Parshas Behar—Bechukosai 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Intriguing Questions & Answers
Is a Ground Floor Resident in an Apartment Building Obligated to Pay for Elevator Maintenance?
Q: In a shared residential building, neighbors divide the cost of building maintenance (vaad Habayit). One of the significant expenses in buildings with elevators is elevator upkeep—such as electricity, insurance, and maintenance. A resident who lives on the ground floor claims that he should not have to pay for the elevator’s maintenance at all, arguing that he does not use the elevator and it is unfair for him to pay for something others use. Is his claim valid?
A: There is a well-known ruling from many Dayanim that since the building is jointly owned and the elevator is part of the shared property, all residents must equally contribute to its maintenance expenses. When the residents purchased or moved into their apartments, it was with this understanding. Just as in the case of roof repairs due to rain damage—where upper-floor residents cannot be required to pay alone, but all residents must participate since the roof is part of the common property—so too, the elevator is considered part of the shared property, and it makes no difference whether a particular neighbor uses it or not.
See Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 161:1, for the general laws regarding expense-sharing among shutfim.
However, there are Poskim who disagree, and follow the local custom according to the local courts. According to these opinions, if a resident does not use the elevator, they are not required to pay for its upkeep—unless local custom dictates otherwise.
See also Shevet HaLevi, (Vol. 9, 301:3).
Additionally, if someone has a private entrance to their ground-floor apartment and does not enter the building at all to reach their home, the common practice in Beis Din is to exempt that person from contributing toward elevator expenses.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, many Dayanim rule that if a person owns an apartment within the building, even on the ground floor and even if they do not use the elevator, they are still obligated to share the elevator expenses like all other residents.
Joining a Christian Health Insurance Organization
Q: I was asked by people abroad about a Christian organization called Liberty HealthShare, which functions like health insurance. All monthly payments go into a joint fund, and when a member needs medical care, payments are made from that fund. Recently, as health insurance has become very expensive in the United States, many Jews are interested in joining this organization because it is significantly cheaper. However, in order to become a member, one must agree to believe in God and in His Torah (which they refer to as the Bible), and a few other principles—but it is not required to believe in “oso ha’ish” (i.e., Yoshka). Is it permissible to join such an organization for health insurance purposes, or is it considered participation in or affirmation of avodah zarah?
A: There are two main issues in this question:
Regarding the acceptance of the “Bible” — this may include the “New Testament”.
Regarding the acceptance of the idea that each person may serve in their own way—which may imply, c”v, that one can worship as they do, and this is likely their intent.
The Gemara in Nedarim (62b) states that it is permitted for a Talmud Chacham to say ambiguous phrases such as “I am a servant of the fire” in order to avoid taxes, since it can also be understood to mean that he serves Hashem. The Rema (Yoreh De’ah 157:2), quoting the Nimukei Yosef, rules that for regular people, this is permitted only in cases of danger. A Talmud Chacham, however, may also use it to avoid unjust taxation (Be’er Heitev. 14), and the Maharshal adds that this is only when they are trying to rob him unjustly. See also Pischei Teshuvah (18).
Regarding glorifying or affirming the name of idolatry, see Yoreh De’ah 147:1, which forbids even mentioning the name of an idol, and even its nickname. The Maharam Shick (Yoreh De’ah §171) writes that even mentioning the non-Jewish calendar years is considered invoking their religion, even if the idol is not explicitly mentioned. Based on this, participating in such systems may be forbidden.
On a related note, Shu”t Vaya’an Dovid (Vol. 11) brings a testimony from his father zt”l, who heard from Rav Shmuel Yaakov Rubinstein zt”l (a Rav in Paris, and author of She’eiris Menachem), who saw real mesirus nefesh from the Lubavitcher Rebbe zt”l during World War II. While staying in a hotel under Nazi control in France, his registration listed him as “Orthodox.” Among the Nazis, this term usually referred to Greek Orthodox Christians. Though “Orthodox” could also refer to religious Jews, there was a question whether to clarify to the authorities that he was not a Christian. According to Chabad sources, he ultimately did clarify this—despite the great risk this carried.
See also Darkei Teshuvah (Yoreh De’ah 147:63).
I was also pointed to the fact that this Christian health organization states that it is just that—and follows the Christian doctrine. The word “bible” primarily refers to the “New Testament,” which is their central text. So, if someone affirms belief in “the bible” under their terms, this may be seen as acknowledging their idolatrous beliefs.
Later, I saw in the Kovetz Halachos – Piskei HaRav Shmuel Kamenetsky Shlit”a (printed in Shu”t Bigdei Chamudos, vol. 1, p. 440), a ruling on joining Christian-based health insurances like “MediShare” or “Liberty HealthShare.” To join, one must sign that they believe in certain Christian doctrines, indicate what church and pastor they are affiliated with, and affirm belief in the Bible—sometimes including explicit statements of heresy. He rules that one may not be lenient, even if the language is ambiguous. If one wants to try to join, they must explicitly state that they belong to a synagogue, have a rabbi, and believe in the Torah of Hashem. Without doing so, one may not rely on leniencies.
In Shu”t Vedibarta Bam (Vol. 3:167), Rav Dovid Feinstein zt”l rules on cases where a health insurance company requires the signee to agree with their religious principles. He writes that this constitutes accepting their religion. Therefore, even in cases of significant financial loss, one may not be lenient, because signing such a document is tantamount to acknowledging idolatry—even if everyone knows it is not sincere and is just to save money, it is still considered an act of affirmation of avodah zarah, and is forbidden.
In conclusion: One may not join a health insurance program that is affiliated with a religious group—especially when the organization requires its members to affirm belief in their religion or its doctrines.
Woman Working in Special Education — Is It Permissible for Her to Hold a Child’s Hand for Teaching Writing?
Q: I was asked by a woman who works in special education settings—sometimes in schools and sometimes receiving students at her home. There are also cases involving special-ed children who need assistance holding pens, etc., and she therefore wished to know what was the halachah regarding negiah and yichud, and whether a woman can be a teacher in such cases where the children need this type of help.
A: Nowadays, it is common for women to serve as teachers for children who need to learn within special education frameworks. These children have various types of difficulties. Regarding the issue of physical contact between teacher and student, sometimes, when necessary—such as when there is concern that a child might endanger himself or others (for example, running into a street)—it is obvious that it is permissible for a woman to touch the child, hold his hand, etc. (since this is in a manner that is completely non-affectionate), and to stop him from endangering himself, even if he is over nine years old.
Since no two children are the same in this framework, it is always advisable for the woman or her husband to consult a halachic authority to determine the correct course of action when touch is necessary, such as when helping a child hold a pen daily. We will present here the general halachic guidelines as they appear to me, but it goes without saying that every specific case can differ and must be reviewed accordingly.
(Full halachic analysis continues in the post, detailing sources and positions from Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rav Asher Weiss, Rav Yechiel Mechel Steinmetz, and others…)