Parshas Acharei Mos – Kedoshim 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers
Is it Permissible or Appropriate to Register with an Organ Donation Organization?
Q: I was asked in the past whether it is permissible to register with organizations involved in organ donation—where a person would donate his organs to patients at the end of his life. Is there any halachic issue with this, or other concerns that would make it improper to participate in such initiatives?
A: First, I would like to emphasize that we are not ruling definitively here on such serious matters that have already been addressed and guided by Gedolei Yisroel, ztz”l. Rather, the intent is to raise awareness of the topic and the questions it involves. It goes without saying that each individual must consult with their personal Posek and Rav to determine the practical halacha for themselves.
Tzitz Eliezer (19:53) cites a letter published in 1992 (5752) presenting the halachic opinion of the geonim Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, zt”l. The letter states:
“We have been asked to express our halachic opinion regarding heart transplants or other organs for the sake of a critically ill patient, at a time when the donor’s heart is still beating but his brain—including the brainstem—is no longer functioning at all (known as “brain death”). Our opinion is that there is no halachic permission to remove any of his organs, and doing so constitutes an act of shefichas damim (bloodshed).”
Similarly, in Igros Moshe, (Yoreh Deah 2:174), Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l wrote regarding heart transplants from one person to another—a practice a few doctors had begun experimenting with. He writes:
“I do not wish to elaborate on proofs and reasoning and pilpulim, because I believe that anyone who adds such discussions only weakens the matter, as it implies the issue is not straightforward and open to challenges and questions. Even though any such objections are baseless, they nevertheless lessen the severity of the issue and may lead people to say that rabbis are divided on this, and therefore one may be lenient, chas v’shalom.
Therefore, I state a clear and unequivocal halachic ruling: the heart transplant procedures that doctors have begun performing are equivalent to the murder of two people. The person from whom the heart is taken is still alive—not only according to halachic definitions of death, but even according to some honest doctors who are willing to admit this, yet due to their wickedness, they do not care to preserve the life of someone with only a short time left to live. Moreover, they also kill the recipient—who might otherwise live for many more years, even decades—because these recipients generally die shortly after the transplant: most within hours, some within a few days.”
Additionally, in Shut Yaskil Avdi (Vol. 6, Yoreh Deah, 26), there is a ruling against using organs from the dead—for example, transplanting an eye from a deceased person into a blind person so they may regain sight. He goes into detail with several reasons this is forbidden, including concerns about techiyas hameisim, as well as the idea that a person is a shutaf, partner, with Hashem in his body, and he has no right to transplant part of his body to another body without the Ratzon HaBorei.
Another halachic concern is that medical establishments will often decide to disconnect life-support equipment based on their definition of death, which may not align with halachic criteria of death. Thus, a person who signs up as an organ donor may be disconnected from life-sustaining devices for the sake of donation, even though they are halachically still alive. There were attempts by leading rabbis to work with the government to establish safeguards on this matter, but the medical establishment did not cooperate under the conditions required by the Chief Rabbinate.
Moreover, many doctors define “brain death” as actual death, but this is actually a major halachic dispute. And even if one were to accept that definition, there is still concern that the medical system does not always apply it properly. It is said that Hagaon Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l was strongly opposed to this and ruled not to sign such donor cards.
Again, all of the above is being written only because I have been asked numerous times over the years whether it is appropriate to register for organ donation. Since there are several serious halachic and hashkafic concerns, one should be very cautious and first consult a qualified halachic authority who is well-versed in both the relevant halachic issues and the medical realities involved.
Asking a Non-Jew to Complete a Test for a Jew on a Computer on Shabbos
Q: Regarding the question of someone who needs to take a major exam crucial for his parnassah, and the exam is scheduled for Shabbos—is it permissible for him to verbally tell a non-Jew the answers on Shabbos, and the non-Jew would type them into the computer? The questioner says that if he does not present the exam on Shabbos, he will lose an entire year of his course and all the work put into it all year, and would have to repeat all the studies the following year before he can take this exam again. Is it permissible to do this on Shabbos?
A: First, it should be noted that typing on a computer is an issur derabanan, and therefore this would be considered a shvus d’shvus (a double rabbinic prohibition) in a case of great need or loss, for which it is already ruled in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim (307:5) that it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to perform a melachah derabanan on Shabbos.
