Parshas Shemini 5785 – Intriguing Questions & Answers

Selling Seforim to a Non-Jewish Library

Q: I was asked the following question by someone who saw my set of Seforim “Ohel Yaakov” in the library of a famous university named “Princeton” in the USA: How could I agree to sell them my Seforim for their library, given that there are many non-Jews there, and a non-Jew might learn Torah from my Sefer. This would seemingly violate the prohibition of “lifnei iver,” by causing the non-Jew to transgress the prohibition of learning Torah, as stated in the Gemara in Chagigah (13a), that it is forbidden to teach Torah to a non-Jew?

A: I replied to him that there is no concern in such a case, as I will explain bs”d.

First, let us try to understand the prohibition of teaching Torah to a non-Jew. The Gemara in Chagigah states that it is forbidden to teach Torah to a non-Jew, as it says (Tehillim 147), “לא עשה כן לכל גוי ומשפטים בל ידעום, He has not done so for any nation; His judgments, they do not know them.” According to most Poskim, this prohibition is m’doraisa, and it is a great sin. This is also an issue of lifnei iveir, since it is forbidden for the non-Jew to learn Torah as well.

Tosafos there cites the Gemara in Sanhedrin (59a) that a non-Jew who engages in Torah study is liable to death, as it says, “תורה צוה לנו משה מאורשה—it is an inheritance for us and not for them.” Even when there are concerns for shalom malchus, one is still not allowed to teach Torah to non-Jews. See Tosafos in Bava Kamma (38a) and Yam Shel Shlomo there.

However, the Acharonim write that this prohibition applies only when one’s intention is to transmit the Torah to a non-Jew, but if one teaches Jews, it is not forbidden because a non-Jew happens to be there listening to the shiur. See Teshuvos Igros Moshe (Yoreh Deah 3:89) and Teshuvos Shevet HaKehati (4:324).

According to all the above, in our case, it seems clear that there is no prohibition to leave the Sefer or give the Sefer to a library of a university of non-Jews, and there is no concern of lifnei iveir by causing a non-Jew to stumble by learning Torah. Especially according to the Igros Moshe rules, that if one’s intention is not to teach them Torah, it is permitted, and even if they enter the shiur, there is no need to stop, and this is how the contemporary Poskim have ruled.

Afterwards, I saw in the Kovetz “Tel Talpios” the notes of Rav Mordechai Gross shlit”a, who quoted what he heard from Rav Elyashiv ztz”l, regarding a library of non-Jews, whether one should be concerned lifnei iveir should a non-Jew learn from one of the Seforim. He replied that it is permitted and is not considered lifnei iveir. It appears that his rationale to permit is that the book is merely intended to be looked at—if at all—and therefore we are not concerned when sending or selling books to such a library, since we are not actually teaching them Torah.

If One Served Milchig Ice Cream at a Fleishig Meal and Later Discovered It — Must They Inform the Guests?

Q: I have been asked several times about cases where hosts invited guests to a Shabbos meal, or a Sheva Brachos or similar event, and the meal was fleishig. They bought what they thought was pareve ice cream to serve as dessert for the meal. After the guests ate the dessert, the hostess, while cleaning in the kitchen, saw the container in the trash can with the words “chalavi” written in large letters, and she was shocked—how could she have served milchig ice cream to her guests after a fleishig meal? Now the question arises: since she caused the guests to eat milchigs within the time frame of eating fleishigs, is she obligated to inform them so they can do teshuvah for this?

A: Before responding to our case about whether one must inform them, we should clarify which prohibition was violated, or perhaps this is merely a harchakah. Indeed, the Gemara in Chullin (105a), codified in Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 89:1), states that Chazal prohibited eating dairy products within six hours after eating meat. This is an issur d’rabbanan as a matter of harchakah, as the issur d’oraisa of basar b’chalav applies only if the meat and milk were cooked together over fire. Therefore, even if one eats meat and dairy together when they are cold, one only violates an issur d’rabbanan. Thus, in our case, the guests were caused to violate an issur d’rabbanan. The question is whether we need to inform them when they only violated an issur d’rabbanan.

The opinion of the Nesivos HaMishpat (234, Biurim, 3) is well-known, that if someone transgressed an issur d’rabbanan b’shogeig, no kaparah is needed. Since no issur d’oraisa was violated here, we can say that no kaparah—and thereby no teshuvah—is needed. Based on this principle, he explains there that in a case where someone purchased food that was forbidden m’derabbanan and paid the price of kosher food for it and ate it, the seller does not need to refund the difference between the price of kosher and treif food, because the buyer is considered to have benefited as if they had eaten kosher food.

The reason for this is that with issurei d’oraisa, the prohibition applies to the cheftza itself, and therefore one who eats it even unknowingly is considered to have eaten inherently forbidden food. But regarding issurei d’rabbanan, the prohibition doesn’t apply to the cheftza itself, but rather only to the gavra upon whom the prohibition to eat falls, while the food itself remains like kosher food. Therefore, one who eats it is only considered to have transgressed that which Chazal forbade them to eat, and thus when done b’shogeg, it is not considered a transgression of divrei Chachamim. This is the explanation of the Nesivos according to HaGaon Rav Elchanan Wasserman hy”d, in his sefer Kovetz Ha’aros (8:15). He adds that the reason that a shogeg needs kaparah is not only because the person was not careful enough in general, but specifically because it is an issur cheftza, they should have been more careful. Therefore, with issurei d’rabbanan that are only prohibitions on the gavra, the issue of why they weren’t careful enough doesn’t apply, and therefore no kaparah is needed at all.

