Am I expected to share that unfortunate chapter in my life with girls I now meet, or can it stay closed and buried in the past?
A:
We’ve previously discussed some of the basic guidelines regarding what personal information must be revealed before the boy and girl meet and what information can simply wait until after a few dates, when things look promising.
Someone with a non-life-threatening medical condition, for example, must act in accord with public perception. If it’s likely that the second party would terminate the shidduch upon learning of the condition and express frustration over not having been told before the first date, then the individual must reveal his unique circumstances up front, before the first meeting.
However, if a particular medical condition is generally regarded inconsequential, then the individual may wait until after a few dates to reveal his circumstances.
Interestingly enough, a broken engagement seems to strike varying chords in people. Some feel that it’s just one of life’s setbacks after which a person picks himself up, dusts himself off, and carries on, now all the wiser. Others, however, feel that a broken engagement is a red flag and possibly indicative of deep-seated problems in either party: perhaps the person who broke off the engagement suffers from commitment issues, or perhaps he uncovered some profound psychological flaw in his would-be kallah that she and her family had carefully hidden.
The consensus of the Gedolei Yisroel with whom I consulted is that when someone is asked before the first date whether or not he’s been engaged in the past, he must be forthcoming with the truth. If, however, the question never comes up, he needn’t disclose the fact until after a few dates. In any event, however, he must ultimately reveal it, because a significant amount of people regard a broken engagement as inherently negative.
May an employer give his credit card to his gentile workers so they can buy a nonkosher lunch?
Q:
I occasionally give my gentile employees my credit card and tell them to go and have lunch on me. But I’m suddenly wondering if that’s okay. In a sense, offering them this treat is part of my “business strategy” of expressing thanks for their hard work and keeping them happy and motivated. They’re obviously buying treif food, so maybe this gesture on my part is actually like doing business with nonkosher food.
A:
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 117) writes that it is forbidden for a Jew to do business (i.e., buying and selling) with nonkosher food, and the Rema indeed adds that one may not even purchase it for one’s gentile workers.
However, the Shach (3) comments that buying one’s gentile employees nonkosher food is in no way an act of conducting business with nonkosher food. Additionally, the Aruch Hashulchan (19) writes that the accepted custom is to be lenient and purchase one’s workers treif food.
Moreover, in our specific case there’s even more room for leniency in light of the Chasam Sofer’s position (106) that if one is not directly dealing with the treif food itself, there’s no prohibition of conducting business with nonkosher food.
Even according to those who maintain that a Jew can halachically acquire something via a non-Jew’s purchase with the Jew’s money, our scenario poses no difficulty of the Jewish employer actually purchasing nonkosher food. Here, the Jew has no intention whatsoever of acquiring the treif food. He simply wants to feed his worker’s lunch.