Therefore, in a case like this, where the individual is facing significant loss—since losing a year’s worth of study is certainly a major loss—it is permissible for him to instruct a non-Jew on Shabbos to write the answers into the computer on his behalf.
I have also heard that Maran Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a has ruled accordingly.
For someone who feels uneasy and is concerned about possible Torah-level prohibitions or other issues, he may hint to the non-Jew rather than directly instruct him. See Mishnah Berurah (ibid. 76). Another option would be for him to hint before Shabbos; see se’if 2 and Mishnah Berurah (10). Additionally, one can also rely on amira de’amira (telling a Jew to tell a non-Jew), a leniency some authorities permit—see Be’er Heitev (3) and Mishnah Berurah (24). One can also factor in the opinion of the Ba’al HaItur (see Rema, 276:2), see Shu”t Igros Moshe (O.C. 2:68).
Another practical suggestion: if one wishes to be stringent and prefers not to rely on the above, perhaps the non-Jew could receive a share of the profits or benefits that the Jew gains by succeeding in the exam (if he succeeds). In such a case, the non-Jew would be considered to be acting on his own behalf (adata d’nafshei ka’avid), which would be another solution.
However, the non-Jew should not perform the task inside the Jew’s home, as stated in Siman 244:5, and he should use his own equipment, as explained in Mishnah Berurah there (ad loc. 30).
In practice, although we’ve provided alternative suggestions for those who are stringent, it seems clear that in a case like this, one may rely on the basic halachic principle that amira lenachri to perform a melachah d’rabanan in a case of significant loss is permitted.
Returning a Rented Car or WAZE Device with More Fuel or Battery Than Received — Is This an Issue of Ribbis?
Q: While delivering a shiur on the halachos of ribbis to avreichim, I raised a common question I had been asked: Someone rents or borrows a car that had a nearly full tank of gas—may he return it with a completely full tank, or is that a concern of ribbis? Similarly, if someone borrows or rents a WAZE device (common in Eretz Yisroel) that had a half-full battery, is it problematic to return it fully charged?
A: We have already written about several principles in hilchos ribbis, particularly the major distinction between she’eilah (borrowing an item for use and then returning the same item) and sechirah (renting), versus halva’ah (a loan). The Rosh in Bava Metzia (5:) writes that there is no ribbis prohibition in cases of borrowing or renting, since the item returned is the same item; the amount paid for a rental is to cover any depreciation that takes place. Therefore, renting a car for pay poses no ribbis concern.
However, with regard to the fuel, the issue is somewhat different. While the car itself is rented, the fuel received with it is not; it is effectively a loan, since one uses up the original fuel and returns new fuel in its place. This raises the possibility of a ribbis issue if one returns more fuel than was originally received.
There are, however, several ways to avoid this issue entirely:
Some say that one can stipulate with the owner that any extra fuel returned should be viewed as additional payment for the rental, not repayment of the loaned fuel, thus avoiding any concern of ribbis.
Others say that since the exact amount of gas that was borrowed is unclear, there is no concern for ribbis. This is based on the Raavad in Sefer Temim De’im, who writes that if one gives extra merely out of doubt to ensure full repayment, there is no concern of ribbis on the addition. (Of course, this reasoning applies in context and must be used carefully.)
Another possible explanation is that the extra is considered compensation for the wear and tear on the car while rented or borrowed.
And finally, among friends and relatives, people are not usually particular about small discrepancies in fuel, and therefore such additions are not treated as ribbis at all.
All of this relates to the case of a car with fuel.
With regard to a WAZE device and its battery:
Since this is a case of borrowing or renting (and not a monetary loan), we have already clarified that ribbis concerns do not apply. Additionally, the electricity is provided as a gift, not with the expectation that it be returned full or empty—unlike the fuel in a car, which is generally expected to be repaid. People also generally do not care about the charge level of a returned device, and there’s effectively no market value associated with recharging such devices, especially when charging it in a car, which incurs no additional cost.
Even if there were a theoretical concern of ribbis here, it is entirely clear that the person is not returning the device with a fuller battery due to the loan, and therefore, there is absolutely no concern of ribbis in this case.
Next week, b’ezras Hashem, we will address a fascinating question sent from Dallas regarding a new restaurant that charges 3% extra for customers paying by credit card, while cash customers pay a lower price. The restaurant claims the extra charge covers their expenses for using the credit card. Would this be considered ribbis? B’siyata d’Shmaya, we will discuss this next week.
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