According to this, in our case where they transgressed an issur d’rabbanan b’shogeg, there is no michshol here at all, and no kaparah is needed. Therefore, the one who caused this did not violate lifnei iveir, because they did not cause their fellow to stumble. This has also been established as the halacha in other sifrei acharonim.

Although some argue and take a more stringent approach, one may be lenient, especially considering that this is a matter of kavod habriyos in an issur d’rabbanan, as it would be a great embarrassment for her to have to tell everyone.

Is It Permissible to Place Shabbos Newsletters in the Garbage or Must They Be Placed in Genizah?

Q: I have been asked frequently about what is common in our times — the abundance of newsletters published in honor of Shabbos Kodesh, such as this weekly newsletter of sheilos v’teshuvos. Baruch Hashem, many people are able to increase their learning of Torah and halacha throughout Shabbos because of these numerous newsletters. However, in every shul large piles of Torah newsletters accumulate, and the question arises whether one must place all of them in genizah after learning from them. Is there any eitzah to avoid requiring genizah, and is there a difference if one has already learned from the newsletters or not? For example, it is common for a shul to receive a large pile of newsletters on Thursday or Friday — can one be lenient before learning from them to wrap them in a bag and place them in the garbage, so that people can take as they wish, and the rest will be thrown out? This requires further investigation.

A: I have already elaborated on all these matters in my sefer Ohel Yaakov “Hilchos Kavod U’Kedushas Sifrei Kodesh,”and we will briefly explain the halachah l’maaseh. Based on the Gemara in Megillah (26a), we learn that a Sefer Torah that is worn out should be buried near a talmid chacham, and the Gemara in Shabbos (115a) teaches that all kisvei hakodesh must be saved from a fire, whether they are read from or not, and even though they are written in any language, they require genizah. This is also brought as halacha in Yoreh Deah (282) and in the Mishnah Berurah (154). Therefore, since all kisvei hakodesh require genizah, it would seem that all the newsletters that contain divrei Torah require genizah.

However, perhaps one can be lenient here for several reasons:

1. Regarding printed kisvei kodesh in our times, perhaps they are less stringent.

2. Furthermore, perhaps one can be more lenient with newsletters that have not yet been learned from, such as those that arrived at the shul but were not studied.

3. One can also consider whether we can be lenient since the writing was not done for permanent keeping, perhaps it is similar to writing with intent to erase, which some are lenient about.

Let us briefly explain these considerations.

Regarding the kedushah of books printed by press, we have already accepted the ruling of the Mishnah Berurah (240:29) that they have kedushah, and one should be stringent for the opinion of the Taz (Yoreh Deah 271:8), that there is no difference between writing by pressing a pen to paper and printing, which presses the paper onto lead letters. The Mishnah Berurah also writes this (40:4), but concludes that the Chavos Yair is lenient about this, and therefore in a shas hadchak, one may be lenient. According to this, if the cleaning of newsletters involves excessive trouble similar to what would be defined as a shas hadchak, some are lenient to place them in a bag before throwing them into the garbage, and they have upon what to rely if indeed it is a matter of shas hadchak.

It is known that several gedolei ha’acharonim write that if one has not yet learned from a printed sefer kodesh, kedushah has not yet taken effect on it. This is cited from the Chofetz Chaim, and also appears to be the view of Shu”t Avnei Nezer (Orach Chaim §42). According to this, HaGaon Rav Moshe Sternbuch shlit”a rules that Shabbos newsletters that arrive at the shul before they are read may be wrapped in a plastic bag and placed in the garbage.

Additionally, one can consider whether the fact that these newsletters were not written for permanent keeping can be added as a reason for leniency. A few weeks ago, we brought a question from the Tashbatz (1:2) cited in Yoreh Deah (283:2), that the practice of teachers to write pesukim on the board and erase them is permitted since they wrote them with the intent to erase them, and they are not considered divrei kodesh. According to this, one could also consider being lenient. However, it would seem that one cannot apply the words of the Tashbatz here, because the writing for students was intended for actual erasure, as opposed to the newsletters. It would also appear from Igros Moshe (Yoreh Deah §75) that he would be stringent in our case and they require genizah.

In conclusion: One who can place all the newsletters found in the shul in genizah, whether they have been learned from or not, tavo alav brachah. However, since this may involve excessive tirchah, to the point of shas hadchak, one can rely on the lenient opinions to wrap them in a plastic bag and then throw them into the garbage. This is especially true given the several reasons for leniency we mentioned above, particularly when they have not yet been learned from. Since these are questions of kedushas kisvei hakodesh, it is worthwhile for each person to clarify with their Rav how to act practically.